Résumé
M. C. Young — Nationalisme, ethnie et classe en Afrique : une rétrospective.
Ces trois notions ont, tour à tour, constitué les thèmes dominants des études africanistes au cours des trente dernières années — chacun de ces thèmes, avec sa méthode d’approche particulière, ne permettant que peu d’imbriques et de recouvrements. Une confrontation systématique de ces approches — et de leurs limites (vite atteintes) — avec les faits de l’histoire récente souligne tout à la fois leur utilité, leur complémentarité, et leurs insuffisances. L’analyse globale de la riche littérature sur ces thèmes génère plus de questions que de réponses, ce qui témoigne de son opportunité.
Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Class in Africa: A Retrospective*

Nationalism, ethnicity and class are themes which cumulatively delineate a vast tract of inquiry. As orienting foci of political action, as organizing ideologies of social organization and conflict, as pivots of analysis, this conceptual triad draws together much of the dynamic of post-war social process and political action in Africa. If a mildly latitudinarian definition of the three topics is adopted, their collective bibliography would include a large fraction of post-colonial Africanist social science, not to mention such other genres as African literature, biography, cinema and art.

Almost none of such an indiscriminate bibliography would bear a publication date more than three decades old. Each theme has acquired a retrospective dimension to its problematic: the nationalist chrysalis in early resistance to colonial occupation; ethnogenesis; precapitalist modes of production. As systematic objects of inquiry, they are all by-products of African independence.

Nationalism, ethnicity and class have for the most part functioned as separate modes of discourse, each attracting its own school of analysts. Their grouping in a single essay represents more of an integrative aspiration than a recognition of a constituted intellectual universe. Indeed, each theme forms a distinctive epistemology, partly founded upon a denial of the valence of the other two. Yet each would be enriched if the other two concepts were fully incorporated into its field of vision.

As major problematics, the three themes became salient in the sequence in which they appear in the title. Nationalism became central, not only as explicit focus of inquiry, but as inarticulate major premise

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of most Africanist scholarship, in the late 1950s. Ethnicity followed in the 1960s, as independence rendered more visible sub-national lines of cleavage. Class became central only in the 1970s, and remains so today. The sequence reflects both successive political conjunctures in Africa and elsewhere, and also transformations in the intellectual milieux, in Africa and the West, where ‘images of Africa’ were produced.

In political terms, independence struggle, with its concomitant transcendent focus upon nationalism, dominated everywhere in the 1950s, then became regionally focussed along a receding frontier: East, then Central, finally Southern Africa. The ethnicity debate was then awakened, fuelled not only by the relatively high visibility of mobilized and politicized ethnicity in much of post-colonial Africa, but also by the impact of cultural pluralism in independent Asia, the erosion of the credibility of the ‘melting pot’ metaphor in the United States, new stirrings among Europe’s submerged ‘nationalities’, and the realization that Stalinism had temporarily silenced but not ‘solved’ the Soviet nationalities question. By the late 1960s, class had forced itself upon the agenda, as the rapidly growing inequalities, and transparent dissensus between ruling and subordinate groups, could no longer be denied.

In the intellectual realm, conjuncture also played its part in the sequencing. In the 1950s and early 1960s, a liberal orthodoxy suffused with ‘the idea of progress’ held sway, especially in Anglo-American scholarship (Almond, Chodorow & Pearce 1982). Nationalism was a particularly congenial partner; somewhat more uncomfortable was the encounter with ethnicity, which offended some of the premises of the liberal persuasion, but not as jarringly as class-based paradigms. The full impact of class focus, in its various guises, came not only as a consequence of evolving political economy within Africa, but also through the resurrection of Western Marxism, and the emergence of a vigorous intellectual Marxism within the African academy. Official Soviet Marxism, tainted and twisted by its Stalinist uses, had little impact upon understandings of Africa outside its sphere of hegemony. A significant Marxist intellectual tradition also existed in France, indeed yielding studies of high value in the 1950s and 1960s such as Suret-Canale (1964). But the removal of the dead hand of Stalinist orthodoxy opened the way for a remarkable renaissance of Marxist analysis, with class as centerpiece (Anderson 1976; Parkin 1979). Coincident with the resurgence of Western Marxism, and its deepening in the African intellectual world, was the breach of the self-confidence of liberal scholarship triggered by the Vietnam war and allied student revolts. A durable division between liberal and radical schools of scholarship emerged, with paradigms as newly-contested terrain (Chilcote 1981; Staniland 1985).

The scope of each of the three topics, taken individually, does not permit within the space constraints of this essay encyclopedic treatment. Ideally, we would focus upon the zones of encounter between the three
topics, and the issues—a number unresolved—they pose for each other; however, these points of intersection are surprisingly limited. The distinctiveness of each theme of discourse requires separate discussion.

Although separate, the three topics are not fully equal. Class, once firmly inscribed on the agenda for all schools of analysis by the 1970s, has yielded a phenomenal volume of works, and range of theoretical variation. This perhaps reflects the far richer philosophical and social science heritage upon which its Marxist variants in particular may draw, and the enduring power of its canonical texts, as well as their contradictions. Africa offers at once a new stage for the re-enactment of earlier dialogues, and a distinctive environment whose particularities spawn original statements inspired by older models, as well as imaginative reinterpretations of a received dialectic. As Leo (1984: 8) observes, ‘We already have more Marxist theory than anyone has time to read’. Not only more, but many: Marxist analysis in Africa, with the demise of any exemplary center for hegemonic interpretation, has shattered into literally dozens of regional and topical variants. To ferret out every nuance in these debates would be a task intimidating to the masters of historical materialism, and is certainly beyond the reach of this article. We do, however, wish to take cognizance of major approaches to gaining conceptual purchase over class. Our efforts are facilitated by the fact that aspects of the class issue have been explored in recent major essays in the Social Science Research Council (ssrc) series (Cooper 1981; Lonsdale 1981; Freund 1984; Berry 1984a). We do not wish to retrace the paths followed in these exemplary articles.

Africa: Background to Nationalism

In contrast to the unfolding and in many respects unresolved debate on class, nationalism and ethnicity are themes which have achieved relative analytical closure. The truly seminal contributions now lie some time in the past; although the early paradigmatic statements have been subject to revision as the phenomena to which they refer have evolved, one encounters relatively few major new contributions in recent years. This observation holds with particular force for the theory of nationalism, as applied to Africa.

Nationalism as a field of inquiry emerged in intimate symbiosis with the rise of independence movements in Africa. It entered and swiftly conquered the space opened up by the discrediting of imperial history and colonial science, although some of the finest texts of the latter date from the end of its era (Hailey 1957). It is worth a moment’s pause to recollect the suddenness of this development. Apter (1963: x) in his preface to a revised edition of a first generation classic notes that, when he arrived in Gold Coast in 1952, he was assured that a long time would pass
before African territories became independent, and that academic employment prospects were bleak for African specialists. Not till 1959 did London decide to quickly cede independence to the remaining African territories under its direct rule, with corresponding French and Belgian decisions dating from the same moment (and of course the Portuguese resisting the tides of history for fifteen additional years). This is to set beside the 1944 Brazzaville Conference declaration of French colonial officials that self-government ‘now or in the future’ was to be excluded, the shock waves in Belgium in 1956 at the publication by a little-known professor of a thirty-year plan for ‘emancipation’ of Belgian Africa (Van Bilsen 1958), or British official expectations persisting into the late 1950s that independence for Kenya and Tanganyika lay fifteen to thirty years in the future.

The earliest statements of synthesis were above all empirically intertwined with the African liberation struggle on the ground. The most influential, the magistral study by Hodgkin (1956), used protest as its organizing concept, weaving together in its vision of nationalism all visible forms of overt anticolonial action. The generation of scholarship devoted to nationalism was led by analysts in close personal contact with the epic leaders of anticolonial action, who largely shared their hopes and their vision of a future whose banners were emblazoned with freedom, liberation, egalitarianism, and prosperity.

In its initial representations, nationalism was of inchoate form. Its negative point of definitional reference, in colonial oppression, was clear enough, and with little effort its origins in this sense could be pushed back to the turn of the century and beyond. But nationalism is by any definition an ideology asserting collective and solidary goals and entitlements for some community; as the debate over nationalism was inaugurated, the specification of this community remained indeterminate. Four levels of alternative solidarity suggested themselves: pan-Africa; regional constellations (Maghreb, Nile valley, East Africa, Afrique Occidentale Française, Belgian Africa) sharing a common colonial legacy; territorial, and ethno-regional. Initial ventures at analytical definition shrank from clearly choosing between these alternative modes of community. Hailey (1957: 252-253) simply equates nationalism with ‘Africanism’, as a reaction ‘against the dominance of Europeans in political and economic affairs’, suffused with a vocation for self-determination and African rule (but not pan-Africanism). Hodgkin (1956: 23), in his action-oriented definition, bestows the nationalist label upon ‘any organization or group that explicitly asserts the rights, claims and aspirations of a given African society (from the level of the language-group to that of “pan-Africa”) in opposition to European authority, whatever its institutional form and objectives’. History supplied the quietus to the definitional debate: by 1960, events had validated the Coleman formulation
(1954), focusing upon political organizations seeking self-government for recognizable African nations-to-be, intending by this notion essentially the extant territories.

The essentially empirical bent, and anticolonial protest focus of early studies of nationalism in Africa sharply demarcate them from the classical studies of nationalism elsewhere (Hayes 1931; Kohn 1944). These and other older works located nationalism largely in the realm of intellectual history: the riddle to be solved was how a primal idea of such potent force could have been constructed. Movements were to be examined, but transcendent was their propelling spirit. Moreover, there were bestial elements in the spirit, ultimately decanting into fascism, militarism, chauvinism, and aggression. None of this ambivalence is encountered in the study of African nationalism; it was beneficent and irresistible historical force, chosen instrument of progress. Emerson (1960: 378-379), in the most comprehensive inquest of the 1960 era into African and Asian nationalism of that time, conceding the cogency of a Toynbee imprecation of Western nationalism as 'this disastrous corruption poisoning the political life', concludes that Afro-Asian nationalism 'intrudes itself not only with an aura of inevitability but also as the bearer of positive goods'.

There were, however, few luminary texts to draw the study of African nationalism in the direction of ideas. There was discourse, in swelling quantities: initially, the raw, populist, not infrequently demagogic discourse of the hustings, where the new political generation tormented their oppressors with protest as armed verb. The ideas articulated were straightforward enough, and required no ornate elaboration: liberation, African rights, self-rule, uplift. Nationalism in Africa of the 1950s was quintessentially action, and thus organized protest as analytical focus was commanded by circumstance. Hodgkin (1956: 191-206), for example, in his epic study cites but a dozen African texts which might be considered intellectual formulations of an idea of nationalism. Of these, almost half really belong to the domain of ethnic charters.

As African nationalism became a potent force, its leaders, and students, did seek out its history, and influential texts began to accumulate. The most visible antecedent was the idea of pan-Africanism, given institutional expression in the series of international conferences extending back to 1900; in this rich history, even though largely the creation of Africans of the diaspora until 1945, the specific theme of African liberation drew upon the energies of a broader response to racial oppression in the Western world (Padmore 1956; DuBois 1903, 1947; Garvey 1923). The doctrine

1. Indeed, Emerson (1942) had made this point long before, in a volume concerned with Asian nationalism.
2. Sir Apolo Kagwa (Buganda), Alexis Kagame (royalist Tutsi), Samuel Johnson (Yoruba), J. M. Serbah (Fanti), J. B. Danquah (Ashanti).
of pan-Africanism was at once a global creed of racial solidarity, a doctrine of shared solidarity in the task of freeing all of Africa from alien rule, and—for a visionary though initially influential minority—an imperative of continental unification. When, following the Manchester pan-African Conference of 1945, with Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta as moving figures, pan-Africanism became predominately focussed upon African liberation, its exalting ambitions attracted several major chroniclers (Legum 1962; Thompson 1969; Mazrui 1967). The domestication of the doctrine as a mere formal ideology of a cartel of States, following the 1963 creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), gradually eroded its motivating force; the disappointments of the OAU in action dissipated the passions of its initial vocation, and rendered it too insipid a topic to attract any major study for a number of years.

In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of themes were elaborated which added to the intellectual corpus of nationalism. Several influential works set forth an African refutation of the condescending racialist ideologies which were associated with colonial rule, themselves ably chronicled by Curtin (1964) and W. B. Cohen (1980). Cheikh Anta Diop (1965) offered a disputable but ideologically important global reinterpretation of history, claiming a Black Egypt as epicenter for early civilization. Two poet-politicians, Aimé Césaire (1956) and Léopold Senghor (1964), constructed the theory of négritude, asserting a unique set of naturalist, non-materialist values juxtaposed as positive contrasts to the hedonism and materialism undergirding the self-proclaimed superiority of Western civilization (Markovitz 1969). A Belgian Franciscan missionary, Father Placide Tempels (1945), had constructed, on the basis of an alien ethnographic exegesis of pastoral intent drawn from his missionary service amongst the Shaba (Zaire) Luba, a philosophic text which had considerable resonance in its polemical plea for recognizing an intellectually serious system of African thought (Mataczynski 1986). Whatever their reservations about the Tempels motivations, the organ of Paris-based African nationalism, Présence africaine, found sufficient congruence with the themes they were seeking to lead them to publish it. Although the philosophical methodology of Tempels has its critics (MacGaffey 1981; Hountondji 1970), its place in the construction of nationalist ideology is indisputable. As a leading Zairian nationalist intellectual, Kalanda (1967: 150-151) argued two decades later, ‘To this day, we have not read any criticism demonstrating that the author of Bantu Philosophy has exaggerated the generality of his study’, adding, ‘Educated Africans who [...] have read this book recognize in it their own philosophy [...] the dreamed-for occasion to exalt their négritude, the possibility of transcending [...] inferiority inflicted, of denying the state of “savagery”’. Its influence is also perceptible in Abraham (1962), and the rather extravagant Nkrumah venture (1964) in philosophical nationalism, Consciencism.
The profound impact, individual and collective, of colonial oppression found singularly powerful voice in the moving texts of Frantz Fanon who, as a West Indian psychiatrist working in Martinique, then Algeria, was strategically placed to both observe and articulate this phenomenon. While the reception of his thought in the Anglophonic world awaited the translation of this major works in the 1960s, the lyrical force of his anatomy of the human cost of colonial subjugation made his work a central factor in the nationalist ferment of the 1950s in both Mahgreb and sub-Saharan Francophone intellectual milieux (Fanon 1952, 1961; Caute 1970; Bouvier 1971; Gendzier 1973). He carried to far more implacable conclusion a line of psychological interpretation given influential statement by Albert Memmi (1957), while adding to it a loosely marxisante perception of historical process.

A third set of texts addressed the concept of liberation, represented as a revolutionary transformation. The pre-eminent statements won authenticity by the visibility of their authors. Thus the audience of Nasser’s major statement, Egypt’s Liberation: Philosophy of the Revolution (1955) was won far more by the aggressive, anti-imperial, radical action to which he became committed following the 1956 Suez crisis, and the sanctuary for African nationalists and powerful radio voice Cairo provided for time in the late 1950s, than the subtlety or sophistication of his contribution to nationalist thought. Indeed, those who actually read the work discovered surprisingly paternalistic notions of Africa and Egypt’s role in the ‘third circle’. Nkrumah (1961, 1964), once installed in power, systematically sought to supply triumphant Ghanaian nationalism with suitable texts. His themes are conventional: the appropriation of an historical charter, the centrality of independence, the vocation of African liberation, the promise of swift development. Portentous of a future decay of the populist resonance of nationalism were the titles; his autobiography was entitled Ghana, an ultimately perilous conflation of personality and policy (Nkrumah 1959), while his account of his initial years in power is sub-titled A Statement of African Ideology (Nkrumah 1961).

Probably the most seminal contributer to the theory of African nationalism as ideology of liberation was Amilcar Cabral (1969). The scope of his audience and impact partly is traceable to the drama of the Guinea Bissau independence struggle: the closest approximation, in the annals of the conquest of independence, to an actual military victory of insurgent forces. But more than this was involved; Cabral, building upon a Marxist intellectual formation, but not a commitment to Marxism as obligatory epistemology, addressed in pragmatic terms the character of the society whose revolutionary organization was required. The lucidity of his exposition of the class and ethnic patterns, and the logic of his revolutionary strategy, always defined with the farther shore of
post-colonial aspirations held firmly in view, gave his testament a luminous far exceeding the scope of his country (Nzongola 1984b). Cabral apparently did not regard his own views as particularly original (Chabal 1981: 37), but the sophistication of his thought took nationalist discourse well beyond the 1960 debate (Bienen 1977), even though most of his writings were composed for specific action-focused party purposes (Chabal 1981: 31).

By the 1960s, nationalism was thus constituted as political discourse, as well as practical action. This paved the way for a projection backwards of African intellectual history, to uncover the nationalism latent within the works of 19th-century African travellers, schoolmen, clergy, and Statesmen (July 1967). Thus viewed, such remarkable individuals as James Africanus Beale Horton and Edward Blyden were, like Monsieur Jourdain, speaking nationalist prose without full awareness of its ultimate finality. The emergence of the African novel—with its frequently highly-charged political content—likewise could be assimilated into the nationalist heritage as cultural foundation (Wauthier 1966; Kesteloot 1974). Many of the most influential novelists readily lent themselves to such an interpretation: Mongo Beti (1956, 1957); Ousmane Sembene (1962); Peter Abrahams (1954, 1956); James Ngugi (1967), to cite but a few.

Nationalism, by the early 1960s, was transcendent as political action, and well advanced in its emergence as a conscious ideology. A third pillar to its dominance was its standing as inarticulate major premise in the production of scholarly knowledge. Nationalism, we would argue, was not only the primary object of inquiry, but also a pervasive paradigm, far more influential than the loose-knit assortment of perspectives collectively labelled by their adversaries as ‘modernization theory’.

Nationalism as Paradigm

When self-consciously Africanist scholarship was initiated, in the 1950s, it confronted two ‘interpellations’: African socio-political reality, and the received body of official knowledge. The former interrogation led necessarily to a profound invalidation of the latter. History had largely been written with the subliminal perspective of European rule as historical culmination; thus its major concerns had been narration of the activities of Europeans in Africa. Other fields were to varying degrees components of ‘colonial science’, pointed towards paternalistic reform of colonial administration. Only anthropologists were focussed upon African society, and most works of enduring value came from this much-maligned discipline. But anthropological inquiry as well was textured by the framework of domination within which it occurred, and the inherent
difficulty of applying *ceteris paribus* assumptions to the brooding omnipresence of the colonial State. The emergence of nationalism brought a quite sudden paradigm shift, in the Kuhnian sense; virtually overnight, in the middle 1950s, nationalism moved from external interpellation to internalized paradigm.

Particularly influential, in this transformation, were—in addition to Hodgkin—the works of Coleman (1958), Apter (1963), Wallerstein (1961), and Morgenthau (1964). Crucial to all these contributions—and others that might be cited in other fields—was the enthronement of nationalism as central socio-historical process. Documents and evidence of colonial origin were viewed with a new suspicion; materials of direct African provenance—largely ignored in the past—received new attention. Historians developed the technique of scientific use of oral history, anthropologists turned their attention to the new towns, as central places of the crucible of change. Political scientists sought out nationalist organizers, party ephemera, political tracts, and African newspapers.

The impact of nationalism as paradigm on the selection of field of inquiry was pervasive. Historians abandoned the colonial era—which remains inadequately scrutinized—for the precolonial past, where the achievements of Africa and richness of its cultural heritage could be authenticated. To this task the first generation of African historians eagerly lent their hand; from this vast collective effort has come a now-rich literature, particularly effective in its coverage of the time periods relatively accessible to the new methodologies, the 18th and 19th centuries. For political scientists, the political party was viewed as the quintessential focus of politics. It was the highest form of nationalist organization. A generation of scholarship was directed to investigation of politics through the party prism (Sklar 1963; Weiss 1967; Bienen 1970; Coleman & Rosberg 1964; Lemarchand 1964; Zolberg 1964; Hodgkin 1961). Nationalism even spilled over into the early phases of the ‘mode of production’ debate, to which we will return. C. Coquery-Vidrovitch (1985: 13), in abandoning her earlier concept of an ‘African mode of production’, suggests wryly that—in retrospect—it was a conjunctural notion related to the necessity of ‘affirmation of the very existence of African societies and history’.

The political party focus yielded an abundant harvest of insights and information. The best of these studies, such as Coleman (1958), Morgenthau (1964), Sklar (1963), or Joseph (1977), were masterly monographs. Nearly all presumed that parties were invested with a populist mission of popular mobilization—or, in the structural-functional vocabulary of the day, that they performed a function of political integration. But there were important differences of emphasis. Studies initiated in the

3. For an admirable tabulation of themes in political science, see the quarter century review by Coleman & Halisi 1983.
terminal colonial period tended to presume a competitive framework in which elections were important; such assumptions did not long survive independence. This issue was hinged to another, a typological debate as to the range of variation in party forms, and their socio-political implications. The most widely invoked dichotomy between ‘mass’ and ‘cadre’, ‘patron’ or ‘congress’ parties, harking back to a distinction originating in the then recent Duverger classic (1954) on political parties. An initially influential current, whose most eloquent spokesmen were Wallerstein (1961) and Morgenthau (1964), held that nationalism was most effectively vehicled by a mass single party, exemplified by the Convention People’s Party (CPP), the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), and the Union Soudanaise (US). Wallerstein (1961: 154) suggested that, ‘African nationalists [...] were no longer ashamed of the fact that these institutions bore only an outward resemblance to the Western parliamentary system [...] they now proclaimed these institutions as a peculiarly African contribution to the theory of democratic society’. Morgenthau (1964) wove these arguments into a well-elaborated theoretical defense of the mass single party as a potentially democratic form, echoing claims which by 1960 were widely expressed in nationalist political discourse by Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, Julius Nyerere, Habib Bourguiba, and others. The claims for the democratic mass single party as a plausible, long-term mechanism for institutionalizing the genuine protest enthusiasms of anticolonial mobilization did not long survive. Kilson (1963) detected the authoritarian impulses increasingly apparent beneath the ‘democratic mass single party’ facade. Zolberg (1966) adduced compelling evidence that the ‘mass’ character had been overdrawn, while Lewis (1965: 63), in a provocative tract, scathingly dismissed the single party as no more natural to Africa ‘than cancer is to man’. Wallerstein (1966), meanwhile, redefined single-party system as a no party model, before redirecting his energies to the construction of a wholly different paradigm.

Other issues in the early debate on nationalist parties concerned the social composition, and the character of the leader-follower nexus. Most studies took for granted an isomorphic relationship between nationalism and parties. Their leaders were presumed to derive from a new, populist elite which was ‘modern’ yet detached from the colonial establishment; the notion of a central societal dichotomy between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ had a powerful hold upon the academic imagination. Leaders were more or less nationalist to the degree they shared its radical, populist doctrinal version, implicitly equated with modernization. For most, the urban sphere was the privileged womb of ‘modernity’; thus the popular sectors of the cities were a critical support base. The urban-centered view was challenged by Weiss (1967), who argued, based on evidence from southwestern Zaire, that ‘rural radicalism’ was the driving social force in nationalism; the nationalist leaders, far from mobilizing the
countryside, tried with indifferent success to tame and channel the surging energies from below. This reading of Kwilu at the time of independence was persuasively documented; less clear was the generality of 'rural radicalism', or its temporal depth.

Sklar (1963) maintained, in contrast, that the critical element in the nationalist party was a 'rising class' of ambitious, thrusting persons, 'engaged in class action and characterized by a growing sense of class consciousness'. Their membership was defined by high-status occupation, income, education, and enterprise ownership (*ibid.*: 480-481). Although the class concept is diffuse, Sklar prefigured better than most the future lines of politics. Owusu (1970) went further to portray nationalist politics as an intense struggle for personal rewards on the part of the 'rising class' and its clientele. In this analysis, the autonomous force of nationalism as transformative doctrine vanishes.

An important sub-theme induced by the paradigm of nationalism was careful re-examination of resistance movements and episodes, now perceived as antecedents. Such epochal movements and leaders as the Mahdiyya in Sudan, Mohammed Abdallah Hassan in Somalia, Maji-Maji in Tanzania, Abd el-Kader in Algeria all assumed a new significance, and were reinterpreted in ways often containing an implicit modern-traditional dichotomy. Innovation in leadership, in social integration, and in ideology were stressed. The transformative power of the nationalist paradigm is well illustrated by the Rosberg and Nottingham study (1965) of the 'Mau Mau' episode in Kenyan nationalism. To place 'Mau Mau' in the context of nationalism at once takes us beyond sterile notions of atavistic reaction embodied in sundry colonial reports, to locate the forest fighters in a broader social context. Representative of the originality and thrust of this analytical school is the Ranger study (1967) of the Shona-Ndebele revolts, which argues the crucial role of novel and socially integrative leadership supplied by religious figures.

The uprisings involved 'revolutionary doctrines' supplied by shrine leaders facilitating supra-ethnic mobilization. The Ranger thesis has been subjected to challenge (Beach 1979; Cobbing 1977), and possibly a robust nationalist ethos is reflected in its interpretations. Similar themes are present in the important collection on protest movements by Rotberg and Mazrui (1970).

Religious movements as well were thus swept into the receptacle of nationalism. In the fertile field of religious expression, there was an ample supply of movements which lent themselves to reinterpretation through the prism of nationalism. The rapid spread of Christianity and Islam in the last century in symbiotic interaction with other African religions offered a rich choice in idiom, role, theology, and prophecy; in many places, all three within ideological reach. Oppression, and for
much of the colonial period, in many places, misfortune on a colossal scale (human and livestock epidemics, forced conscription, diverse impositions) supplied a context.

The paradigm of nationalism (mingled with a functionalist reason) permitted a causal junction between the two, suggested in a number of monographs on specific prophetic, millenarian, separatist, or Islamic revival movements (Sundkler 1948; Andersson 1958; Balandier 1953; Haliburton 1971; Fields 1985). This was generalized into a broad theory of unorthodox religious expression as a dimension, or a stage, in the evolution of nationalism, both through the influence of comparative studies founded upon extra-African cases (Cohn 1961; Hobsbawm 1963), or through drawing upon the African cases in support of an overall theory of the religious vehicle as a response to oppression (Lanternari 1963; Worsley 1958).

The unadulterated nationalist interpretation of religious movements has come under sharp and well-deserved criticism. It flattens the multidimensional nature of the religious experience by forcing it through a secular filter. Thus traduced, religion becomes, as MacGaffey (1981: 230) observes, ‘an affliction that other people have, a bizarre form of discourse for which [. . .] only bizarre explanations come to hand’. The potent elixir of functionalist thought is indispensable to interpret Simon Kimbangu, whose message was moral rectitude, faith, and personal salvation, as primarily a precursor of Lumumba. Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Abdallah, the Sudanese Mahdi, becomes a nationalist only through retrospective reinterpretation, and historical function; Sanderson (1985: 618-619) points out that ‘there is no trace of Sudanese nationalism in the Mahdi’s propaganda or policy; on the contrary, he is at pains to emphasize the universal claims of his mission’. His religio-political action did, indeed, produce a State whose brief existence was decisive in the subsequent creation of a Sudanese State. This outcome was independent of his theology, functionally interpreted, or his intentions.

Other troubling social facts call into question the unidimensional political and nationalist interpretation of dissident religious movements. They continued to exist, or to emerge, after independence; Alice Lenshina and her Lumpa church in Zambia, and Muhammadu Marwa and the heterodox Islamic Maitatsine sect in Nigeria are but two examples. Barrett (1968), in his massive (5,000 cases) study of Christian schismatic churches in Africa, began with a problematic informed by the nationalist paradigm, but concluded that ‘independency’ was basically a religious phenomenon. From a culturalist perspective, Fernandez (1982) supplies a similar corrective.

The necessity for a modification and nuancing of the location of movements of religious revival and dissidence does not totally invalidate the pertinence of the linkage. It does call for a vigilant self-awareness of the risks and limits of often unconsciously functionalist analysis. Fur-
ther, the possible excesses of a purely nationalist paradigm were illuminated in the propensity to rip social phenomena from their cultural moorings. Indeed, by the time that Lanternari, Worsley, and Hobsbawm were subjected to critical interrogation, by cultural anthropologists and others, the intellectual force of the paradigm was already in decline.

Regional Variation in Nationalism

Nationalism in Africa, both in the academic mind and in African political discourse, had frequently been treated as if it were a single phenomenon; so has it been, thus far, in this essay. Regional variations of several sorts were, however, of considerable importance. The survival, in recognizable form, of the precolonial polity as a self-standing unit was of consequence in a few instances (Egypt, Morocco, Swaziland, arguably Tunisia and Lesotho, in decolonization politics Rwanda and Burundi). In the Somalia case, newly politicized sense of linguistic, cultural, and religious community provided an historical charter similar to those of self-determination movements in Eastern and Central Europe, absent in most African nationalism. Its legacy was an irredentism unique in Africa. The presence of significant immigrant communities, embedded in presumptively permanent niches in farming, commerce, or bureaucratic service, created a special problematic for nationalism, and raised the issue of its racial content.

Paris, London, Rome, and Lisbon were somewhat different intellectual milieux; the colonial States which the sundry metropoles spawned differed significantly—within the common imperatives of the vocation of domination—in their particular ideologies of rule. Nationalist thought—and to some extent analysis—reflected the specificities of an intellectual dialectic shaped by the particularities of the European metropole-African State diad. Political sequences played some part; nationalism acquired sufficient ideological and political force to impose decolonization first in North and West Africa; later interplays of the power transfer process were influenced by the experiences of the earlier ones. Mode of conquest of independence likewise played some part; nationalism formed in the crucible of armed revolutionary struggle (Algeria, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe) had a somewhat different texture and social composition, partly because it could survive only in rural bases. But the most important regional particularities—and the only ones we will pause to consider—are those of the Arab and Islamic northern rim, and the racial State of South Africa.

- The coincidence in the northern tier of States of anticolonial nationalism, territorial orientation, Arab cultural consciousness (for many), and Islamic heritage produced a distinctive pattern of nationalism. Egypt
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was a special case, often omitted from the African universe; it had been under continuous foreign rule since Alexander the Great. An early nationalism was clearly present in the 19th century, though ambiguous through its association with the State-building ventures of the (Albanian) khedives; by the time of British occupation a growing struggle had already emerged between indigenous Egyptians, now clear claimants to nationalism, and a ruling class primarily composed of Turks, Mamelukes, and Europeans. Decolonization was less of a single, focussed struggle, than a phased transition in stages from nominal sovereignty in 1922 until the final British withdrawal from Suez in 1955. Nationalist discourse was thus a singularly complex amalgam of many elements: Egyptian, Arab, Islamic, liberal, socialist, Middle Eastern, African (Safran 1958). The valence of these sundry elements has fluctuated over time.

The proximity of the Levant, and the shared cultural heritage, has brought an important ideological flow of debates and ideas from Damascus, Beirut, and Baghdad throughout North Africa; many among the North African intelligentsia studied or spent exile years in Cairo or the Levant. The radical nationalist thought embodied in the Ba’ath socialism thus had resonance; Nasserism, in its ascendant phase in the late 1950s and early 1960s, also had high standing, making—as Karpat (1968: 29) notes—‘Arabism’ its centerpiece, Egypt as its spokesman, and Islam as an emotional link but not a principle of political organization. The Palestinian issue was a constant orienting factor.

Arab nationalism has attracted extensive analysis, and has been treated much more as intellectual history, along the lines of the classical studies of European nationalism. Its first major chronicler, Antonius (1965), pursues a mode of analysis precisely parallel to Kohn (1944). Nationalism in Northern Africa, which utilizes Arabism, acquires a transnational vocation of many ambiguities, reflected in the abortive State unification schemes of its two primary voices, Nasser and Muammar al-Qadhafi. When Arabism as ideology of unification casts its eyes southward to what Nasser and al-Qadhafi tend to consider as the African hinterland, the complexity, multiplicity, and ambivalence of identities along the cultural and linguistic frontier on the southern Saharan fringes that demarcates the Arab zone comes into view (Nuseibah 1956; Carmichael 1967). Nasser (1955) sought to resolve these conundrums by his concept of the ‘three circles’ (Arab, Islamic, African). Al-Qadhafi offers a comprehensive populist (Jamahariya), radical, anti-imperialist concept of the Arab polity, with a heterodox Islamic cultural underpinning (al-Qadhafi 1979; Hajjar 1980, 1982). He also promotes a remarkable dilation of ‘Arab’ as cultural concept, extending its frontier well below the Sahara to incorporate numerous groups who fail to recognize themselves in al-Qadhafi’s national imagery.

Nationalism in the Arab tier has encountered growing difficulty, especially as post-colonial State ideology, in defining its relationship with
Islam. The domestication of Islam, as a partly free-floating ideological resource, and ready-made vehicle for articulation of discontent, is indispensable to nationalism, even in its role of anticolonial protest, and much more in post-colonial circumstances. No leader in Northern Africa—with the arguable exception of Gafar Nimeiri in his final year—nor any significant element in the State class wishes a rigorously Islamic State, along the model suggesting itself in Iran after the 1979 revolution. In the 1980s, a number of important developments have occurred in the adjustment of State nationalism to Islam: the Family Code in Algeria; the imposition of shari’ा in Sudan; its elevation in Egypt to standing as normative screen for legislative enactments. In spite of the vast outpouring of works concerned with contemporary political Islam, the full implications of these recent trends have yet to receive persuasive study in their relationship to nationalism in Northern Africa.

- South Africa represents another very special universe, for several reasons. The sequence issue at once occurs; the liberation struggle, of growing intensity, is far from over. Many episodes lie ahead, which will inevitably have a crucial impact upon the eventual form of nationalist political discourse. Moreover, the struggle is not anticolonial in the normal sense, but with a racial oligarchy equipped with international sovereignty. Further, the South African State itself is underpinned, since 1948, with a highly developed, exclusive, Herrenvolk nationalism associated with the Afrikaner community (Adam & Giliomee 1979; Moodie 1975).

The dialectics of ideology and struggle thus pose a series of unresolved dilemmas for participant and analyst. The interplay of race and class with nationalism is of unmatched importance, and finds different resolution in the various nationalist organizational forms. State ideology postulates race as the criterion for subjugation and oppression, a fundamental fact with which nationalist thought must grapple. Movements such as the Pan-Africanist Congress, and ‘Black Consciousness’ of the late 1970s, tilted towards race as the paramount principle of solidarity. Yet nationalism also faces the challenge of defining a post-liberation role for the White minority, which views itself as prescriptively present to a degree far beyond any other immigrant community in the power transfer process. Thus class as master metaphor for a solidarity of liberation has appeal, and has been important to the African National Congress (ANC). The presence of a small but long-standing South African Communist Party, influential in nationalist debate, and a larger segment of the

4. The liberation struggle in South Africa of course confronts a ruling racial oligarchy of colonial origin, resulting from European conquest, and maintains itself in power through the apparatus of a State initially fashioned as a vehicle for colonial rule. However, since 1910, rule as been exercised by a White oligarchy that views itself as indigenous and permanent.
intelligentsia and nationalist leadership drawn towards a Marxist orientation, provides philosophical resources to the class-centered concept of revolutionary nationalism.

Nationalism in South Africa, both in its organizational forms and ideological dilemmas, has been minutely chronicled, particularly for the period up to the escalation of repression at the beginning of the 1960s, driving the key organizations into exile and underground, and into a clandestine mode of operation (Lodge 1983; Nolutshungu 1982; Gerhart 1978; Walshe 1971). The sheer intensity of politics in South Africa, and the global attention they attract, ensure that the ideologies of nationalism will undergo continued flux and evolution, as a complex amalgam of liberation, race and class. The categories of ideological thought themselves are not fixed, as evidenced by the growing rejection by the 'Coloured' community of a label now seen as imposed upon them, although long accepted without question. The claim of the Black Consciousness movement that 'Black' was an ideological, rather than purely racial, term was another example; as Nolutshungu (1982: 193) observes, in a study sympathetic to this orientation, the 'criterion was not race in any ethnographic sense, nor even colour in any literal sense'. Whether such subtleties will survive the incandescent polarizations which seem to lie ahead is open to question; the key point, however, is that the challenge to analysis is much less a reconstruction of the origins and development of nationalism in South Africa—here we are well served—but to engage in a continuous process of revision, in function of changing circumstances.

Beyond South Africa, nationalism as object of inquiry has gone into eclipse. The tongue of discourse is—perhaps momentarily—stilled. Conjuncture doubtless plays its part; so dispiriting are the economic circumstances confronting most African States that the self-confidence exuded by an earlier discourse has vanished. As nationalist thought was assimilated into State ideology, it suffered the delegitimation of the State itself, and the silent processes of civil society disengagement from the public realm.

Academic analysis bears some responsibility for this state of affairs. Nationalism as paradigm overpowered its subject, and abetted the construction of an artificial image of Africa. The hagiographic treatment of the nationalist generation of the 1950s left one unprepared for their behavior in office. Hansen suggests that the humble memoir of Nkrumah's private secretary, Erica Powell, tells more about Nkrumah than anything in print at the moment; rather than charisma in instance of routinization, as Apter (1963) forecast, or the hero in history super-intending the birth of the new society, we had:

'... erratic decision-making, the countless intrigues [. . .] suspicions and conspiracies which seemed to consume the participants, and cloud their vision and goals, and the intensely personal nature of political conflict. In the end the machine comes
to consume its creators and those very close to it [...]. In all this it was the Special Branch which towered over all. It became the rule of the Special Branch. It is the tragic end of great man' (Hansen 1984: 126).

Similarly, the mass single-party populist democracy model promised far more than could be delivered. The disillusionment engendered by the single party metamorphosis into autocracy was a distant precursor of the mood of deep pessimism which grips much recent analysis, whose opening salvo was fired by Dumont (1962) in claiming Africa was off to a false start.

The heavy sense of disappointed expectations, which casts its pall over-nationalist discourse north of the Limpopo, perhaps helps explain not only its virtual disappearance as object of inquiry, but also its surprisingly limited impact on recent comparative studies of nationalism (Gellner 1983; Smith 1971; B. Anderson 1983). Breuilly (1982) is a major exception, but this is partly because he incorporates elements of ethnic self-consciousness into his concept of nationalism. More broadly, the vitality of nationalism owes much more to its clan as a politically motivating force than to the magnetism of its philosophy. As B. Anderson (1983: 14) remarks, at its moments of mobilization, nationalism achieves a social power which stands in contrast to its 'philosophical poverty and even incoherence. In other words, unlike most other isms, nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers’. Perhaps he gives too short shrift to the Hegels, Herders, and Renans; however nationalism, as discourse and ideology, does require a propitious psychological terrain.

The lack of staying power of post-colonial nationalist thought doubtless also relates to the relative absence of cultural content. In its most vital forms in other parts of the world, nationalism draws nourishment from the cultural resources that normally supply the inner core of ideology. Compare, for example, the lyrical tones of Jawaharlal Nehru’s major nationalist statement, whose title, The Discovery of India (1946), aptly locates anticolonial ideology as a voyage in cultural self-discovery, with the analogous works of Nkrumah (1959), and their strained appropriation of medieval moments of historical glory in some neighboring regions, and the contrast becomes clear. African culture as an ideological weapon was usable only in generalized, abstracted form, shorn of any ethnic specificity. The vocation of territorial unification embedded in anticolonial struggle denied to nationalism the emotive wellsprings which had supplied much of its energizing force in a number of other regions. ‘Imagined communities’ required a renewable flow of vitalizing sentiments; too much of the creative passion was bound up with uhuru itself, and drained away when territorial nationalism became fused with the ‘hegemonical projects’ (Bayard 1979; Callaghy 1984) of the post-colonial ruling class.
The impact of nationalism, however, is clearly visible in two post-colonial doctrinal realms: the reception of ‘dependency theory' in Africa in the 1970s, and the debate over development ideologies. Whatever the analytical flaws of dependency theory, its attractiveness as a perspective is unmistakably linked to its subliminal incorporation of nationalism in its stigmatization of a malevolent ‘world capitalist system' as the engine of African underdevelopment. Rodney, who launched the ‘dependency' debate with his powerful tract, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972), developed his blend of radical, Marxist, and nationalist themes in a Dar es-Salaam intellectual community whose frame of reference was socialism and anti-imperialism. For Wallerstein (1974), the elaboration of ‘world system theory' as a more subtle and sophisticated outgrowth of the dependency paradigm was a natural progression from his early intellectual commitment to anticolonial nationalism, then subsequent disillusion with this ideological force to overcome the obstacles to African well-being he now located in a much broader and deeper spatial and temporal frame.

Nationalism as sub-theme has remained visible in the debate over the root causes of the African developmental impasse in the 1980s; the dependency perspective has played a clear role in shaping the policy reason of the Lagos Plan of Action. So also did the economic nationalism which underpins ‘dependency' help motivate the 1970s wave of indigenization measures affecting foreign categories.

Nationalism also plays a part in the ideologies upon which African regimes have drawn guidance for policy choice, and legitimation for their rule. This linkage is particularly clear in the Afro-Marxist States, but is also central to the doctrinal foundations of radical populist socialist States (Ottaway & Ottaway 1981; Young 1982a). Even regimes of capitalist orientation, in a number of instances, draw upon nationalism in State ideology, as in the ‘nurture capitalism' model suggested by Schatz (1977).

For the moment, though, nationalism as direct orienting focus for ideological discourse or academic analysis is in relative eclipse. The widespread mood of demoralization characteristic of contemporary Africa denies to nationalism the audience to supply it with driving energies. Neither its philosophical richness nor its cultural foundations are sufficient to sustain its elan. 'No condition is permanent', runs the African aphorism; nationalism as thought and analysis owed its ascendancy to a particular historical conjuncture. The possibility of a future confluence of catalyzing circumstance resurrecting nationalism cannot be excluded.

Before turning to ethnicity we need to delineate the linkages between nationalism and the other two themes. We may recollect that, until well into the 1950s, not only was African independence seen as distant, but the territorial framework for it was uncertain. Hodgkin (1956: 23),
we may recollect, defined nationalism in such a way as to include ethnic solidarity movements, a notion which quickly became unacceptable. Nationalism became rapidly territorialized, then assimilated as post-colonial State ideology. Unity became imperative, and the potential threats to it became dramatically illustrated in the political competition which the withdrawing colonizer usually insisted upon. The necessity of unity, and its precarious nature, was a major aspect of the claims that a single party was indispensable. Democracy, ran the argument, was only possible within a single party; outside, its fragmenting potential was too great to tolerate.

Earlier, nationalist leaders felt no particular inhibitions in setting forth views which—at a later moment when the political climate was more saturated with ethnicity—entered taboo terrain. The Kenyatta study of the Kikuyu was much more than an ethnography, and was—at its time of publication—in intent a nationalist text, not a testament to ethnic solidarity. Kenyatta (1962: xvi) composed his book to confront those who ‘monopolize the office of interpreting [...] [the African] mind and speaking for him. To such people, an African who writes a study of this kind is encroaching on their preserves. He is a rabbit turned poacher’.

In Nigeria, both Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe indulged in ethnic declarations that were to haunt them—and Nigerian politics—for many years. Awolowo, who in 1947 had declared Nigeria to be a ‘mere geographic expression’, wrote in his campaign autobiography (1960: 166), in justification of his role in launching a Yoruba cultural solidarity movement, that ‘the Yorubas [...] had become effete and decadent [...] it was widely bandied about that the Yorubas were no longer capable of leadership [...] I thought it was in the best interests of Nigeria that the Yorubas should not be reduced to a state of impotence, into which they were fast degenerating’. Azikiwe, in a 1949 speech to the Ibo State Union, made his celebrated declaration which was to be quoted back to him innumerable times in later years: ‘it would appear that the God of Africa has specially created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the ages’ (Coleman 1958: 347).

For academic analysis, national integration became a central sub-theme in the nationalist school. The flavor of this epoch is well conveyed in the Ake study (1967), setting forth a general theory of political integration influenced by structural-functional concepts. The issue, for Ake (ibid.: 1), lay in how to elicit from subjects deference and devotion to the claims of the State, on the one hand, and how to increase the normative consensus governing political behavior among members of the political system—a shared political culture, in short. Ake was to

5. Coleman (1958) refers to ethnic ‘strands’ to Nigerian nationalism, but fundamentally conceptualizes the doctrine at the territorial level.
radically revise his perspective soon thereafter, characterizing as 'imperialism' the social science concepts employed in national integration theory and espousing in its place (for a time) a stridently neo-Marxist dependency orientation (Ake 1979, 1982).

National integration as an analytical and normative mode was influenced by two elements whose conjunctural specificity was not well appreciated at the time: the exceptional quiescence of cultural pluralism in industrialized countries of West and East in the 1950s, and the initial successes of the supra-national integration movement in the European community. By the 1970s, when the national integration literature petered out, these patterns were both altered, thus invalidating the premises of the implicitly unilinear 'political development' theory, of which national integration was a centerpiece.

Some useful contributions are to be found in the national integration literature, in the realm of concept clarification (Hayward 1971), and above all in empirical exploration through survey mechanisms of public orientations (Smock & Smock 1975; Hayward 1976, 1979). Useful, though inconclusive, were efforts of some national integration studies to capture the elusive qualities of this phenomenon viewed as a process, rather than a state.

However, for the most part the 'national integration' orientation, with its summit-focused prism, directed attention away from a grasp of the actual dynamics of ethnic conflict, and the durability of ethnic consciousness. It often implied normative goals which, in many settings, were probably unattainable, and sometimes harmful if they appeared to threaten groups who saw themselves targeted for 'integration' (Nigerian 'minorities', Ethiopia, Chad, Algeria, Sudan). A State whose economic performance was adequate seemed able to persist comfortably without apparent signs of decreased salience of ethnocultural identities (Cameroon, Ivory Coast).

Setting aside the racial divide in South Africa, the interaction between nationalism and ethnicity has been intense in instances where the definitional boundary between the two is at issue. Both are, in B. Anderson's captivating phrase (1983), 'imagined communities'; they are socially constructed ideas of common identity. The critical difference lies in sovereignty, or the claim to it; nations are, in the contemporary world, indissolubly associated with States—or assertion, through the doctrine of self-determination, to the right to sovereign statehood. This issue has been, over time, closest to the surface in Nigeria and Ethiopia. In Nigeria, each of the three largest ethnic agglomerates has, at one time or another, threatened to cross the fateful boundary into the nationality claim by demanding sovereignty, hopefully taking a subordinated ethnic clientele along; one group actually implemented the menace, bringing on the tragedy of a 30-month civil war. Of the first wave of classic nationalism monographs, only the Coleman study on Nigeria (1958)
directly addressed, *in extenso*, the ethnic issue. All the great constitutional debates in Nigeria—a richer source of insight than in any other African State—hinge upon the regional and ethnic issues in the quest for national unity.

In Ethiopia, the tension between State and ethnicity is differently expressed. At the center the image is of a millenial, multi-cultural State, with an historical charter extending back 2,500 years. In his signal contribution to the construction of a legitimating national myth, Levine (1974: 21, 27) argues the audacious, even breathtaking theory that Ethiopia is 'an ingathering of peoples with deep historical affinities'. 'To see Ethiopia as a mosaic of distinct peoples', he adds, 'is to overlook the many features they have in common [...] and to ignore the numerous relationships these groups have had with one another. In particular, it leads to the erroneous view that before the conquests of Menelik II [...] the other peoples of Ethiopia had lived independent and self sufficient lives'. The 'erroneous view' is precisely what is at issue, when seen from the periphery. The Ethiopian reconstruction under Menelik, argue Selassie (1980) and Sherman (1979) concerning Ethiopia, and Baxter (1978) regarding the Oromo, was part and parcel of the imperial partition of Africa. 'Greater Ethiopia' is thus a colonial State, and outlying communities claim the full self-determination rights of nationalities.

As an ideological abstraction, nationalism invariably denies the relevance of class. In Poulantzian terms, as hegemonic ideology of the State, it performs a legitimating function by 'interpellating' individuals as subjects, and collectivizing them as a nationality (Poulantzas 1978: 93-120). In its generalized African form, nationalism denied the existence of class, both on the grounds of the communal cultural heritage, to which individual property and private accumulation were alien, and the equality of oppression and denied opportunity within the frame of the situation coloniale.

Analytically, however, the picture differed. In many European instances, elements of the bourgeoisie were the spearhead of nationality movements. Although initially most analysts were reluctant to apply class analysis to African society in general, and nationalism in particular, they did generally identify the 'new elites' as the leadership. Sklar (1963) went further, to label this group a 'rising class'. Others, subsequently, have labelled this group a 'petty bourgeoisie', a possibly accept-

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6. Uganda was another instance where, particularly at the time of decolonization, a claim to self-determination rights was advanced by an ethnic community, the Ganda. However, Buganda nationalism was justified in terms of asserted legal entitlements of the kingdom and not directly grounded in ethnicity. This special character of Ganda self-determination demands is reflected in the analysis it attracted. Apter (1961) hinges his then influential study of Buganda entirely upon kingship, and offers no exploration of Ganda ethnic consciousness.
able term, at the time, if we understand it to mean young, upwardly-mobile petty professionals. Of the leaders of nationalist thought, Cabral went furthest in confronting the issue, identifying a ‘revolutionary petty bourgeoisie’ as the core leadership element. In a memorable and eloquent phrase, he argued that the class contradiction within nationalism could be resolved only if, upon the triumph of the struggle, ‘The revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must be capable of committing suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which it belongs’ (Chabal 1981: 44). The post-colonial suicide, of course, never took place; further, the group in question was not simply a recognizable social class, but—and on this point Cabral is silent—in large measure an ethnic community, the Cape Verdeans. His project required not only class but ethnic self-extinction. The juncture of the two dimensions—class differentiation and cultural distinctiveness—paved the road leading to the 1980 Guinea Bissau coup.

Ethnicity: The Baseline

Ethnicity, as focus for inquiry, first crept into the Africanist annals in the interstices provided by nationalism. If nationalism was a progressive and worthy topic, ethnicity was a retrogressive and shameful one. To dwell unduly upon it was to summon forth from the societal depths demons who might subvert nationalism at its hour of triumph. Only when it became apparent that bidden or not, the demons of disunity were at hand did ethnicity begin to receive systematic examination. As noted above, this first occurred in Nigeria.

‘Tribe’, of course, was central to the sociology of colonial hegemony. ‘Native administration’ was erected upon a division of the African population into units of presumed relative homogeneity, and their rule through intermediaries. The controlling image was of a natural situation where society was composed of discrete, territorially bounded units, whose inherent clarity was muddied by migrations and ‘endemic tribal warfare’.

The reality did not match the grid of colonial classification placed upon it. Ethnic consciousness, while certainly present, was very different from its contemporary forms, and indeed difficult to retroactively reconstruct. It certainly lacked, in most instances, political articulation, and was largely unrelated to the process of State formation and dissolution: ethnic charters were usually irrelevant to State building, and the

7. There are exceptions worth noting. Sklar (1971) and Coleman (1975) argue a positive contribution of ethnicity to nationalism in the Nigerian case.
crucial post-colonial mobilizing issues of ethnic 'domination' and resource distribution were not present. To a large degree, the colonial system encountered a set of blank tablets, on which to inscribe its own tribal metaphors. As Apthorpe (1968: 18) put it, 'Certainly in Anglophone Africa, what happened was the colonial regime administratively created tribes as we think of them today'. This was particularly the case for the British and the Belgians, somewhat less so for the French and Portuguese.

Compelling new images of society were constructed, and given the enduring authority of the printed word, by a wide assortment of ethnic monographs, initially by amateur (but often ethnographically informative) missionaries and administrators, later by professional anthropologists. The better of these works such as Rattray (1929), Roscoe (1966), or Vanderkerken (1944) among the administrators, or Van Wing (1959) for the missionaries, were of enduring value as sources of basic information. Even these works, often based on a very small number of informants, and even more the large number of thoroughly mediocre works of this origin, entrenched in formal ethnographic knowledge, persisting in distortions and stereotypes, or heavily functionalist portraits (A. Kuper 1983). The anthropologists, by the 1930s, produced a more disciplined ethnography, but one likely to be shaped by the disciplines of the participant-observation method: prolonged field inquiry in one or two villages, then presentation through the filter of emergent anthropological theory (structural-functionalism, for a number of the most influential) as a conceptionally informed portrait of a much larger community, with the 'tribe' as analytical boundary.

While the anthropological monograph embraced 'tribe' as conceptual unit, it rarely explored ethnicity as social consciousness. Consider, for example, the intriguing statements by Green, introducing her study of the Igbo village. Although it was perfectly natural for the professional observer to employ 'Igbo' as unit of analysis, it was only at the end of her inquiry, she notes, that she began to be struck that 'an increasing number of educated or sophisticated people are coming to use the name both about their whole people and their language and with more or less clear idea of the unit to which the name refers' (Green 1947: 6-7). 'Education' and 'sophistication' were required for self-awareness of a unit that was self-evident in the sphere of colonial knowledge. In large numbers of instances, including the Igbo, such indeed was the case, a revealing measure of the singular importance of the cultural maps constituted by the colonial superstructure in the definition of contemporary ethnicity.8

8. One may recollect, in this connection, the private visits of political organizers to anthropologists at the then-Lovanium University in Kinshasa, seeking illumination on the scope of their potential ethnic clientele. The responses they received, needless to say, were imprecise.
The explicit emergence of an ethnicity literature dates from the 1950s, and germinated in the field of urban sociology. The reasons are plain enough; urban centers were the arenas of social encounter and competition, where group labels came to structure the rivalries over a host of scarce resources: jobs, school places, land plots, trade licenses. Novel forms of social consciousness took form around these struggles, which attracted attention and some original explorations, although not yet efforts at general theory. Particularly noteworthy were studies growing out of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in present-day Zambia, especially Mitchell (1956) and Epstein (1958). A sharp contrast was drawn between ethnicity in the urban areas and rural ‘tribe’, with lingering implications that the latter represented the genuine unit, and that the former was somehow artificial. ‘Tribe’ was tradition incarnate, the authentic Africa of the alien imagination.

Two major contributions to grasping ethnicity appeared simultaneous with independence. Mercier (1960), contemplating Dakar, explicitly argued the link between ethnic consciousness and ‘modernity’. This point, at once simple and profound, had innumerable implications. ‘Tribe’ was rural, hence ‘traditional’, or even primitive, and thus ultimately destined for the scrap heap of history; this was an inarticulate major premise of much of the nationalism literature. But if ethnos were not old, but new, and formed in the same crucible for historical transformation which was to bring the new society of the future as nationalism, then all the developmental scripts required revision. The spread of literacy, migration to town, the penetration of capitalism rather than solvents of tribalism, these now might be the catalysts of ethnicity.

Wallerstein (1960) took the argument one step further, stressing the specificity of the new urban ethnicity. It was, he suggested, a pattern of identity different in kind from rooted, rural solidarities, shaped by the requirements of urban life. An additional, and false, deductive step was taken, in arguing that this identity, because lacking the prescriptive force of the rural ‘tribe’, was a malleable clay readily remolded into integrative sentiments by nationalism.

It is no accident that, at about this time, ‘tribe’ began to be displaced in academic discourse by ‘ethnicity’. Partly this responded to the unanswerable African query as to why African ethnic units were labelled ‘tribes’, when similar social categories in other regions were designated as ‘ethnic groups’ or even ‘nationalities’. But also the lexical shift reflected a transformation in perceptions of the phenomenon. A number of theoretically influential anthropologists detached themselves from the older disciplinary mold, and led the way in building a viable theory of ethnicity. Southall, in an eloquent denunciation of the ‘illusion of tribe’, argued for abandonment of the concept of clear-cut ethnic maps. The essence of African ethnicity, he suggests in a memorable phrase, is ‘interlocking, overlapping, multiple collective identities’ (Southall 1970: 36). Barth
(1969) took the argument a different direction, by arguing that boundaries were indeed the central issue in grasping ethnicity. Ethnos, he maintained, is not culturally constituted; 'boundary defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses' (ibid.: 15). A. Cohen (1969) demonstrated the interplay in urban settings of consciousness and socioeconomic niches (Hausa drovers and Yoruba butchers in Ibadan, the ethnic parish within the Islamic community). Any number of valuable monographs appeared during this period which cumulatively began to define the parameters of a conceptual map of ethnicity (Helm 1968; Cohen & Middleton 1970; Biebuyck 1966).

Types of Conceptualization

Several particular approaches in the quest for understanding may be identified. An early effort was made to link the unfolding African experience to the model of 'cultural pluralism' as set forth by Furnivall (1948). In this perspective, different cultural communities constitute closed social entities, meeting only in the marketplace for impersonal economic transactions. Such a system necessarily involves ranking of the communities, and domination of one through the coercive machinery of the State. The model, originating in colonial Burma and Indonesia, was insightful in its original time and place, and certainly applicable to South Africa and other racially stratified settler colonies. However, the essence of ethnicity in most of post-colonial Africa was the unranked nature of the groups, their extraordinary layered complexity, fluidity; and degrees of interpenetration as well as conflict. The premises of the model simply failed to hold, and it was speedily abandoned, even by M. G. Smith, its most prominent architect (Kuper & Smith 1969).9

A more durable argument was the rooting of ethnic conflict in uneven development. The penetration of capitalism and opportunities for social ascent, were unequally distributed, a factor introduced by colonial rule. The accidents of location of communication routes, siting of towns

9. There were some exceptions to the general pattern of unranked groups. Rwanda and Burundi are obvious cases, and spawned an important literature grounded upon the 'premise of inequality' (Maquet 1961) in Tutsi-Hutu relations. The Maquet thesis postulated a totality of domination and sharpness of group boundaries alien to the Furnivall (1948) 'cultural pluralism' model which has engendered persuasive rebuttals for its exaggerations and indeed projection upon society of a central Rwandan Tutsi royalist ideology as reinforced by its cooptation for colonial purposes (Newbury et al.; Lemarchand 1970). Power relations, however, are cogently argued as crucial to ethnic group formation (Codere 1962; Lemarchand 1966). A different type of cultural ranking obtains in the Maghreb, where the unequal ideological resources of 'Arab' and 'Berber' lead to an historical process of 'Arab' expansion through incorporation of 'Berber' elements into the dominant cultural configuration (Gellner & Micaud 1972; Young 1976: 413-419).
and major centers of wage employment, and distribution of missionary resources offered new opportunities to some groups for small but significant fractions of their sons (rarely their daughters) to enter the ranks of the subaltern elite below the foreign estate created by colonialism. Other segments of the populace were denied such openings, and had only small representation in the new elites. This point, argued by Coleman (1958), Lemarchand (1964), and many others, is beyond dispute.

Much more controversial is a second dimension of the uneven development thesis: postulated cultural differentials between ethnic groups. Some groups, ran the argument, were by nature thrusting, individualist, aggressive in pursuit of economic opportunity, culturally predisposed to syncretizing new values: in short, receptive to change. Others—pastoral communities generally—are encapsulated within a cultural code leading to self-isolation, and rejection of the new pathways to social mobility (Bascom & Herskovits 1959). The Igbo, one might suggest, were the prototypical examples of ‘receptivity’ (Ottenberg 1959), while the pastoral Masai were paradigmatic of resistance. A powerful stimulus for such views came from official colonial knowledge concerning Africa, redolent with stereotypical characterizations of groups as ‘industrious’ or ‘lazy’, ‘open to civilization’ or ‘refractory to European values’. Insofar as such perspectives influenced, especially in the early colonial period, missionary strategies or colonial social policy, the self-fulfilling prophecy was at hand.

A yet more disputable line of analysis sought to relate culture to psychological properties, an exercise burdened with ethnocentric dangers. Evidence was sought in content analysis of folktales (McClelland 1961) or deconstruction of dreams (Levine 1966). The perils of the former were well illustrated by the counter-intuitive ranking of ‘N achievement’ which it generated; the Masai, intriguingly, contrary to their image in the uneven development literature, ranked high, while the Kikuyu and Chagga—hardly under-represented in the ranks of the successful—were in the nether reaches (McClelland 1961: 66). Levine, on the other hand, managed to confirm the Igbo-Yoruba-Hausa scaling supplied by conventional wisdom, but the line of reasoning permitting the identification of the undoubted disparity in relative number of diploma-holders as psychologically determined remained unpersuasive. In the political context of the escalating pre-civil war ethnic tensions in Nigeria, this form of interpretation held political as well as intellectual liabilities.

Uneven development, certainly, is a powerful vector of ethnic conflict, particularly at the dawn of independence when fears of ‘domination’ leading to permanent exclusion from mobility opportunities were widespread among communities who found themselves poorly situated to pour into the new spaces opened in the political and bureaucratic interstices of the State by decolonization. Elsewhere, it led to the ‘internal colonialism’ school of analysis, personified by Hechter (1975) and Nairn
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(1977). However, it is important to keep the phenomenon in perspective; what gave rise to the notion, in Africa, was above all the differential ethnic representation in the ‘new elite’ (or petty bourgeoisie, if one prefers). The great majority of all groups remained at the lower reaches of the social scale, whatever the presumed ‘receptivity’ or ‘resistance’ to change. There will continue to be differentials at the elite level, explained by opportunity factors above all. Cultural congruence with the behavioral requirements of a capitalist form of economic organization, or more generally the mobility exigencies of the post-colonial social environment, probably is a factor, and may well have psychological correlates. Their measurements and identification, however, are singularly elusive, and yet to be accomplished.

Another important line of analysis argues the essentially political determination of contemporary ethnicity. Pursued to its logical conclusion, this argument reverses the causal arrow normally running from ethnicity to political conflict. Politics is central in shaping ethnicity, goes this thread of reason. The colonial State was a prime architect in the initial construction of the units. Power transfer politics, and the suddenly introduced political party competition, naturally drew competing organizations to seek vote banks in ethnic communities, as a cost-effective mobilization strategy. The sheer scale of societal resources distributed by the post-colonial State created high stakes in its control, and located all major allocation issues squarely in the political realm; this in turn made ‘domination’ a more sensitive and central question. Politics thus dictated ethnic mobilization, which produced in turn incentives for the enhancement of ethnic consciousness, and active identification of the cultural resources susceptible of supporting its consolidation (Young 1976; Melson & Wolpe 1971). Kasfir (1975) developed this reasoning into a coping strategy, calling for ‘departicipation’ to arrest the politicization of ethnic conflict. Weinstein (1983) extends the political determination thesis in interesting ways into the field of language.

The political determination thesis makes an interesting contribution, and has been influential—not least, as we shall argue, because its conclusions can be rendered compatible with neo-Marxist analysis. The argument, however, cannot stand alone. It goes too far in banalizing the primordial dimensions of ethnic consciousness; its explanations of the activation of ethnic consciousness are persuasive enough, but it fails to convey the intense passions and peculiarly coercive powers of activated ethnicity. The ethnic tie is not simply political and circumstantial; it is, as Horowitz (1985: 60) notes in his masterful synthesis, ‘simultaneously suffused with overtones of familial duty and laden with depth of familial emotion’.

A further elaboration of the politically-focussed analytical school is found in the linkage of ethnicity to the implacable (and debatable) logic
of rational choice theory, an option most notably chosen by Bates (1983) but also apparent in Rabushka and Shepsle (1972). The heart of the Bates thesis (1983: 152) is that 'ethnic groups represent, in essence, coalitions which have been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization—benefits which are desired but scarce'. They are 'a form of minimum winning coalition, large enough to secure benefits in the competition for spoils but also small enough to maximize the per capita value of these benefits' (ibid.: 164-165).

Rational choice theory undoubtedly provides an elegantly parsimonious model of ethnic conflict. The severity of its assumptions—the political world is composed of clearly demarcated, collectively calculating ethnic groups—strains credulity. Both social process and primordial loadings vanish in the excessively simplified equations of rational choice.

A promising new approach to the understanding of ethnicity is found in the work of Newbury (fthecg.) and Lemarchand (1983). Here the urban-rural gradient, down which ethnic mobilization is held to follow in the political determination school, is reversed. Ethnicity can congeal in rural society first, then diffuse to the urban sector, as part of a process of peasant consciousness construction. A plausible brief is entered in the Hutu and Sara instances for this line of interpretation, which is a valuable corrective to residual unilineal premises embedded in political determination analyses.

Passing reference may be made to the intriguing debate on ethnicity in course among Soviet scholars (Bromley 1979; Kozlov 1980; Ismagilova & Kochin 1984) now freed from the crushing burden of Stalinist orthodoxies on the subject. The Soviet debate remains heavily determined by definitional and classificatory issues: narody ('tribe', characterized by primitiveness) versus narodnost (a developed nationality); ethnikosy (loose-knit ethnic agglomerations) versus 'ethno-social organism' (a Bromley lexical innovation, referring to ethnic groups with established social and power relationships); narodnost ('nationality') versus ethnos (ethnic group). Kozlov (1980: 123-139), a Soviet scholar, feels able to dismiss as inadequate the Leninist definition of nation (language, territory, common economic life, psychological character) because of its failure to incorporate the crucial factor of consciousness.

In the most systematic African application of Soviet academic analysis (Ismagilova 1978), one finds a certain number of suggestive insights, although no compelling overall conceptual statement. Thus far, Soviet

10. Bromley, the most influential theorist in Soviet ethnicity studies, is descended, as the name suggests, from a family of English merchants who settled in Russia in the 19th century.
approaches to ethnicity have had no discernable impact either on African or Western analysis, or on African political process.

Soviet nationality theory, however, seems on the verge of its first actual African application in Ethiopia. At the present time, three separate bodies are busily concocting a national ethnic classificatory scheme, the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia nationalities committee, the Nationalities Institute, and the constitutional committee. By 1986, some seventy ethnolinguistic groups have been formally identified. A scheme based upon the ‘federal’ administrative structure of the Soviet State seems in gestation, with regions to be created based upon a ‘titular’ primary group, with smaller ethnic communities slated for more limited cultural autonomy. The 1976 National Democratic Revolution Program declared in tones evocative of Soviet nationality theory, that ‘no nationality will dominate another since the history, culture, language and relation of each will have equal recognition’ (Sherman 1979: 282-293). The capacity of the Ethiopian State to implement a blueprint as complex as that prescribed by Soviet theory, while maintaining the Leninist centralized autocratic hegemony which appears to be the core value of the regime, is open to doubt. But, if pursued, the strategy is likely to have a powerful influence on the development of ethnic consciousness, and the categories through which it is expressed.

‘Instrumentalism’ and ‘Primordialism’

In the late 1970s, there had become evident, in the realm of ethnicity studies, two discrete schools of analysis, one ‘instrumentalist’ in orientation, the other ‘primordialist’ in thrust. The instrumentalist perspective saw ethnicity essentially as a vehicle for social competition. Ethnicity was thus political, contingent, situational, and circumstantial. What mattered analytically was specification of the circumstances in which ethnicity became politically mobilized and grasping the dynamics of its political articulation. The foundation axiom of the instrumentalist approach is, as Keyes (1981: 10) phrases it, ‘that ethnicity is salient only insofar as it serves to orient people in the pursuit of other interests vis-a-vis other people who are seen as holding contrastive ethnic identities’. Otherwise put, in a phrase that might be borrowed, mutatis mutandis, from Marxist class analysis, struggle and conflict are natural and necessary to ethnicity. Ethnicity is driven by interest, and is ultimately material. Ethnic analysis may draw upon interest group theory. Generally speaking, ‘instrumentalism’ has predominated in the analysis of African ethnicity, and indeed in more broadly comparative studies (Enloe 1973; Rothchild 1981; Young 1976).

‘Primordialism’ asserts an essentialist, cultural view of ethnicity. Geertz (1963: 109) staked out the opening position in this debate by
defining primordial attachment as ‘one that stems from the “givens’”—or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed “givens” of social existence’. Epstein (1978: xi) notes, in justifying his retreat from a more instrumental position in his earlier work (1958), ‘the powerful emotional charge that appears to surround or to underlie so much of ethnic behavior; and it is this affective dimension of the problem that seems to me lacking in so many recent attempts to tackle it’. Isaacs (1977: 24) echoes these sentiments, in stressing the psychological needs served by ethnicity, which he perceives as an invocation of a lost past: ‘It is a desperate effort to regain the condition of life in which certain needs were met, to get behind walls that enclose them once more, if only in their minds, in a place where they can feel they belong, and where, grouped with their kind, they can regain some measure of what feels like physical and emotional safety’.

Primordial analysis seeks to identify and define the cultural and psychological dimensions of ethnicity. Culture is a human construction, and is socially learned; the key to understanding lies in the unravelling of these processes. They are, of course, singularly elusive, and the attempts to do so have been speculative, metaphorical and intuitive (Isaacs 1977).

The necessity to weave together the instrumentalist and the primordialist dimensions of ethnicity is self-evident. Instrumentalism alone fails to capture the intensity, the passion, the availability of ethnicity for political mobilization. Keyes (1981: 10) well captures the ineluctable linkage: ‘While cultural formulations that serve to define the heritage assumed to have been determined by virtue of one’s descent from mythical ancestors or historical forebears are essential to the establishment of ethnic identities, they are not sufficient in and of themselves to make ethnicity a factor in social relations’. It becomes so when activated by interest.

Cognate Identities: Race and Religion

Some analysts include in the concept of ‘ethnicity’ not only solidarities based upon affinities of a cultural nature (usually, though not always language, cultural codes and symbols, beliefs of shared origin and history) but also those founded upon race and religion (Enloe 1973; Horowitz 1985). Yet both race and religion are sufficiently distinctive in nature as to require different analytical treatment, although they join ethnicity as part of a broader genus which can be labeled ‘cultural pluralism’. Within this rubric, there are a number of comparable elements, which permit proposing a common overall analytical frame, provided the important special properties defining ‘race’ and ‘religion’ categories of affiliation are given due recognition. We will not pursue in full detail here the race and religion issues, confining our attention primarily to
ethnicity in the narrower sense. Before setting them aside, however, a few parenthetical remarks may be offered.

Race has attracted a very large literature, and its own specialized journals, owing to its ubiquity in the Western world. Naturally enough, the most seminal contributions concern the Caribbean, the United States, and Brazil. In Africa, during the colonial era, race was a central dimension of the *situation coloniale*. The racial hegemony inherent to the colonial State generated both the racialist mythology well chronicled by Curtin (1964), and the racial solidarity aspects of African nationalism (pan-Africanism). Its impact on colonial historiography (the ‘Hamitic myth’, for example) was substantial. The effort, especially in East and Central Africa, to embed racial communities into decolonizing constitutions kept race on the agenda of political analysis until the eve of independence. So also did its importance in Portuguese colonial ideology through the Lusotropical myth so effectively punctured by Bender (1978) and others. It swiftly evaporated as a topic of interest with the demise of the colonial State; race has played little part in analysis concerned with unequal relationships between Africa and Europe and America. Thenceforward, the topic has been almost exclusively South African in focus. To this we will return in considering the race versus class issue; suffice it to note here three remarkably stimulating comparative works which illuminate the dynamics of race through a comparative historical sociology of South Africa and the United States (Frederickson 1981; Greenberg 1980; Cell 1982).

Religion, as a comprehensive belief system, is of immense importance in Africa. If we view it in the much more narrow sense employed in this paper, as a correlate of ‘ethnicity’, its significance is much less. Islam and Christianity have both expanded enormously in Africa over the last century, in a generally silent competition. When one reflects upon the lethal intensity of confessional politics in, say, Lebanon, or nationalist conflict operating under a religious idiom in Ulster, the challenge to analysis is the relative lack of religiously-grounded political conflict, a task Laitin (1986) undertakes with illuminating results for the Yoruba regions of Nigeria. Yet Africa has several of the handful of States in the world where Islam and Christianity are represented in closely balanced numbers (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria). Disputes over *shari’a* (Nigeria, Sudan) or allegations of religious discrimination (imperial Ethiopia) have occurred, but without the intensity or duration of religiously-grounded conflict in other areas. As a system of social identity, Islam has received much more extensive attention than Christianity (Nimtz 1981; Lewis & Kritzeck 1969; D. B. Cruise O’Brien 1971; Behrman 1970; Trimmingham 1964; *La question islamique*... 1981; Paden 1973).
Related Issues

Three particular sub-themes in the ethnicity field merit brief mention. At the tragic outer limit of ethnic conflict, the history of the last century instructs us, lies the specter of genocide. Dag Hammarskjöld first evoked the phrase, in the African context, in reference to Luba massacres that took place in a brief, unhappy moment of post-colonial Zairian history. During the Nigerian civil war, Biafran information services made skillful use of the concept, which had become genuine fear within the encircled Igbo redoubts. The episode which most closely approximated the concept was the 1972 holocaust in Burundi, which claimed 100,000-200,000 victims, the vast majority Hutu. These instances were sufficient to generate an inquest, whose most prominent participant was L. Kuper (1977, 1981). The concept is so overpowering and emotive that questions arise as to its utility; only the Burundi tragedy begins to approximate it, and here one may note the remarkable remission of ethnic violence since that time.

Another outer boundary of ethnicity, which as we suggested earlier demarcates it from nationalism, is the option of secession claims. The striking fact is that these have so rarely arisen; most of the cases on record occurred in the immediate disputes over the power transfer process (Buganda, Katanga, Bakongo, for example). In all instances of armed secession efforts, save those involving Somali irredentism, the claim of self-determination has been entered on behalf of a territorial, not an ethnic principle (Western Sahara, Eritrea, southern Sudan, Biafra, Katanga). These cases have all been the subject of an extensive monographic literature, with a useful overview in Rothchild and Olorunsola (1983).

The impulse to prescriptive science runs strong in the field of ethnicity, perhaps because its students are nearly all of ameliorist, liberal persuasion. Major comparative studies often contain a concluding chapter offering an assortment of remedial formulas (Horowitz 1985; Young 1976). The most thoroughly elaborated and ingenious theory of this nature is the doctrine of 'consociationalism', associated with Lijphart (1977). Beginning with the premise common to nearly all ethnicity analysis, that ethnic consciousness and conflict is a permanent feature of the political landscape, Lijphart sets forth a carefully constructed scheme for its management. The primary components of consociational statecraft are summit diplomacy, mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy, all within the framework of a grand coalition.

The image of the model has suffered in Africa from the interest shown by the South African regime in a distorted interpretation of it; indeed,
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in Lijphart’s original elaboration of the model no African cases were considered. In fact, in the more harmoniously governed African States one may well detect elements of the constitutive parts of the model, though not its total architecture. However, a number of criticisms have been voiced. In the African instance, the most crucial is that the ‘multiple, overlapping, and interlocking’ forms of ethnic consciousness are not capable of being organized and represented in the way demanded by consociationalism. Consociationalism is of application in settings such as Malaysia, Fiji, or Lebanon, where the character of group definitions and relationships approximates the Furnivall model. To fully apply consociationalism would require, as prior step, a systemization and organization of ethnicity to consolidate its building blocks. African States, with good reason, are unlikely to be attracted to this strategy. Various other objections have been voiced: elitism of summit diplomacy; paralysis of the mutual veto; risks of institutionalizing proportionality throughout the State apparatus. Yet, if the model in its totality is unlikely to prove applicable, the line of reasoning in its construction is rich in instructive insights. In those instances where regional and ethnic tensions have become most entrenched, such as Ethiopia and Sudan, pages from the book of consociationalism are far more promising than unitary autocracy as a political formula.

Ethnicity as General Theory

If one surveys the field of ethnicity as a whole, one is struck by the general consensus which has emerged. This is not to argue that the consensus is beyond critique, or that it will not be invalidated in part by the dynamic of change. In 1960, ethnicity was virtually uncharted terrain; its crucial importance had become transparent, yet there was little basis for either analysts or participants to grasp its nature, the sources of its energies, or its likely future trajectories. Today a basic conceptual map is in place; absent is the furious debate raging over the nature of class. This consensus is given magisterial summary by Horowitz (1985); one sets down this admirable volume with the sense that few major additions to his statement are likely in the near future.

Noteworthy in ethnicity studies is their more frequent incorporation in general theoretical statements not restricted to Africa; Horowitz (1985), Rothchild (1981) and Keyes (1981) stand as three recent examples. This disposition to synthesize regionally specific monographs is doubtless fostered by the substantial degree of consensus which exists as to the

can prescribe a formula for preserving White hegemony, but official South African interpretations of consociationalism clearly interpret the notion in this fashion.
similarity of the ethnic phenomenon in its different particular settings. Congealed as general synthesis, there are perhaps risks of over-confidence in its permanent applicability.

There are some discernable flaws. We may begin by suggesting that too little of the inquiry has been empirical, in a strict sense. Most studies have focussed upon ethnicity through a retrospective examination of its political impact. The literature thus generated then has formed the basis for the synthesizing statements in which overall theories of ethnicity have been put forward.

There are obvious reasons which have dictated such an approach. In nearly all African States, ethnicity has from the moment of birth of organized nationalism been a sensitive, even subversive topic. ‘National integration’, à la rigueur, might be an acceptable focus, but rarely ethnicity per se. Thus ‘ethnicity’ was most frequently a by-product of studies initially undertaken with a different focus. Nigeria stands out as virtually the only country where ethnicity has been officially acknowledged; it is no accident that it is by far the largest single source of monographic studies.

The view of ethnicity as shameful subject tends to be shared not only by ruling classes but also by the African intelligentsia. There are special risks for an African scholar to engage in ethnicity research in a direct sense, although the anthropological monography or regional history is feasible; examples of the latter are numerous, and often excellent: for instance, Uchendu (1965) or Ogot (1967). Studies such as Selassie (1980) or Wai (1980) are most prudently pursued in exile. Relatively rare are contributions from African scholars, excepting Nigeria (Nnoli 1978; Sanda 1976) which focus upon ethnicity. Sithole (1980), Ilunga (1973) and Osei-Kwame (1980) are among the handful of exceptions.

A summons to empirical inquiry needs to recognize its limits. The overly mechanical, survey-based mode, exemplified by the major UNESCO study carried out two decades ago by Klineberg and Zavalonni (1969), taps only limited dimensions of the phenomenon. One may also recollect the spectacular inaccuracy of the forecasts of the Smock and Smock (1975) comparative study of Ghana and Lebanon. With survey evidence playing an important role in shaping their conclusions, they argued the sturdy integrative prospects for Lebanon, and foresaw serious fissiparous dangers, under-acknowledged in the political realm, for Ghana. One hastens to add that the study is much better than its prophecy.

However, what tends to be missed in this mode of inquiry, and in the purely political approaches to ethnicity generally, is the primordial dimension. Here the absence of African contributions is keenly felt. Penetration of the depths of primordial identity, overlain as it is with protective screens, requires an experiential verstehen intuition. Here one may invoke the prefatory comment by one of the most helpful analysts of the primordial dimension, Epstein (1978: xi): ‘I am keenly
aware that if I achieved any insight into these situations it was because they touched some chord of response that echoed my own ethnic experience as a Jew of the diaspora. In other regions, the ethnicity literature of a primordial vein is disproportionately the reflection of this element of personal witness. In our view, the excessively instrumentalist weight of dominant understandings of ethnicity in Africa is explicable, in large measure, in these terms.

Finally, the criticism often advanced by Marxist analysts that class is all but ignored is well-founded. Not all studies are equally vulnerable to this critique; in different ways, van den Berghe and Primov (1977) and Horowitz (1985) do propose elements of synthesis. Saul (1979: 394-398), in his stimulating effort at an ethnicity-class synthesis from a Marxist perspective, correctly takes Young (1976) to task for simply setting class aside. We will return to the issue of the challenge of integration of class and ethnicity in our concluding section.

Class: Background to the Debate

Class was the last of the three themes under review to achieve analytical significance. Wallerstein (1961), in his classic statement on nationalism, never mentions the word. The independence generation of African nationalist leaders were unanimous in the position that class was absent in African society. Lloyd (1967: 306) still expressed a dominant view in suggesting that class conflict was only 'incipient', pitting the new elites and the mass of the populace. Differentiation within African society—described as stratification—was mainly perceived in terms of status groups: chiefs, elites. This view was not, at the time, wholly false: in most colonial settings, Africans faced comprehensive barriers to accumulation and mobility. The primary avenues of social ascent depended above all on mastery of skills and personal resources pertinent to European-created hierarchies: hence 'elites', or 'évolués'.

By the 1970s, this claim had been abandoned by virtually all. The verdict of Vansina (1982: 60) spoke for unanimous academic court: 'It is often said that classes do not exist in tropical Africa because kinship solidarity effectively counteracts their formation. The wealthy hand out their riches to many poorer relatives, and income is thus equalized. This is rubbish'. In a very brief period, analysis moved from denial to central preoccupation with class.

Several factors explain the phenomenal upsurge of class analysis. Doubtless one should begin with empirical realities. After independence, the rapid emergence of a new and prosperous African class, associated

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12 I acknowledge, with gratitude, the assistance received on this section from Darabshah Aram and Deborah Datsko.
above all with the exercise of State power, was everywhere apparent. Whatever vocabulary was employed to characterize this group, it had certainly outstripped the ‘elite’ label. Particularly from the 1970s, when the early optimism about African development eroded, and processes of pauperization became apparent, inequality of an unanticipated scale opened up. For many, the deepening patterns of inequality became the most crucial issue calling for analysis and understanding.

Another crucial factor, entirely within the intellectual realm, was the resurrection of Western Marxism, a process precisely coincident with the drama of social differentiation in Africa (Jewsiewicki 1985). The radicalization of large sectors of the Western intelligentsia which accompanied the Vietnam war played its part. In Anglo-American milieux, a lasting bifurcation occurred in the later 1960s between ‘radical’ and ‘liberal’ schools, which for the most part overlapped a Marxist/non-Marxist divide. In the French case, Marxist debate was important from the time of independence, given a particular flavor by the increasingly ambivalent membership of a number of participants in the incorrigibly Stalinist French Communist Party.

A third factor was the emergence of a radical African intelligentsia, both in Africa and in exile. As they became disaffected from the political class—a swift development, in most cases—the nationalist paradigm in its initial form lost its allure. Though rejecting the ‘classless society’ form of nationalism, their premises throughout remained profoundly nationalist. In different stages, one may identify periods of fascination with the loosely class-focussed arguments of Fanon and Cabral, then a conversion of many to dependency theory. There followed a stress upon a revolutionary, Leninist, and African Marxism, reflected in the creation of the Journal of African Marxists (Tandon 1984). For those remaining within Africa, intense ambivalence was imposed by the difficult political circumstances most faced. Many were disposed to praxis and revolutionary engagement, yet denied its possibility by regimes often inclined to tolerate Marxist discourse only if it remained entirely within the academy; thus exile, silence, or retreat into purely theoretical elaboration were the only viable choices.

By the 1970s, class had reached a critical mass; a self-reproducing process of fission took over, and fragmented it in many directions. Marxism, on arrival in Africa, no longer had an authoritative center; indeed, least influential of all its sources is contemporary Soviet Marxism. Works of Soviet scholars—though some are of considerable interest—are rarely cited. Swiftly there came to be many Marxisms in Africa. The great diversity of the canonical texts; the evolution in Marx’s perspective during the course of his long and productive life; the important glosses added by leading disciples (Engels, Lenin, Gramsci, Luxemburg, and others)—all of these factors opened the way to a rapid diversification of perspectives. A predilection for the categorical statement, a disposition
to perceive analysis as 'correct' or 'incorrect', with truth buttressed by reference to sacred texts, furthered the centripetal dynamic. Any number of antinomies may be spied in these rich, turbulent debates: theoretical Marxist versus revolutionary intellectual; expatriate versus African (or, Review of African Political Economy versus Journal of African Marxists), mode of production versus class struggle, dependence versus internal determination; regime ideology versus critical theory. Class does constitute a central core; yet so numerous are the fragments that it is scarcely an exaggeration to suggest that many Marxists disagree with most Marxist analysis. But the shared set of central concerns constitute a kind of gravitational field, which sets some outer limits to the debate.

Class analysis is not an exclusive preserve of Marxism; its importance is such that it cannot be ignored. Class, one might say, has become the common property of all analysts; it is striking that, in the excellent recent collection, State and Class in Africa (Kasfir 1984), only one of the five contributors lays claim to Marxism, although all extensively employ many of its modes of thought. Indeed, they must do so. Systematic theoretical treatment of class does not require a Marxist engagement, but it cannot proceed without a reference to debates within Marxism.

The number of contributions relevant to a consideration of class analysis in Africa now runs into the thousands. Indeed, the number of identifiable approaches and orientations easily is counted by the dozens. A comprehensive inquest is thus utterly beyond our reach; we cannot pick up all these many glittering fragments of a shattered paradigm, one by one, for individual examination. Rather, we will examine in turn the different derivational logic by which class is identified, some of the divergent categorizations, and the regional variations.

The Rise and Fall of Mode of Production

A particularly rich vein of analysis pivots around the 'mode of production' concept. This debate opened in France in the 1960s; in its opening rounds, the primary issue was the revival of Marx's imperfectly developed concept of an 'Asiatic mode of production' (Suret-Canale 1969). The object was to define a method for grasping, within a Marxist framework, the character of the African societies upon which the capitalist superstructure imposed by the colonial State rested, without having as yet transformed the entire social structure to that corresponding to the capitalist mode of production. The imported Asiatic mode postulated a despotic bureaucratic State resting upon a cellular structure of village

13. This section is heavily indebted to the invaluable collection assembled by Jewsiewicki & Létourneau 1985.
communities, self-sufficient in their agricultural and artisanal production, subordinated in tributary linkage to the State.

The Asiatic mode, long banished from Soviet Marxism, had been revived by Wittfogel (1956), with hydraulic requirements as its functional *deus ex machina*. The Asiatic mode in its Wittfogelian version had been largely discredited as a representation of the classical Chinese and Indian States, and was ridiculed by the once-influential spokesmen for Althusserian mode of production analysis, Hindess and Hirst (1975). It was exceedingly difficult to identify any African States which corresponded, closely scrutinized, to the Asiatic mode. Thus the Asiatic mode had a short life in Africa; but it did open the door to the search for a definition of the precapitalist modes of production in Africa, which manifestly did not follow the simple primitive communism-slave-feudal-capitalist progression supplied in most of the Marx and Engels texts.

Coquery-Vidrovitch (1969) proposed a more specifically African mode of production, whose essential mechanism was political control of long-distance trade. This bore a resemblance to the somewhat more vaguely defined Amin contribution (1978) to the catalogue, the tributary mode of production. Like most of the founders of sundry African modes, Coquery-Vidrovitch (1985) subsequently renounced her model. The logic of mode of production, she argued, was particular to the capitalist mode. The fusion of the economic with the political and the religious, the simplicity of production resources and impossibility of restricting access to them (land and household labor), the absence of private appropriation of land: so many factors making the extension of mode of production reasoning unsuitable.

The most important and persistent theoretical innovation, in this field, was the notion of the lineage mode of production, originated by Rey (1969), under the influence of Meillassoux (1960, 1972). The notion was systematized in an Althusserian style by Terray (1969), and further embellished with the companion concept of ‘articulation of modes of production’ by Rey (1969). The ruling class, in the lineage mode, were the elders, whose hegemony was maintained through their control of the means of reproduction (access to women, and social knowledge including the supernatural realm). A valuable supplementary gloss was contributed by Godelier (1978), in clarifying the domains of infrastructure, superstructure, and ideology.

The lineage mode theory has left an enduring imprint upon the vocabulary of class analysis. However, it had several serious flaws. In terms of its own logic, the model was debatable. The mechanisms of control were unclear, and the inability to limit access to the essential factors of production undermined the schema. Perhaps more important were the underlying flaws of the Althusserian Marxism which underlay it. The claim that analysis, to be scientific, had to renounce empiricism, and to construct an image based upon ‘Marxist scientific theory’, as
Hindess and Hirst (1975: 2-3) put it, which is to be judged only in terms of that theory, and anchored to concepts and proof specific to its problematic, was bound to lead to the sterile impasse eloquently identified by the E. P. Thompson critique (1978) of structuralist Marxism. Inevitably, the deductive character of the theory also led to a pervasive functionalism in its application (Giddens 1981).

Further, the lineage mode theory was constructed upon what Vansina (1983: 85) argues to be a mythological folk model of society. He points out that:

‘...scholars who elaborated the “lineage mode of production” aimed at highlighting inequality, but it was much more pronounced, and much more irregularly distributed, than their model implied. The ranking of members by seniority in the core lines was more tentative and more changeable. Rank was more often determined by the fluctuations of power politics than by any lineage structure’.

After the fecund initial stimulus provided by the novelty of the debate over the lineage and other precapitalist modes of production wore off, by the 1980s, the approach progressively lost its luster. Those attempting to utilize the concept empirically found themselves engaged in a taxonomic exercise, or in the identification on the ground of the deductively derived categories which were \textit{a priori} axioms. The new questions about the empirical value of the modes identified rebounded with greater force on the theory of articulation. To postulate a regression equation joining two static abstractions is a certain recipe for banality; as Clarence-Smith (1985) enjoins us, ‘Thou Shalt Not Articulate Modes of Production’.

A rather different direction was suggested by Hyden (1980), who set forth a ‘peasant mode of production’. The peasant mode was characterized not only by the forces of production involved, but also their social correlates. The Hyden theory was far removed from the structuralist deductions of the lineage mode; it was the product of two decades of service in Africa, extended field research, and incorporation into an African family. It makes use of Marxist sources, categories, and ideas, but lies outside the Marxist framework. Central to the Hyden argument is the ‘economy of affection’, concerned with the ‘means of reproduction’, or the network of social relationships and reciprocities which offer guarantees of survival. Although there are points of convergence with ‘lineage mode’ theory, the underlying logic more closely resembles the ‘moral economy’ Scott thesis (1976). Above all, rather than ‘articulation’ with a capitalist mode, there is a profound disjuncture. The peasantry is ‘uncaptured’, because it does not depend upon the colonially-imposed economic and political superstructure for its reproduction.

The peasant mode theory has had considerable impact, and its vocabulary has travelled widely. The ‘uncaptured’ peasantry thesis has
received a degree of conjunctural validation. The rapid deterioration of the Tanzanian and many other African economies since the publication of this study, and the disengagement of the peasantry from the public realm which is a frequent product of declining legitimacy and ineffectual rural performance of the State, have given cogency to its arguments. The theory has, at the same time, been subjected to searching criticism. Even with the diminishing authority of the State, important mechanisms of extraction and control remain (Nzongola 1986). Accumulation and social mobility are almost impossible without encountering its apparatus: through the virtual necessity of recourse to the educational system, for example. The large number of female-headed rural households, whose male members are wage-earners (or informal sector dependents) fits uneasily into the theory. Tanzania, others argue, is an atypical case whose capitalist sector is relatively weak, compared to Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya, or many other States.

Recent work suggests intriguing questions about the solidity of conception of the master mode, capitalism itself. While the specificity and diversity of precapitalist modes has been the pivot of the mode of production debate, rarely is any uncertainty expressed concerning the capitalist mode. Berry (1984b), in a fine grained and evocative analysis, demonstrates that capitalism in Nigeria fails in its most central function: accumulation. She concludes:

‘Farmers seek to enlist the power of the State and its resources in support of kin- and community-based interests and relations, as well as to draw on the latter to enhance their access to the State. The contradiction of farmer-State relations in western Nigeria have fostered the pursuit of multiple strategies of personal and collective advance which, in turn, have contributed to unproductive accumulation, uncertainty, and social conflict’ (p. 191).

Joseph (1984) puts forth, in his theory of ‘prebendal politics’, an argument pointing in a similar direction. So also does Schatz (1984: 56), examining the Nigerian economy, which he characterizes as ‘pirate capitalism’:

‘Manipulation of “government”, the most attractive route to fortune, has diverted effort into unproductive channels. The predominance of such widespread manipulation signifies pirate capitalism, and is a major factor in the emergence of the inert economy’.

Callaghy (1985) develops these points further, suggesting some of the implications of a capitalism in Africa very different from the model sketched by Marx. He draws upon Weberian conceptualization of capitalism, as contained in General Economic History and Economy and Society. Capitalism has a number of identifiable forms: ‘commercial capitalism’, ‘political capitalism’, ‘booty capitalism’, ‘adventurers’
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capitalism', 'traditional capitalism', and 'patrimonial capitalism'—all characterized by some degree of derogation from the standards of calculability and rationality which Weber (and Marx) perceived in full capitalism. The patrimonial essence of the State, Callaghy argues, precludes the emergence of productive rationality in the economic realm. Patrimonial capitalism has a quite different class-forming logic than does the conventional concept of the capitalist mode of production, Marxist or Weberian.

Dependency and Class

The migration of dependency theory from Latin America had for a time an impact upon class theory. This approach, subjected to innumerable critiques (Cooper 1981), will be considered only in relation to its class logic. Its influence peaked in the mid-1970s; even reformulated as 'world systems' theory, as a comprehensive paradigm its credibility was short-lived. However, its impact upon orientations and perspectives has been lasting and important.

Because of its stress upon the linkage between Africa and the world economy, the dependency-induced class focus rests almost exclusively upon the class at the point of international capitalist penetration. In its most doctrinaire forms (Frank 1967, 1972), the dominant, indigenous class is nothing more than a deformed, comprador bourgeoisie. Other social classes fade into the distant mists of the 'periphery'. Leys (1974)—although a far more meticulous scholar than Frank—did closely approximate the unadulterated dependency model in his portrayal of the ruling class in Kenya as the junior partner of imperialism, created and placed in power by a carefully crafted decolonization strategy designed to maintain the bonds of dependency to international capitalism.

The utter untenability of the dependency position in its initial, crude Frank portrayal soon became apparent in Latin American studies, and engendered—under its stimulative goad—some far more nuanced and persuasive dependence-tinctured perspective on the dominant class. Cardoso and Faletto (1979) argue the importance of an autonomous national bourgeoisie, in a sometimes conflictual alliance with multinational capital in associated-dependent development. Evans (1979) extends this to stipulate a shifting, triple alliance between multi-national, State, and indigenous capital. A parallel reaction to the exaggerations of the neocolonial model occurred in Africa. Kenya and Ivory Coast were the primary locales for the debate which ensued: logically enough, as both—especially during the 'miracle' years of the 1960s and 1970s—through their robust growth rates and capitalist commitments were compelling refutations of the 'development of underdevelopment' thesis. In Kenya, Leys (1977, 1978) swiftly retreated from his initial position,
now finding dependency theory unenlightening, accepting the existence of an autonomous bourgeoisie, but doubting its capacities to invest on a sufficient scale for the necessary industrial base to be created. Swainson forcefully challenged the initial Leys view, arguing that the emergent Kenyan bourgeoisie was rooted in autonomous, internal accumulation (1980). Further important steps in this debate are taken by Leo (1984), who locates the primary dynamic of the Kenyan economy not in the agrarian Kenyan bourgeoisie at all, but in an expanding peasant society.

A parallel exchange occurred in the Ivory Coast setting. Campbell (1978) presented the pure neocolonial thesis, perceiving a dominant class created by and in the service of neocolonialism and international capital. Her interpretation, and others in the same vein, provoked a riposte along analytical lines similar to those of Cardoso and Faletto (1979) and Evans (1979), although not inspired by these works. In Ivory Coast, the new bourgeoisie issues more specifically from the State than in Kenya, although it too has roots in rural capitalism. Its most important analysts, Fauré and Médard (1982), utilize dependency theory as their negative point of reference in insisting upon the autonomy of the State, and its closely associated class.

Class Struggle

A venerable theme in Marxist analysis is the proposition that class is a relational concept, defined in conflict and struggle. This overlaps the mode of production debate, in the frequent insistence on social relations of production as determining factor. But often mode of production fades into the background, as it does in the line of reasoning of Wright (1982: 322-323):

'class struggle refers to the practices of individuals and collectivities in pursuit of class interests; class formation designates the social relations within each class that determine its capacity to pursue its interests; and class structure is the social relations between classes that determine or shape basic interests over which classes in formation struggle'.

The number of contributors to the debate on class struggle in Africa is large; restricting our canvas to the most recent, and setting aside the South African case, we may note Nzongola (1984a), François (1982), and Anyang' Nyong'o (1983). Each of these illuminates events in the cases described but they, like others in the mode, do not resolve the uncertainties of class definition through application of the struggle prism.

Notwithstanding the Wright injunction (1978: 30-110) to seek class definition only in struggle, and to abjure a simply pigeon-holing, geometric representation, and the elegant abstractions of the Poulantzas embroidery (1975) of an Althusserian text, with its incorporation of political and
ideological superstructures in the classforming matrix of struggle, the dilemma remained. Struggle had serious shortcomings in fulfilling the analytical expectations invested in it. It was, to recollect the original title of the Shivji classic (1976), too often 'silent'. Overt conflict, along what might be viewed as class lines, was episodic, concealed in its anti-colonial phase by the imperative of unity, and often driven underground after independence by the ubiquity of autocracy—and, in the 1980s, by the widespread phenomenon of withdrawal and exit by lower strata. Shivji (ibid.), in his relentless pursuit of proletarian consciousness to be served by the proletarian ideology which he proposes, finds only sporadic 'moments of enthusiasm': unrest on the docks in the 1940s, a wave of factory dissidence at the beginning of the 1970s, triggered by the short-lived application of worker autonomy in the workplace. Struggle had the further inconvenience of more frequently—when it did become manifest—flowing along ethnic lines of cleavage. Moments of overt conflict are indeed revelatory as to the most important fault lines of civil society; however, scrutiny of moments of struggle alone is incapable of the pedagogical burden some would have it carry. The well-turned aphorism of Przeworski (1977: 372) is called to mind: 'The ideological class struggle is a struggle about classes before it is a struggle among classes'.

Political Determination

Sklar, in a seminal article (1979), introduced a wholly new dimension, implicit in various earlier contributions, in transferring the dynamic of class formation out of the economic and into the political realm. Drawing upon the Ossowski observation (1963) that in both State socialist and advanced capitalist settings, control over the 'means of consumption' and 'means of compulsion' must be included in class determination, he makes the critical assertion: 'class relations, at bottom, are determined by relations of power, not production' (ibid.: 537). A similar argument, somewhat differently worded, is encountered in Fauré and Médard (1982: 125): 'The State in Ivory Coast, because of its weak degree of institutionalization and autonomy in relation to society, is largely indistinguishable from the ruling class which provides its substance and its raison d’être. Conversely, it is the relationship to the State which, directly or indirectly, determines the very existence of this ruling class'.

The Marxist intellectual heritage was indispensable for formulation of the class determination issue in these terms. A willingness to venture beyond its confines was crucial to this penetrating and productive perspective. Indeed, the Sklar theory of the dominance of power

14. The Sklar argument is foreshadowed in some passages of the seminal review of class formation in Africa by Robin Cohen (1972).
relations in class formation opened the way for an increased interaction between Marxist and non-Marxist intellectual currents—or, as others might put it, a selective appropriation of Marxist ideas by non-Marxists. We may note as well intriguing parallels with the logic of the political determination and instrumentalist approaches to ethnicity. Sklar, one must add, employs this model only to identify the dominant class, not the subordinated social categories. The intimate interpenetration of the dominant class and the State, stressed by Fauré and Médard, pointed toward a possible integration of currents of 'statist' analysis which have emerged in the 1980s (Bayard 1979; Callaghy 1984; Kasfir 1984; Young & Turner 1985) and class-based paradigms.

Class as Contextual

Another stimulating model is proposed by Schatzberg (1980), who likewise pursues a primarily political mode of reasoning. The core of his position is summarized in three propositions:

'(1) Social classes are constantly changing in response to differing sociopolitical contexts. (2) The individual can, and does, belong to differing class alliances at the same time. (3) The degree of class identity will vary depending upon the geographic, social, political, and economic junctures of the moment in question' (p. 31).

The linkage between this argument and the thrust of situationalist, circumstantialist, contextual theories of ethnicity will be at once apparent; their resemblance is purely intentional.

Naturally, this perspective cannot be squared with any of the many fragments of Marxist theory in Africa. Not only is the Althusserian-Poulantzian economic determination 'in the last instance' banished, but the fluctuating, fluid, ephemeral, and ever-changing view of class is beyond the boundaries of acceptable heterodoxy. It does indeed have the limitation of generating an infinitely complex and mutable theory of class, incapable of generating general categories of class taxonomies though possibly contexts may be classified. It does nonetheless constitute an effective method of analysis in a particular situation, as many readers of his captivating examination of the class-politics interplay in Lisala have found.

A quite different source of class derivation is suggested in a remarkable study by Vwakyanakazi (1982): interrogation of the social consciousness. The possibilities of this approach are suggested in a parable he encountered in a research visit to his home area, after some years of absence. This colorful fable captured, in a kind of Geertzian 'thick description', popular understandings of class formation and struggle in their immediate environment:
'Once upon a time God, who created the world, decided to reward his sons living in this earth. He warned them in advance that he would throw down from heaven two packages containing the different rewards. On the day agreed upon the two packages were thrown down from heaven. The elder son rushed forward to the bigger package, leaving the smaller one to the younger son.

The two packages were opened in front of the assembly, filled with wonder. The bigger package contained French, a very good French. The smaller package contained money, a lot of money and the necessary skills to increase its amount.

The elder son is the ancestor of the intellectuals. These master French and speak a refined French, indeed. But they eat cow skin. The younger son is the ancestor of the traders. They speak little French, if any. But they were rewarded with the money and the skills to increase its amount.

The history of Butembo is the history of a battle between these two packages' (p. 1).

Nzongola, in an early article (1970), drew in part upon this technique, while noting the correspondence that could be established with more conventional class categories. Pierre Mulele, the most ideologically interesting of the leaders of the 1963-65 ‘Congo rebellions’, offered a folk Communist manifesto which proceeded in similar vein. Such an approach may also draw upon the valuable work now in progress around the ‘modes d’action populaire’ group in Paris led by Bayart. Its promise is also validated in the latest Scott work (1985), founded upon long immersion in a Malaysian village, listening to the often furtive and even secret texts of perceived inequality oppression, and everyday resistance.

Interrogation of the social consciousness beckons the particular, and pulls analysis away from the general and the comparative. But the broad similarities throughout at least sub-Saharan Africa would doubtless produce a large degree of convergence. Insofar as behavior is filtered through consciousness, folk categories may be a more reliable guide than externally borrowed or deductively generated ones. Here one may recall the cautionary note of Leys (1971: 307) on imported class models:

'Any attempt to present Kenyan politics purely in terms of antagonism between classes tends to appear artificial. This is partly because of the difficulty of finding Kenyan equivalents for the most familiar Marxian class categories. While it may be possible to talk of an embryonic haute bourgeoisie, it is extremely difficult to speak intelligibly about a proletariat, and the classic problem of analyzing the all-important and diverse socio-political characteristics of the peasantry must always be solved afresh in this context; while all of these concepts tend to obscure the equally obvious patterns of relationships based on lineage and locality which cut across the objective base of class identification'.

Class Categories

These Leys observations may serve as a useful bridge to the next issue, the specific debates which have arisen hinging upon the major categories of class analysis. However valiantly one struggles against the reduction
of considerations about class to a taxonomical discussion, the question presses itself upon us. The necessary dialectic between the theoretical and the empirical, structuralist Marxism notwithstanding, enters in. The vast heritage of cumulated class inquiry, over the last 150 years, cannot be dismissed; it has supplied a deeply entrenched set of categories of thought which have found their way into the major political ideologies, and feed into the evolving African social consciousness through several channels. At the same time, this discourse is modified by the analyst, the political leader, and various echelons of civil society in their diverse efforts to obtain conceptual purchase on the everyday world. But at all levels inequality—everywhere perceived—cannot be captured or expressed without metaphorical representation. Otherwise put, class analysis, without its categories, is stripped blushingly naked.

We will not discuss all categories on the social hierarchy; the worker and peasant debates have been well covered in recent comprehensive and valuable articles (Freund 1984; Berry 1984b). At the summit, one at once encounters the colonial origins of the contemporary ranking. In the still-recent past, the dominant class was a racially defined alien group. Only in South Africa is the racial hierarchy fully maintained, perceived by Africans, as Nolutshungu (1982: 193) suggests, as identifying Whites as 'legatees of colonial dispossession', with an 'asserted continuity between colonial domination and present-day white supremacy'. However, in most other States there remains a 'foreign estate', of varying size and influence. Outside of South Africa, this 'foreign estate' remains little examined; among the rare exceptions are R. Cruise O'Brien (1972) on Senegal, Wasserman (1976) on Kenya, and—at a purely anecdotal but richly informative level—Péan (1983) on Gabon. They may control some parts of the productive apparatus, and their standard-setting opulence reflects their disproportionate role in the Ossowski 'means of consumption'; however, they rarely control the means of compulsion.

The foreign estate is not to be confused with the 'metropolitan bourgeoisie', which Shivji (1976) and some others assert to be the ultimate ruling class. The 'metropolitan' (or 'international') bourgeoisie, if such a collective indeed exists, is on the whole supremely indifferent to Africa. If the term is held to refer to the more specific assemblage of persons and economic organizations with some interest in a particular country, we no longer have a class but an interest group—in truth, several interest groups, as in any specific case they are likely to be torn by rivalries and hold conflicting goals—an observation which also holds for the foreign estate in most African States, as it has several national components, with different institutional niches: international banks, multinationals, embassies, international agencies.

Much of the class debate has—appropriately enough—pivoted upon the definition of the dominant class, an issue already introduced in the
preceding section. Rare in analysis is identification of the ruling African group as simply a ‘bourgeoisie’: almost always some modifier has been applied. Since Dumont (1962: 66) first wrote of ‘a bourgeoisie of a new type, that Karl Marx could hardly have foreseen: a bourgeoisie of the public service’, the most widespread tendency has been to employ a label which highlights the connection to the State: ‘bureaucratic’ (Shivji 1976), ‘organizational’ (Markovitz 1977), ‘State’ (Amin 1970), ‘managerial’ (Sklar 1975).

Virtually everywhere, the dominant class owed its standing to control of the State. Over time, from its point of departure as a terminal colonial petty bourgeoisie, power has given access to accumulation of wealth; in most instances this has been invested in ventures with the promise of rapid turnover (urban property, transport, import-export businesses), rather than long-term productive assets. It is also reasonable to argue, as do Sklar and Markovitz, that not only are politicians and the top end of the public service to be included, closely linked are the managers of the sprawling parastatal sector, and African cadres of multinational business.

In objectifying this social category as a dominant class, important qualifications are required. The group is singularly insecure in many countries; its capacity to reproduce itself over time remains to be demonstrated, in spite of efforts to acquire overseas assets and heavy investment in education for offspring. To perceive it as a ruling class overlooks the personalist, patrimonial character of the exercise of power; its members are neither autonomous of the State, nor—more serious—of the ruler (Jackson & Rosberg 1982). They are, in many respects, a service class, furthermore splintered by faction, ethnicity, and—sometimes—ideology (Sudan, for example, or Congo-Brazzaville).

The nature, orientation, likely future trajectory, and even the interests of this class remain an open question. The unresolved issues are rendered more perplexing by the environment of prolonged economic crisis likely to prevail in many, if not most, African States during the balance of this century. In a setting of extreme scarcity and insecurity, joined to the phenomenon of ‘pirate’ or ‘patrimonial’ capitalism, the impulse to accumulate, individually and collectively, is driven into channels of short-term return or capital export.

There will doubtless be a growing range of differentiation reflecting particular circumstances in various African States. The relative importance of State and market as propelling forces in class formation varies widely. The texture of ‘capitalism’ is sharply different in post-inflah Egypt, with its swiftly emergent mercantile-contracting class (Waterbury 1983), and ‘prebendal’ Nigeria. In the latter case, as Joseph (1984: 25) argues, ‘investible capital is diverted into discretionary consumption and real estate speculation’, whose bourgeoisie’s ‘rapacious economic activities impelled it to fragment and abuse State power’. 
Kenya approximates more closely, in the eyes of some analysts (Swains-
son 1980), a setting where a capitalist class of more classical hue can be
perceived. Baylies (1978) claims that a similar process is in course in
Zambia. Yet another setting is provided by ‘magendo’ economies in
stricken polities such as Uganda; here both State and market defy rational
calculation and predictability. As Kasfir (1984: 101) suggests, the ‘State
may sometimes be the principal cause of class destruction’; as its relevance
diminishes in a shrinking economy, and black markets come to dominate,
‘new and complex relationships [emerge] [...] that fundamentally alter
the formation of what may yet become the dominant class in Africa’.

The remarkable range of ideological orientation which came to
characterize African States in the 1970s is another intriguing indicator of
the fluid and problematic character of the dominant class. ‘Socialist
orientation’ may be espoused by States whose dominant groups differ
little from those in which a more capitalist preference is maintained (for
example, Tunisia and Algeria; Togo and Benin; Congo-Brazzaville and
Central African Republic). Socialism, it is true, is not a serious contender
in those States where relatively large mercantile or rural capitalist groups
are encountered, such as Kenya and Nigeria. ‘Socialism’ as practiced,
has facilitated income transfers from the peasantry to the bureaucracy,
as Ellis (1983) eloquently demonstrates for Tanzania. Soviet analysis
tends to impute the mutability and abrupt shifts in ideology to the
essentially ‘petty bourgeois’ character of the dominant group, thus
casting them in the role of vacillators (Kosukhin 1979). All of this
demonstrates the enormous range of possible interpretation.

Kosukhin leads us into the problematic category of the petty bourgeoisie.
It is, D. L. Cohen (1981: 97) tells us, ‘the most important focus for class
analysis of politics’. The analytical value of the term has been seriously
adulterated by the vast confusion and diversity in its usage—a difficulty
which began in the original Marxist texts which first gave rise to it. The
concept, in its apparently purest sense, refers to petty artisans and
shopkeepers, who depend on their own (or family) labor, and thus do not
extract surplus value. However, the term was also used to refer to
employees of large enterprises of bureaucracies, who did not own capital,
nor participate in the direct productive process (thus their labor was
‘unproductive’, but they did not directly exploit through extraction of
surplus value). The magnitude of the potential confusion is demonstrated
by Wright (1980), who shows that Marxist analysis ranges from a virtual
exclusion of the petty bourgeoisie, to a definition so broad (Poulantzas
1975) that it virtually swallows up all of society, and reduces the industrial
working class to a shrinking residual.

A number of analysts, beyond Soviet scholars, argue the view that the
incumbent African ruling class is a ‘petty bourgeoisie’; this is the position
adopted by Kitching (1980), in a historically rich and valuable study.
But the difficulties of such a notion become apparent in considering his definition.

'The household heads involved might be shopkeepers, primary school teachers, the local dispensary dresser, a successful trader, a civil servant or clerk, or a highly skilled and well-paid artisan [. . . ] these households slowly became the “reference group” for the entire African population' (p. 310).

In the next breath, however, we learn that this apparently modest stratum also includes the Kenyatta family and its vast conglomeration of assets.

According to Kitching, the petty bourgeoisie, at the present time, is simultaneously defined by its access to surplus product, primarily through the State (although not its direct control of the process by which wealth is created), and the ‘unproductive’ mode of labor. These criteria permit Kitching to conclude 'not only that Kenya’s ruling class is a petite bourgeoisie, but that Kenya is predominately a petit-bourgeois society' (ibid.: 452-453).

This argument, ingenious in its reasoning, and resting upon a subtle personal lecture of Marxism, presents difficulties. One may wonder about the explanatory value of the distinction between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ labor, or the cogency of a concept which places Jomo Kenyatta and the lonely primary school teacher on the shores of Lake Turkana (Rudolph) in the same category. Nor can one escape the burden of received meanings and connotations in a term such as ‘petty bourgeoisie’; the analyst is not free to undertake a personal appropriation of vocabulary so contaminated by past confusions.

In our view, the notion of the petty bourgeoisie is best reserved for small traders, artisans, teachers, soldiers, and the subaltern ranks of the public service. The present dominant class was recruited from the petty bourgeoisie, in most instances; however, its present role, status, and command of resources through proximity to power make inappropriate retention of a label which simply describes its origins. Three decades ago, the petty bourgeoisie was the top significant echelon of the African population, poised to profit from the unique historical occasion for class mobility provided for a significant fraction by decolonization. This moment has passed, and mechanisms of social closure have sprung into place setting barriers to their potential mobility—though inter-generational hopes remain, through the educational system. Driven, as Berry (1985) argues, by the nature of the State into self-limiting cycles of unproductive accumulation, the petty bourgeoisie has been a particular victim of the deteriorating economic conditions of the 1980s, and finds itself profoundly déclassé.

However, when closely scrutinized in any empirical setting, even ‘petty bourgeoisie’ in the sense proves to encompass troublesome diversities which suggest reification risks in analysis which constitutes this
category as collective social actor engaged in struggle. Nzongola (1983), in a subtle and illuminating text—founded upon the premise of class struggle as analytical touchstone—, shows the ambiguities, contradictions, and divergencies within the class. Speaking of colonial Zaire, his lucid study well shows the particularity of interests and social identifications of subaltern State agents (at once contenders for évolué status in the colonial hierarchy and anticolonial nationalists), traders, domestic servants and mission employees (the latter two often affectively attached to their individual or institutional patrons, who enjoy a Gramscian ideological hegemony as well as material domination). Classes dissolve into fractions, permitting interest group theory to creep unhidden into the chamber of class analysis.

The absence of consensus on vocabulary or categories of class analysis, and the frequent shifts in usage by a single author are symptomatic of the complexity and uncertainty of the empirical world. Some, such as Shivji, borrow the Poulantzian concept of a ‘hegemonic bloc’ composed of ‘class fractions’ to evade the terminological dilemmas. Once class becomes fractionated, however, it swiftly loses its distinctiveness as a mode of analysis. ‘Class fractions’ turn out to be occupational categories, and the analytical logic comes to resemble interest group theory.

The ranks of the impoverished sectors of African society have been given admirable recapitulation by Freund (1984) and Berry (1984a). It seems pointless to condense a rich debate concerning worker and peasant each requiring fifty pages of text in two or three, all the more since on key points our judgments differ little from those of these authors. Let us instead turn to the class-ethnicity nexus, before offering a few concluding observations.

Class and Ethnicity

An invisible wall has separated ethnicity and class analysis, which has only infrequently been scaled. The barrier is high, partly because of the bifurcation of scholarship into liberal and radical streams, and related differences in underlying epistemologies. On both sides of the wall, analysts tend to concede that the other exists, then proceed to ignore or trivialize it. Ethnicity and class are autonomous determinants of social action: this must be conceded for any fruitful synthesis to occur. Neither can be reduced, without banalization, to a simple derivative of the other.

They differ in the forms of consciousness evoked, and the social idiom through which they are expressed. Ethnicity, an affective phenomenon by definition, is more readily mobilized, through mechanisms well explored in the literature. Class, because it is founded upon economic
inequality, and embedded within the most influential contemporary political ideologies, may be a more deeply-rooted basis of conflict. Its activation requires assimilation into the social consciousness by metaphorical representations which move class beyond the deductive realm of academic discourse into the arena of popular conflict.

Where regional disparities in economic well-being and social mobility opportunities are pronounced, ethnicity and class tend to fuse, both in the analytical mind and the popular imagination. The juncture permits each mode of analysis to appropriate the other as dependent variable. The dramatic illumination of the issues of 'domination' and 'distribution' explain the elemental force of class and ethnicity fused, perceived with particular force in Rwanda (1959), Zanzibar (1964) and Burundi (1972)—and, in the race/class issue, South Africa continuously.

One suggested site of juncture between class and ethnicity lies in the pervasive realm of patrimonialism and clientelism, to which systematic attention was drawn initially by seminal articles by Lemarchand (1972) and Scott (1972). The clientelist net, from the top, is a mechanism of control; from the bottom, it is a mechanism offering the poor access to the State, to secure favors within its authority or to mitigate its extractive impact, based upon the 'economy of affection'. The complexity of these networks, their frequently ephemeral character, and their elusiveness have made systematic analysis difficult. The most eloquent treatments, such as the Joseph theory (1984) of 'prebendal politics' in Nigeria or the Lemarchand treatment (1986) of factional politics in Zaire, provide a persuasive intuitive framework, yet remain tantalizingly allusive and metaphorical. Crucial questions remain unanswered; is, as Flynn (1974) argues, clientelism simply a mechanism of class domination, or, as Hyden (1980) suggests, one more device by which the State is softened by its peasant periphery, and 'capture' is evaded? Is the flow of resources downwards or upwards?

More important, for our purposes, is the absence as yet of any conceptually compelling linkage of class and ethnicity through the bridge of clientelism, beyond the intuition that we should be able to discern its spans through the patrimonial mists. Suggestive assertions sprinkle the literature. Mwabila (1980: 266-267) argues, in the Zaire case, that the phenomenon of clientelism made possible a 'new type of class alliance founded on ethnic solidarity [. . .] in fact, an alliance within which there occurred a kind of chain of clientelization, internal to the ethnic group, whose final object was to hoist the wealthy members of the ethnic group, into the proximity of political power, so that the "interests" of ethnic group [. . .] might be protected'. Jewsiewicki (1983) adds that ethnicity is an 'initial instrument' joining through clientelism the urban and rural worlds, which through the collective representations by which it is expressed negate class solidarities. Ethnicity is lived in everyday
experience through countless clientelistic relationships, which cumulatively fragment emergent classes, thus sparing the State the need to repress social conflicts.

These insightful formulations fall well short of systematic theory. Particularly striking is the lack of analytical connecting tissue joining clientelism, class, and ethnicity in Senegal, a uniquely privileged terrain for patron-client nets. Clientelism in Senegalese politics has been eloquently chronicled, by D. B. Cruise O'Brien (1975) and Cottingham (1969), among many others. But, beyond the insipid insight that, functionally viewed, dominant class interests are well served by its mechanisms, the class/clientelism dynamic remains a tantalizing invitation to more thorough conceptual elucidation. Even more remarkable is the unexplained puzzle of the exceptional 'ethnic peace' in super-clientelized Senegal, which a recent Soviet analyst attributes to the powerful trend towards 'wolofisation' of Senegalese society (Kalshchikov 1984).

Perhaps the most striking measure of the separate development of ethnicity and class as fields of inquiry is the absence of any major monograph systematically integrating these themes. One may find a number of articles of more modest dimension (Samoff 1983; Schatzberg 1982; Saul 1979: 391-428; Jewsiewicki 1983). These studies, though constructed from different perspectives, cover rather similar ground. They are suggestive, and tend to converge on the State as arena for their interaction, with clientelism as mediating link, and ethnicity as a factor diffusing and potential class conflict. None of them go beyond the discursive synthesis of secondary literature, or retrospective re-examination of field data. The obstacles in the path of a major, empirical study of this nature require no elaboration. In the absence of such work, many unanswered questions remain concerning the precise nature of class-ethnicity linkages, the varieties of interaction in the many sites of social encounter (workplace, school, government office, neighborhood, marketplace), the changing forms of consciousness in the face of deteriorating economic circumstances and the rise of 'suffermanage' coping strategies (Chazan 1982).

The closest analogue to a full class-ethnicity dialogue is to be found in the race-class debates concerning South Africa, which gained force in the 1970s. This energetic exchange, however interesting, is entirely specific to South Africa. Race, as we have argued, is not precisely comparable to ethnicity; it lacks the primordial properties, and confounding complexities of the ethnic idiom. Race is the basis of a rigorously hierarchial cultural order, which stands in contrast to what Horowitz (1985) terms the unranked multi-ethnic domains to the north. This means that the interface between race and class is not simply the outcome of 'uneven development' or a conjunctural result of competition, but rather inscribed
in public law and enforced by multiple mechanisms of coercion. Finally, the race-class juncture is joined to a capitalist order far closer to both Marxist and Weberian concepts than elsewhere.

The hinge of the race-class debate, accordingly, turned upon the character of its connection to capitalism (Lipton 1986). Liberal scholarship, such as L. Kuper (1974) tended to view racialist State ideology as an aberration, which over time would give way to the levelling impact of capitalist economic development. Revisionist analysis of the Marxist school, on the contrary, tends to assert that racial supremacy, in its apartheid form, is a functional requisite of South African capitalism (Greenberg 1980; O'Meara 1983; Davies 1979; Johnstone 1976; Wolpe 1972; Saul & Gelb 1981; Magubane 1979). This debate is given cogent and telling critique by Posel (1983), who takes issue with the functionalist and reductionist premises of the revisionists, in calling for an integration of the liberal and radical approaches.

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One significant trend is the growing regionalization of class analysis. This reflects, in important measure, the increasingly significant impact of African contributions, much more likely to be tied to a particular geographic sphere. Egypt, intellectually and analytically, belongs to a Middle Eastern mode of analysis. The Mahgreb, West Africa, East Africa, Ethiopia, Lusophone Africa, Southern Africa: so many distinct analytical realms, with specific problematics. Thus historical processes and class configurations differ sharply. Egypt, in its successive phases from the State-building of Mohammed Ali to the present post-\textit{infitah} era, has relatively little in common with South Africa, and the fateful hinge of the race-class nexus. Ethiopia, with its arguably feudal baseline, has a class pattern which resists common analysis with Tanzania, natural laboratory for ‘peasant mode of production’ debates. There has been a tendency—shared by this analysis—to conflate analysis generated within a regionally-specific environment upon the overly vast canvas of the entire continent.

Secondly, there is probably a retreat in progress from general paradigms. In different ways, this is reflected in the virtual abandonment by liberal scholars of the most ambitious collective venture in theory construction, the ‘structural-functional’ theory associated with the former SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics. Within the realm of Marxist discourse, it is embodied in the growing fragmentation and diversification of approaches, as applied to social class.

Thirdly, we may suggest that, of the three themes reviewed, nationalism—aside from South Africa—has exhausted for the moment its possibilities as an analytical orientation, and as political discourse. Ethnicity analysis has reached a plateau to which only the enrichment of a wholly
new empirical infusion, or improbably original reconceptualization, can impart new momentum. Class, by some distance the richest, partly because of its constant dynamic of fission, seems likely to attract the most numerous intellectual energies, and original departures. However, it appears to have a vocation of dissensus, and its accomplishments fall far short of the claims of most of its practitioners. Most fundamentally class paradigms have as vocation the explication of conflict, yet provide a transparently inadequate and incomplete model of the empirical realities of everyday struggle.

Fourthly, all themes are challenged by some important new cognate fields of inquiry. The growing body of gender studies, which actively seek incorporation into other problematics, pose crucial new questions, interrogating most obviously class models. Illustrative is the seminal Robertson monograph (1984), which argues the central place occupied by gender in class formation in Ghana. The 'State' orientation is a second category of theoretical framework whose arguments have yet to receive full consideration, a point argued, for example, by Giddens (1981) and Fossaert (1977-81). Subsidiary to this focus is the new issue of State decline (Chazan 1982). The grim economic prospects facing many African States may create new situations calling into question various assumptions of all three themes.

The three, taken together, incorporate or at least intersect a very broad swath of contemporary scholarship. This article could scarcely hope to comprehensively treat all aspects of the extraordinary range of topics which, in one way or another, have some tangency with nationalism, ethnicity, or class. Perhaps the most fitting tribute to the richness of the material we have considered is the confession that many more questions have been raised than answered.

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