64 2011 Quebec Journal of International Law (Special Edition) question directly relates to the protection of the deceased’s right to benefit from a dignified burial, even if, in practice, this right is protected through the family’s right to the truth and results from the combination of Convention Articles 8 and 25. Although, at death, the individual ceases to benefit from his rights, his body remains legally protected. The respect of the dead is an obligation owed to the living, which are the rights-holders. 20

A similar reasoning based on the vulnerability standard reappears in a series of judgments regarding various categories of beneficiaries of rights and freedoms. The Court systematically deduces a special need for protection tailored according to the vulnerabilities of certain groups which are particularly targeted. Children, indigenous peoples, women, and migrants are all such groups through whose lens the Court will interpret the extent and nature of the Convention''s rights. The Court protects their “ best interest”. Thus, the protection of the right to life from the perspective of vulnerable individuals is emphasized by the Inter-American Court when it rules on the rights of disabled individuals who, according to the Court and due to their vulnerability, should benefit from special protection in order to preserve their dignity. 21 Beyond the State’s special responsibility, rights and freedoms are generally defined according to their subject: the right to property protects indigenous communities’ collective property, 22 the “ family” extends to an individual’s various

Court has established the obligation of the State to investigate the facts while there is uncertainty about the fate of the person who has disappeared, and the need to provide a simple and prompt recourse in the case, with due guarantees. Following this interpretation, the Commission stated that this is a right of a society and that it is emerging as a principle of international law under the dynamic interpretation of human rights treaties and, specifically, Articles 1(1), 8, 25 and 13 of the American Convention.”

20Ibid., A. A. Cançado Trindade, Separate opinion, at para. 12 : “ Even though the juridical subjectivity of an individual ceases with his death (thus no longer being, when having died, a subject of law or

titulaire of rights and duties), his mortal remains– containing a corporeal parcel of humanity,– continue to be juridically protected […]. The respect to the mortal remains preserves the memory of the dead as well as the sentiments of the living (in particular his relatives or persons close to him) tied to him by links of affection,– this being the value juridically protected. In safeguarding the respect of the dead, also penal law gives concrete expression to a universal feeling of the human conscience. The respect for the dead is thus due– at the levels of both internal and international legal orders,– in the persons of the living.” See also at para. 13 : “ In fact, the respect for the dead is not an element entirely alien to the international judicial practice. It may be recalled that, in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 16 October 1975 on the Western Sahara, the Hague Court took into account the

modus vivendi, the cultural practices of the nomad populations of the Western Sahara, in affirming the right of these latter to self-determination. One of the elements, pointed out by the Tribunal, proper to the culture of the nomad tribes of the Western Sahara, was precisely the cult of the memory of the dead. In sum, the respect for the dead is due in the persons of the living, titulaires of rights and duties.” On this issue, see also A. A. Cançado Trindade, Separate opinion annexed to the Bámaca-Velásquez Case (Guatemala) (2002), Inter-Am. Ct. H. R., (Ser. C) No. 91, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights : 2002, OEA/ Ser. L/ V/ III. 57/ doc. 5 (2003) 20 [ Separate opinion annexed to the

Bámaca-Velásquez Case] ; A. A. Cançado Trindade, Separate opinion annexed to the Moiwana Community Case, supra note 16.

21Ximenes Lopes Case (Brazil) (2006) Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. C) No. 149, at para. 63, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights : 2006. at 21 online : Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. < http :// www. corteidh. or. cr/ docs/ informes/ 20063. pdf>.

22Indígena Yakye Axa Community Case (Paraguay) (2005), Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. C) No. 125, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights : 2005, at 8 online : Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. < http :// www. corteidh. or. cr/ docs/ informes/ Inf% 20anua% 202005% 20diag% 20ingles. indd. pdf> [ Indigenous Yakye Axa Community Case]. See also a very similar case : Girls Yean and Bosico Case