Résumé
D. C. Hindson — Urbanisation et contrôle de l'immigration : de l'apartheid territorial à l'organisation régionale de l'espace en Afrique du Sud.
Examen critique de la stratégie d'« urbanisation dans l'ordre » recommandée par le rapport de la commission présidentielle sur « Une stratégie d'urbanisation pour la république d'Afrique du Sud », publié en septembre 1985. L'article, écrit en novembre 1985, commence par la description de la politique urbaine pendant les trois premières décennies de l'apartheid. Il montre ensuite en quoi l'« urbanisation dans l'ordre » rejette ou retient divers facteurs de l'apartheid traditionnel. La politique proposée est liée aux stratégies d'emploi et de développement régional de l'État sud-africain. Certains de ses traits constituent un progrès par rapport à l'apartheid traditionnel, mais tendent à résoudre les problèmes urbains en mettant le coût de l'urbanisation à la charge des fractions les plus pauvres de la classe ouvrière. Cette politique d'« urbanisation dans l'ordre » s'intègre dans les projets constitutionnels à base raciale et ethnique du Parti nationaliste, perpétuant ainsi une forme d'apartheid décentralisé.

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Orderly Urbanization and Influx Control
From Territorial Apartheid to Regional Spacial Ordering in South Africa

The President’s Council (PC)\textsuperscript{1} report entitled ‘An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa’ (South Africa, President’s Council Report, 1985), which appeared late in September 1985, sets out a policy which relinquishes the original objectives of territorial apartheid—but not necessarily of residential apartheid—and calls for the abolition of influx control and the pass laws. Its premise is that urbanization is both inevitable and economically desirable. It argues that State intervention in this process should be restricted to ensuring that urbanization occurs in a planned or ‘orderly’ fashion. It recommends that pass controls over movement and settlement should be replaced by racially neutral measures such as slums, squatter, and health laws, and that these should be linked to indirect measures to promote residential dispersal or ‘deconcentration’ in and around the metropolitan centres of the country.

The report is now (mid-November 1985) under consideration by government and it remains to be seen whether it will be accepted in whole or part. However, the fact that it is the latest contribution to the major overhaul of official policy taking place in South Africa, and that it inter-

\textsuperscript{1} The President’s Council was set up in 1983 as an advisory body to the President. It comprises elected members from the three racially constituted parliamentary chambers and members appointed directly by the President. Its role has been to re-formulate policy within the framework of the State’s ‘Total Strategy’, which entails the incorporation of Asian and coloured people into (racially divided) parliamentary structures, and the creation of some form of confederal arrangement between the Republic of South Africa and the Bantustans. Since late 1984, it has turned its attention to widening the basis of reform by extending citizenship to black South Africans inside and outside the Bantustans, and is attempting to devise means by which some sections of the black population may be included within central State representative structures, probably on a racially and ethnically divided basis.
locks with recently accepted policy changes in the fields of industrial location strategy and local and second tier government, makes it likely that the Nationalist party will accept the substance of the report and weave the recommendations into its evolving constitutional plans. Current indications are that the Nationalist party’s preferred options entail variants of a geographically and ethnically based federal/confederal order for South Africa.2

This paper aims to address a number of questions relating to the urbanization strategy set out in the PC report: how does this strategy differ from that followed under apartheid; what accounts for this shift in orientation in the 1980s; what are the dimensions and what is the content of the new policy; what are its shortcomings and how could it be turned to advantage to meet the needs of South Africa’s urbanizing people.

The paper begins with a review of traditional apartheid, then discusses the modifications entertained by the Riekert report of 1979 (South Africa 1979a). The third part asks why the Riekert strategy failed despite repeated attempts to implement it in the five years after the acceptance of its recommendations by government (South Africa 1979b). The last part of the paper examines the PC’s urbanization strategy, shows how it is connected with developments relating to industrial location and local government policy, and discusses some of its shortcomings.

Traditional Apartheid and African Urbanization Apartheid

On coming to power in 1948, the Nationalist party began implementing an urbanization policy based on the recommendations of the Sauer report.3 The Sauer report had called for measures which would slow down and eventually reverse the movement of Africans into the White-controlled urban areas. The long term aim was to settle all Africans in territorially segregated areas on an ethnic basis. These were ultimately to be developed into economically and politically independent units. However, in the transition period to full territorial apartheid, urbanized Africans should, the Sauer report argued, be given temporary residence rights and preferential access to urban jobs, on condition that they remained economically active (capable of work) and did not fall into idleness. While in town, their legal status should be that of politically rightless temporary visitors.

The recommendations of the Sauer report were translated into legis-

2. This issue is discussed in COBBETT et al. 1986. See also Star (Johannesburg), 1 Dec. 1985, for the latest in a long series of speculations about this issue.
lation through the amendment of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act in 1952. Section 10 of the Act provided that no black person could remain in a prescribed urban area for more than 72 hours unless he had obtained permission from the local labour bureau. This measure became, and remains (December 1985), the primary instrument for the regulation of the influx of Africans into the urban areas.

Section 10 made a clear distinction between Africans who could acquire permanent exemption (or, more accurately, exemptions which were not annually renewable) from the prohibition over presence in an area, and those who could acquire only temporary exemption. The measure thus reduced all Africans to the legal status of temporary residents in town but, through the permit system, it introduced a sharp administrative distinction between permanent and temporary residents. Despite the tenuousness of the permanent residence qualification under Section 10, this privilege was in later decades to be tenaciously defended by those who had acquired it. Today, Section 10 residence permits are regarded by their holders as proof of their right to live in the relevant prescribed area, and are widely referred to in the literature, in the media, and on occasion even by the authorities, as 'Section 10 rights'.

Controls over the movement and settlement of Africans were exercised by labour bureaux working in conjunction with the reference bureau system. The Central Reference Bureau is a population identification, registration and monitoring apparatus. It issues all Africans over the age of fifteen with documents of identification—the pass book—into which their work and residence permits are entered by a local (urban) or district (rural) labour bureau. In terms of regulations under the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act, as well as several other pieces of legislation, these documents have to be produced on demand for inspection by police or labour bureau officials. By registering employment contracts, issuing and withholding residence permits, labour bureaux have become the primary mechanisms concerned with the monitoring and policing of African movement, settlement and employment at local and district level.

Influx control is exercised in terms of Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act through the mounting of road blocks, street- and transport-related checks and night raids into the townships and the white suburbs (where servants quarters are inspected for illegal lodgers). In all these cases, the onus is on a pass bearer to prove his or her right to be in an area by producing the pass book on the spot, and satisfying the inspecting officer that it contains the necessary endorsements. This requirement was to

give rise to huge numbers of purely documentary or so-called technical offenses under the pass laws. It also ensured that all Africans, regardless of whether they had temporary or permanent resident permits, or were legally or illegally in an area, would be vulnerable, and periodically subjected to harassment, punishment and humiliation under the pass laws (Hindson 1983).

Despite the privileges accorded Africans deemed by officialdom to be permanently settled in town, the pass system evoked a burning sense of grievance amongst all sections of the urban African population. It became the focus of mass political mobilization through the anti-pass campaigns of the 1950s.

Nonetheless, a crucial effect of the implementation of this policy during the first decade of apartheid—the 1950s—was that it divided the African urban population into two segments: a permanently settled group, rehoused in family dwelling units in the newly established, residentially segregated townships on the peripheries of the South Africa’s cities, and a temporary migrant work force accommodated in single-sex compounds and hostels, or as lodgers with urban families.

Section 10 provided the means both of blocking and reversing African urbanization and of fostering it through coercive occupational immobilization and residential stabilization of people who qualified for permanent residence rights. Influx controls, job allocation and housing policies, and the municipal tax and expenditure system were consciously manipulated by local authorities to improve the economic welfare of settled urban dwellers relative to temporary migrants. The effect of these measures was to promote a process of stratification within the urban African population. I have examined (ibid.) this process in some detail in an earlier work where I advanced the argument that the pass system in the post-World War II period functioned to reproduce differentiated forms of African labour power.

The defeat of organized African resistance to the pass system in the early 1960s cleared the way for the extension and streamlining of the administrative machinery of pass control. This led to a more determined and ruthless implementation of territorial apartheid. From the early 1960s to the early 1970s, influx control was greatly intensified and the acquisition of permanent residence permits became increasingly difficult. A regulation introduced in 1968 sought to cut off Section 10 (1) b as a route for permanent urban settlement by making employment contracts under Section 10 (1) d of the Urban Areas Act annually renewable under the 'call-in-card' system. This secured for management an occupationally stable work force, while continuing to relieve the local authorities of the reproduction cost of migrant families. At this time too, an attack was launched against African women attempting to settle in town, through the amendment of Section 10 (1) c in ways which made the
acquisition of residence rights difficult or impossible.\textsuperscript{6} And at one point a bill was drawn up which aimed to remove Section 10 in its entirety, thereby opening the way for the final phase of the Sauer strategy: the reversal of African urbanization through outright removal of settled urban populations to the Bantustans.\textsuperscript{7} This bill, which marks the high tide of legislative apartheid, failed to pass into legislation.

Notwithstanding the failure to remove Section 10 from the statutes, implementation of territorial apartheid continued apace in the 1960s and 1970s. In the white urban areas, African township housing construction slowed down, and eventually came to a standstill. Only single-sex hostel accommodation was expanded to meet the ever growing needs of industry, commerce and the service sectors for African labour. From the late 1960s new commuter townships were erected only within the Bantustans in locations abutting the white cities. In some places, such as Umlazi, near Durban, existing black townships were simply incorporated into the Bantustans by re-defining political boundaries. In other cases, there was physical relocation, involving the demolition of existing townships and forced resettlement to the Bantustans. The effect of these moves was to bring into being a new official category of black labour: the so-called cross-border commuter.

To complement the policy of population relocation, a vigorous policy of industrial decentralization to the borders between the Bantustans and white areas was implemented, especially from the late 1960s onwards.\textsuperscript{8} Cross-border commuting was a compromise between the aim of securing the economic and political independence of the Bantustans, and the demands of industry and commerce in the White-controlled urban areas for an expanding African work force. Restricting political rights to the Bantustans was justified by the State in terms of the fact that Africans were domiciled there.

The housing relocation and industrial decentralization policies of the late 1960s marked an important change in the means of regulating black urbanization: from direct controls over presence, employment and residence of individuals and their families within existing urban areas, to indirect measures aimed at generating employment and housing away from these areas. The relocation of housing and employment in and near the Bantustans was intended to attract Africans away from the prescribed urban areas, whereas pass and influx controls had sought to prevent them from staying, by imposing penal sanctions on illegal presence. In practice, though, the impact of industrial decentralization

\textsuperscript{6} Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 42/1964.

\textsuperscript{7} Bantu Laws Amendment Bill, 1967.

\textsuperscript{8} Details of these and other removals have been recorded by the Surplus People Project 1983.
on employment location was at first only slight (Bell 1973). The State continued to rely on direct coercion to achieve the aims of territorial racial separation.

The Riekert Reforms of 1979: Adjustments within the Framework of Territorial Apartheid

The reform policy set out by the Riekert Commission was premised on the acceptance of the basic territorial and political assumptions of traditional apartheid, specifically that Africans in the urban areas should continue to exercise their national political rights solely in the Bantustans (South Africa 1979a: §1.8-1.9). Integral to this policy framework was also the assumption that within the white urban areas Africans would continue to be confined to residentially segregated towns with self-financing local authorities separated from white, coloured and Asian local authorities.

Where the policy differed from that originally laid out by the Sauer Commission was over official recognition of the settled township dwellers' right to remain in the cities and towns of white South Africa. The Riekert Commission argued that the de facto permanence of this group should be acknowledged in law, not merely through administrative fiat. Urban residents who had acquired permanent residence rights under Section 10 should be allowed to move to and work in any urban area, subject to the availability of housing of an approved standard. They should also be allowed to participate in (racially segregated) local government structures with increased powers and greater autonomy from the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (now called Development Boards).9

The key issues in determining whether or not occupational mobility would in fact be promoted by these reforms was the availability and standard of employment and housing in the urban areas. What had traditionally been deemed by the Boards to be 'suitable' employment was wage labour provided by (mainly white) employers in the formal or registered sector of the urban economy. 'Approved' accommodation meant Board-controlled or -supervised township houses, hostels and compounds. In part, the Riekert strategy was to fail because of shrinking urban employment and chronic housing shortages.

In place of the restrictions over physical presence in an area, which were applied under Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act, the Riekert Commission

9. The Bantu Affairs Administration Boards were set up under the Bantu Affairs Administration Act, 45/1971. They took charge of all aspects of the administration of black townships: recruitment, employment registration and job allocation.
advocated the use of housing- and employment-related controls to regulate population movement and settlement. It called for large increases in fines for illegal employment and residence. By these means it intended to lift the burden of influx control from the black worker or township lodger, and place it on the white employer and black township householder. If these employment- and housing-linked control measures were successful, the report argued, it would be possible to do away with Section 10, and the racially discriminatory pass control measures associated with it.

The Riekert Commission envisaged a process whereby central State control of the townships by the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards would gradually give way to decentralized structures under the control of black local authorities. The devolution of powers to these would be accompanied by the withdrawal of central State subsidization of local government expenditures, and the development of a system of self-financing of the townships based on rates and taxes levied on home owners and black businessmen. This attempt to displace the full costs of reproduction of the townships onto their inhabitants was to provoke widespread opposition to township administration, even during the upswing which happened to follow hard on the publication of the Riekert report. Continued efforts to remove rent subsidies during the period of recession—from 1982 onwards—contributed to the township revolt of the mid-1980s. It was this revolt that finally drove the State to seek new and more radical alternatives to the Riekert strategy.

The corollary of the acceptance of the permanence of settled urban Africans, and of the development of fiscally independent black local authorities, was that this section of the urban black population should be protected from the competition of African workers domiciled in the Bantustans—i.e. from competition for jobs and homes by ‘outsiders’.

To achieve this, the Commission called for strict measures to control the influx of people without Section 10 (r) a, b, and c exemptions into the cities. It called for establishment of assembly centres (centralized labour bureaux-cum-border posts) near the borders with the Bantustans, to regulate the recruitment and employment of workers. In the black townships, decentralized labour exchanges, called guidance and placement centres, were to be set up to promote the occupational appointment of local residents. Thus the existing system of local, district and regional labour bureaux was to be replaced by a dual structure corresponding to the division within the labour market between urban insiders and outsiders.

While the Commission stressed the need to abandon the more directly repressive and racially discriminatory aspects of pass control, it did not show how this could be done without weakening the entire influx-control system. Its call for the establishment of an assembly centre system contradicted this intention in that this machinery would theoretically
have strengthened the State's capacity to exercise control over African urbanization in the white urban areas.\textsuperscript{10}

The Commission gave scant attention to the employment and income needs of workers excluded from the urban areas, beyond a vague call for the further economic development of the Bantustans and a more vigorous industrial decentralization policy. Apart from one brief reference, it ignored the question of the specific position of cross-border commuters within the framework of its urbanization policy, and considered that only township dwellers under the control of the Administration Boards were part of the settled urban population.\textsuperscript{11}

Although the Commission was clearly aware of the futility (to use its own description) of influx control in the face of mounting rural poverty and unemployment, it did not give serious consideration to the implications this held for the process of black urbanization: namely that the rural poor would move to the cities whatever the controls, since for many the stark alternative was starvation. Furthermore, although it was conscious of the growth of the cross-border commuter population, it failed to recognize the profound implications of this system for the policy of territorial apartheid. It did not occur to the Commission that the large scale urbanization of black people within the Bantustans in areas situated near to the White-controlled metropolitan centres of the country, and their dependence on employment within those areas, had already effectively undercut the basis and rationale for traditional territorial apartheid.

Within the planning and then the administrative branches of the State, the idea began to take root that cross-border commuters could be seen as part of the settled urban work force, rather than as temporary migrants from the Bantustans; that they could be conceived of as an integral part of new regional labour markets rather than as the hopelessly unemployed dumped in the Bantustans.\textsuperscript{12} Instead of imposing a burden on the treasury through subsidization of employment-creating industrial decentralization, this section of the working class could be re-integrated into the metropolitan regional economies and developed into a valuable supply of residentially stable and potentially productive labour.

However, this new conception of the role of commuters was not to spread widely until the mid-1980s. It was only in the context of deepening economic recession, mounting hostility to the Bantustan system and a worsening fiscal crisis of the central State that the position of commuters,

\textsuperscript{10} I have argued this in detail in my doctoral thesis (Hindson 1983).
\textsuperscript{11} Cf. South Africa 1979a: on commuting, see § 2.19, on industrial decentralization, see § 5.85.
\textsuperscript{12} One of the first writers to recognize this point was J. De Villiers Graaf 1984.
and with it the standing of the Bantustans themselves within South Africa’s political economy, began to be seriously reviewed by State planning authorities and the governing party’s leadership.

The Failure of the Riekert Reforms

The repeated attempts to implement the Riekert report’s recommendations in the five years following its publication all met with failure. Most damaging, the strategic aim of dividing the African urban population into insiders and outsiders did not materialize.

The fundamental weakness of the strategy set out by the Riekert Commission was that it attempted to resolve the crisis in the townships of white South Africa without seriously addressing the question of the growth of urban populations within the Bantustans and their dependence on employment within the metropolitan centres. The success of its ‘insider’ strategy lay above all in securing the economic viability and political legitimacy of the Bantustans, and yet the Commission provided no new insights as to how this could be done.

In accepting the premises of territorial apartheid, the Riekert Commission was prevented from giving due consideration to fundamental changes that had taken place in South Africa’s economic reproductive system in the three decades since the adoption of apartheid. Like most analysts of contemporary South Africa, both liberal and radical, it accepted a dualistic conceptual framework grounded in the historical division of this country into white and black areas, with capitalist and precapitalist forms of production respectively.

Elsewhere I have argued that this dualistic reasoning in both its liberal and marxist forms fails to grasp essential features of South Africa’s changing political economy, especially in the period since World War II. Through a critique of dualism, particularly that variant of it known as the ‘cheap labour power thesis’, I have advanced an approach to the explanation of apartheid which gives centrality to the development of industrial capital and the formation and strength gathering of the urban African proletariat. In opposition to approaches which explain the pass system simply as a mechanism designed to reproduce migrant labour, I have argued that it was refashioned after the Second World War, and deployed in such a way as to promote the reproduction of a differentiated African working class: on the one hand a settled work force servicing industry and commerce’s demand for semi-skilled labour, and on the other

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13. This history is traced in HINDSON & LACEY 1983.
14. Within the liberal tradition, see HOBART-HOUGHTON 1967. The best example in the marxist literature is WOLPE 1972.
hand migratory labour to fill unskilled heavy manual workplaces in town (Hindson 1983: ch. iv).

More recent work in collaboration with my colleagues William Cobbett, Daryl Glaser and Mark Swilling (Cobbett et al. 1986) has revealed the outlines of a further fundamental transformation of South Africa’s reproductive economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s (with roots going back much further in time). This new phase has been brought on by a crisis of profitability, the irreversible erosion of the material basis of temporary migration, the weakening of bureaucratic labour controls, and the failure to attain either the economic or political aims of territorial apartheid. The precise features and significance of this new phase have yet to be systematically researched, and it is clearly not possible in this paper to do more than point to evidence of the most striking of its traits, and to suggest a framework for its interpretation.

The most profound change to which attention needs to be drawn is the growing ascendancy of residentially stabilized and regionally ordered working populations in and around the country’s metropolitan centres. There is evidence to suggest that the regional ordering of proletariats is superceding the existing division within the urban areas between settled and migratory labour.15

The process of regional stabilization of African labour supply is already well advanced. This is evident from the rapid growth of commuter populations in the 1970s and the unprecedented expansion of (illegal) squatter populations in and around the cities, especially during the 1980s. The extent to which a process of regional stabilization has already occurred has, I believe, been masked by the tendency for commuters to be subsumed in official statistics—as well as in most academic writings—under the legal category of temporary contract workers. Commuters are in reality as much a part of settled urban population as are township residents with Section 10 rights.

Attention should also be drawn to the changing nature of long-distance migration itself, even in sectors where it continues to provide the major source of labour. Although large numbers of workers, notably in the mines, continue to be employed under annual contracts, returning home to the rural areas for holidays, the basis and nature of this oscillatory migration has changed during the last decade. Pointers in this

15. Cf. SOUTH AFRICA 1982a: Tables 24 and 26. These indicate that the ratio of commuters to migrants has been rapidly increasing since the late 1960s, but that migrant labour employed in South Africa is continuing to increase in absolute terms. Statistics which gather this information are rare, and usually, as in the case of the BENBO material, not sensitive to substantive changes underlying formal categories. For example many of workers included in the category ‘migrants’ would, in fact, be weekly commuters who stay over in town to save transport costs.
direction are the shift on the mines towards the use of domestic labour supplies since the early 1970s, occupational stabilization of workers through the system which guarantees them a job if they return within a specified time, and settlement of gradually increasing proportions of supervisory black staff.\textsuperscript{16} The recent announcement that the mines are turning to geographically proximate, residentially settled urban black labour markets for future supplies is a profound break with traditional mine practices, and further evidence of underlying processes which have been working towards a regional ordering of labour markets.\textsuperscript{17} Of course, it remains to be seen how far and how fast the mines are able to restructure forms of labour utilization underground, and to reorganize or replace the compound system in a manner that accords with the development of regionally ordered labour markets.

The pattern of regional settlement of populations is being shaped by forces operating both in the countryside and in the cities. In the Reserves declining production, and on the white farms increasing productivity through mechanization have driven thousands of families towards the metropolitan centres. In the cities, industrial and commercial concentration has acted as a magnet for populations fleeing (and expelled from) the countryside. But the pattern of settlement within the wider metropolitan areas has also been shaped in crucial ways by the strong industrial dispersal tendency, observed in some sectors since the early 1970s. Important empirical work done by Bell (1984, 1985) shows that industrial employment, but not output, has grown faster in non-metropolitan than in metropolitan areas since the late 1960s. Much of this appears to have taken place in deconcentrated industrial growth points and medium-sized towns rather than in remoter locations within or near the Bantustans. One crucial result of this process of industrial dispersal has been the integration of commuter populations into metropolitan-centred labour markets, thereby dissolving and rendering economically spurious political boundaries which demarcate Bantustans from the rest of South Africa (Cobbett \textit{et al.} 1986).

The forces underlying industrial concentration and dispersal and city-bound migration, which were initially constrained and moulded by the spatial framework of territorial apartheid, have, since the early 1980s, finally breached these barriers, thereby producing modified industrial location and population settlement patterns, transformed labour market structures, giving new content and significance to older ones. The outcome of these processes, it may be argued, is the gradual development of new regional economies and sub-economies, regionally organized and hierarchically ordered labour markets and transformed systems of social reproduction.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Star (Johannesburg)}, 11 Nov. 1985.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, 27 Nov. 1985.
The Riekert Commission failed even to recognize that these fundamental processes were taking place, let alone to address them. While it noted the existence of commuter populations, it showed no awareness of their place within the evolving regional labour markets. It went no further than orthodox apartheid in calling for the stepping up of industrial decentralization as a means of expanding employment amongst this section of the Bantustan population. The commissioners were undoubtedly aware of the magnitude and significance of rural and urban unemployment within the Bantustans, and yet the report gives no guidance as to how this problem could be dealt with practically, apart from advocating tighter measures to control rural recruitment for employment in the white urban areas. Similarly, it provided no relief for African workers expelled from white farms, denying them the mobility rights of urban insiders.

The five years following the publication of the Riekert report, and especially the period of recession since mid-1982, witnessed the dramatic surfacing of structural contradictions underlying territorial apartheid. The period was characterized by a deepening and apparently irreversible crisis of Bantustan legitimacy, the exposure of desperate rural poverty, the flight of impoverished Africans from the countryside towards the cities and the mushrooming of peri-urban squatter settlements inside and outside the Bantustans.

None of these developments were catered for in the recommendations set out by the Riekert report. The extension and strengthening of the labour control bureaucracies within non-Bantustan South Africa notwithstanding (Hindson & Lacey 1983), the years following the report have witnessed the uncontrolled growth, rather than the decline, of illegal settlement within and near the cities. Attempts to reorganize and streamline labour selection and recruitment machinery within the Bantustans have had even less success. The already weak and corrupt system of tribal and district labour bureaux caved in under pressure from the unemployed (Greenberg & Giliomee 1983). The result has been the rise of internal migration within the Bantustans, from rural districts to areas abutting the metropolitan centres, and, for growing numbers, permanent emigration to the White-controlled cities.

An essential prerequisite for successful implementation of the Riekert strategy was for the authorities to maintain sufficient control to sift out so-called insiders from outsiders and target these categories for concessions and intensified controls respectively. However, if the report failed abysmally with respect to the Bantustan question, it proved no more

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18. The importance of commuter labour and its de facto status as permanent urban labour was recognized in South Africa 1981a.
successful in addressing the crisis in the cities. None of the fundamental requirements of the co-optive insider strategy were met in the years immediately following the report.

Despite public acceptance at official and ministerial level of the policy of co-optation of insiders, the requisite relaxation of controls over Section 10 (r) a, b and c qualifiers was obstinately resisted by white bureaucrats within the Administration Boards. This resistance took the form of delays, blocking and outright refusal to yield rights where they were due. In documented cases, Section 10 rights have been downgraded or even removed for no reason other than bureaucratic vindictiveness. Despite promises from the Minister of Co-operation and Development20 that individuals with Section 10 rights in one prescribed area would not lose them if they moved to another, few dared to move. It was too well understood that Section 10, which remained on the statutes, was applicable only to a specified prescribed urban area. Few black urban residents risked trading the little protection given to them by Section 10 against the promises of a notoriously unreliable Minister (Hindson & Lacey 1983).

Resistance from the White-run Boards to the implementation of the Riekert concessions provoked a number of key legal battles.21 One outcome of these cases was that rights already conceded in policy were secured in practice for a small number of individuals. Despite this disciplining by the courts, most Administration Boards continued to do all in their power to block the extension of residence rights, and the number of people who subsequently acquired Section 10 (r) b and c rights grew only slowly. Nevertheless these court cases, and especially the tireless efforts of the Black Sash22 in taking up and attempting to redress the inumerable injustices to which individual Africans are subjected under the pass laws, have played a major role in exposing and publicizing the ineptitude, corruption, petty vindictiveness and often outright illegality of practices within the Administration Boards.

A second crucial area in which the insider-outsider strategy floundered was that of the financing and administration of the townships. Central to the Riekert recommendations was the policy of placing townships finances on a self-sufficient footing with regard to housing, infrastructure and services. This, the reformers believed, was a prerequisite for the successful installation of the black local authority system—the Commu-

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19. Some of these cases are documented in the Black Sash publication Sash.
20. Piet Koornhof, the Minister of Co-operation and Development at the time acquired the nickname ‘Promises Piet’.
21. Rikhoto v. State and Khomani v. State were the two most prominent cases.
22. The Black Sash is a women’s organization dedicated to the struggle against oppressive State legislation and bureaucracy. Amongst many of its activities, this organization runs advice offices in the major centres of South Africa which assist individuals with the problems they experience with the pass laws.
nity Councils. The implementation of the Community Council system and parallel attempts to remove housing and transport subsidies by raising rents and fares, coincided with the onset of recession, the rising urban unemployment and the falling real incomes. Not surprisingly, the years following the publication of the report witnessed growing hostility to the policy of urban black co-optation, culminating in mass mobilization against the new system from mid-1984.

From the outset the Riekert report met with strong opposition from both conservative and progressive forces. The earliest attempts to translate its recommendations into legislation were resisted, as shown above, by white Board officials. There was also vocal opposition from right-wing white political groups and from certain white municipalities. It has been suggested that the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, which was excepted to give effect to the Riekert report, but failed to incorporate its liberalizing recommendations, was sabotaged by elements within the Department of Co-operation and Development.

In a very direct way the independent union movement played a decisive role in undercutting the insider/outsider strategy. More important than its many public denouncements of the attempt to divide the working class, the unions, especially the large independent industrial unions, set out deliberately to organize migrants, commuters and settled township-based workers alike into single workers organizations. The effect of this, and the struggle to reduce wage differentials, was to attack the root of the Riekert strategy, the successful implementation of which depended heavily on the maintenance and entrenchment of divisions within the workplace, between migratory and settled urban workers. Union organizing strategy eroded the material basis of this division, thereby removing management's incentive to reserve unskilled, low-wage jobs for migrants and the higher grades and supervisory labour for urban dwellers.

It is significant that employers, many of whom initially welcomed the Riekert reforms, by the early 1980s had joined in the call for the complete scrapping of influx control and the acceptance of African urbanization. For unionists, the abolition of influx control meant the removal of discriminatory and oppressive measures, particularly those used against their migrant members; for management, it meant that labour markets could be opened up and competition between workers intensified. Furthermore, larger supplies of labour could be stabilized in accessible locations in and around the industrial centres.

23. Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, 113/82. This was the first attempt to legislate the Riekert recommendations relating to movement and settlement. It was passed to the Grosskopf Committee, but eventually shelved.

24. This period is discussed in Hindson & Lacey 1983.
The struggles of squatters, beginning in the late 1970s and increasing in intensity into the 1980s, struck a further blow at the Riekert strategy. After bitter and protracted resistance to removal, squatters in the Western Cape and elsewhere won the right to settle in or near the cities. Enforced resettlement in planned residential areas such as Khayelitsha (in the Western Cape) and Soweto-by-the-Sea (near Port Elizabeth) has meant that official acceptance of these communities has not taken place on the squatters' terms. Nevertheless, more than any other single factor it is their struggles that have finally forced the State to concede the failure of the insider/outsider strategy, and the impossibility of total territorial apartheid, and to acknowledge the inevitability of African urbanization outside the Bantustans.

From the ad hoc acceptance by the State of the permanence of some squatter communities in or near white cities it was a short step to re-thinking in its entirety the issue of African urbanization. The breaching of the influx control barrier in the Western Cape, where the State had operated the strictest controls under the so-called Coloured Labour Preference Policy, has thus been crucial in opening the way for a wave of officially sanctioned African urbanization throughout the country in the 1980s and beyond.

The township revolt of 1984 dealt a fatal blow to the Riekert strategy. In the face of deepening economic recession and an escalating crisis of township finances, the State moved to implement the policy of fiscal self-sufficiency and local government autonomy. A population already struck by falling real wages and rising unemployment now faced increased rents, service charges and transport fares. In response, township after township revolted, focusing their attack on the community council system, its personnel and eventually all seen to be associated with the system of oppression.

The period from mid-1984 to the present has witnessed the widening and deepening of opposition to the State, the increasing national co-ordination of this opposition, and even in recent times the beginnings of a challenge to State power itself. Youths, workers and residents have come together in growing mass political organizations, to fight against apartheid.

Especially from mid-1984 onwards, employers' organizations, and reformers (within and outside the State) gave up the hope that solutions could be found to township conflict along the path set out by the Riekert report. The ruling class' search for more radical solutions to the deepen-
ing economic and political crisis of the mid-1980s has finally led to an abandonment of territorial apartheid, and an acceptance of the need to reintegrate the Bantustans into some form of single national system, albeit one constituted on the basis of ethnic-cum-regional federal/confederal units.

It is under these circumstances that the President's Council report was published late in 1985, and it is against this background that its intentions and likely consequences should be judged.

Orderly Urbanization and Regional Strategy in the 1980s

1 – Premises of the President's Council Report

An undeniable implication of the PC report is the abandonment of the territorial and constitutional aims of apartheid as originally set out in the Sauer report. The Commission remains open on the question of what constitutional dispensation should replace territorial apartheid. It explicitly raises the issue of the status of citizens within the formally independent Bantustans of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (the so-called TBVC countries) in terms of mobility and citizenship rights within greater South Africa. Although it makes no specific recommendations with respect to these entities, the thrust of its argument favours the extension to their populations of mobility and settlement rights identical to those of other groups.

The question of citizenship was deliberately excluded from the Commission's terms of reference in order to allow the State to marry its recommendations to one of a range of constitutional alternatives presently regarded by government as negotiable (South Africa 1985b: § 9.119). And it is indeed the case that the recommendations of the report have been formulated in such a way as to make them theoretically compatible with a range of geographically and ethnically based constitutional dispensations (Cobbett et al. 1986).

As indicated in the first paragraph of this paper, the point of departure of the PC report is an acceptance of the inevitability, and a belief in the economic desirability, of black urbanization in and around the metropolitan centres of the country:

'The challenge as regards the South African problem of urbanisation lies in finding a positive approach, which recognises the common features and inevitabilities of urbanisation trends all over the world, and is designed to deal with these, as well as the acceptance, accommodation and effective economic and socio-cultural integration of the urban population as a whole, in as orderly and cost-effective a manner as possible' (South Africa 1985b: § 1.19).

The report further argues that this could not be achieved by means
of influx control, and calls for its replacement with a positive urbanization strategy:

'neither the present system nor any other direct form of "negative" influx control should be retained. There is, however, a need for a positive approach to urbanisation that would allow the orderliness of the process to be promoted. It is necessary for influx control to be replaced by a positive urbanisation strategy that, by making use of market forces, subsidies and development, among other things, will encourage people to settle in certain suitable areas rather than forbidding them to move to certain urban areas' (ibid.: § 9.152).

On this basis, it recommends the adoption of a strategy of 'orderly' or 'planned' urbanization. The essence of this strategy entails the following changes in the means of control over the movement and settlement of population: (1) the replacement of traditional pass and influx controls with (formally) racially neutral measures such as squatter, slums and health regulations; (2) a shift away from direct prohibitions over movement, physical presence, residence and employment in designated areas, to the use of indirect measures, notably regionally differentiated financial penalties and incentives designed to influence settlement patterns; and (3) the substitution of economically integrated metropolitan and development regions for the Bantustans as the spatial bases of population settlement planning.

If this strategy is to be understood and assessed, it is essential to examine not only each of its parts but to grasp it as a whole. This is what I set out to do in the remainder of the paper.

2 – The Reorganization of Space: Metropolitan and Development Regions

Just as it would not be possible to come to an understanding of the nature and significance of the policy of influx control from the 1940s to the end of the 1970s without locating it within the framework of territorial apartheid, so is it evidently impossible to develop an adequate understanding of the urbanization strategy set out by the PC without grasping its place within the framework of the State's regional strategy. The report itself is explicit about this framework: 'The Committee would like to state clearly that planning intervention in the form of incentives and disincentives is regarded as essential at both the macro-spatial and the micro-spatial levels to promote orderly urbanisation, especially in the absence of direct control measures' (ibid.: § 5.17.4). And elsewhere it states that: 'Future urbanisation linked to industrial development should be spread over larger geographical areas and therefore more evenly, with a reasonable degree of stimulation of urban development in the outer peripheral areas of certain metropolitan areas and large towns and not so much in remote border areas' (ibid.: § 5.27).
The PC report does not spell out the details of the policy of regional spatial ordering. It accepts in their essentials the recommendations of two other reports: the Croeser report (South Africa 1982b) and the Kleu report (South Africa 1984c) whose recommendations have been accepted by government. They deal respectively with industrial dispersal and metropolitan government. It is necessary to refer to the findings of both these reports in order to explain the policy of spatial ordering adopted by the PC report.

The framework within which the policy of planned urbanization is evolving comprises two distinct kinds of spatial units: development regions and metropolitan regions. The total surface of South Africa has been divided up, provisionally, into eight (or possibly nine) development regions. One region corresponds closely with the boundaries of Natal and another with the Orange Free State (or), two fall roughly within the present boundaries of the Cape Province, and four (or five) within the province of the Transvaal.

The significance of these regions lies in the fact that they encircle and in some cases cross-cut the borders of the Bantustans, to form integrated planning and administrative units. Since 1982, these development regions have provided a framework within which certain State institutions, notably the Development Bank and Regional Development Action and Liaison Committees, have already been operating. There is speculation that these regions, or spatial entities approximating them, may provide the geographical units of a future federal or confederal order (Cobbett et al. 1986).

A recent act of Parliament provides for the demarcation of one or more metropolitan regions within each of these development regions and the creation of third-tier governmental structures called Regional Services Councils (RSCs) to administer the metropolitan areas. This legislation is based on the recommendations of the Croeser Working Group's report.

Metropolitan regions hold out the prospect of a system which differs from that envisaged by the Riekert Commission in three crucial respects: (1) black local authorities are to be represented (on the basis of a weighted electoral system) on the RSCs alongside representatives from white, coloured and Indian local authorities; (2) a Regional Service Council may include local authorities within a Bantustan where they fall within the ambit of the metropole; (3) the RSCs are to comprise a single fiscal system, and taxes levied on white businesses are to be used to subsidize infrastructural expenditure in black townships within the RSC concerned thereby relaxing the financial self-sufficiency principle in an important area of local government finance.

26. The Kleu report was released in Afrikaans in 1983, and in English in 1984. See also South Africa 1985c.
Within the spatial framework provided by the metropolitan and development regions, incentives and disincentives are to be applied, ostensibly in order to foster a more even distribution of population and economic activity both within development regions and over the country as a whole. Considerations of cost and efficiency should, according to the aims of this policy, be given priority over the manipulation of space to achieve political or constitutional objectives—where the two conflict.

For the PC report, fiscal incentives and disincentives are intended to play a decisive role in ordering the pattern of location of urbanization. Their use, along with other more direct controls over settlement, is seen as indispensable if direct pass and influx controls are to be avoided.

The revenue foundation of the projected Regional Services Councils is to be a tax on the turnover and the wage and salary bills of businesses located within their jurisdiction. This is likely to raise the cost and reduce the incentive to employ labour, particularly unskilled, unproductive labour, within these areas. One aim is to encourage the relocation of labour-intensive enterprises and those with a low ratio of profits to turnover to areas outside the boundaries of the metropolitan regions (Solomon 1984). Costs passed on to consumers within the RSC’s will reduce the incentive for workers to move to these areas, and are intended to weigh most heavily on low-income earners, and people with large numbers of dependents—in short, African families who attempt to move from the rural areas to the core metropolitan zones.

These measures have already been strongly opposed by business in the urban areas, and it is a matter of serious doubt that either the revenue necessary to support infrastructural expenditure in the townships will be raised or that significant employment will be induced to relocate to the deconcentration areas.

Once the necessary township infrastructure has been provided, the aim of metropolitan fiscal policy is to ensure that the standard of services supplied in an area is directly tied to the contribution of the local authorities concerned, allowing for residential differentiation on the basis of the wealth and expressed preferences of the communities. The essence of this arrangement is to privatize the supply of services and individualize the costs of their consumption. This approach, as we already showed, has sparked off violent confrontation between the communities on the one hand and Board officials, police and, since the declaration of the state of emergency, the army on the other. Without considerable application of further repressive force, it is no more likely to succeed in the near future than in the recent past.

Despite its centrality in the evolving regional strategy, metropolitan fiscal policy is not, on its own, regarded as sufficient to produce the desired geographical dispersal of production and population. It is to be coupled with a system of incentives to attract industry from metropolitan core
areas to deconcentrated areas within regions, and from relatively well-endowed to poorer regions. This industrial dispersal, as conceived since 1981, aims to prevent the concentration of population within the established metropolitan centres, and also to re-allocate it from expanding metropolitan areas, such as the Witwatersrand, to declining ones, such as Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. This policy has recently been up-dated by the Kleu report (South Africa 1984c) and endorsed in a White Paper (South Africa 1985c). It differs from traditional border industrial decentralization policy both in terms of its aims and the methods employed to achieve the spatial re-distribution of economic activity. The primary aim is no longer to attempt to make the economies of the Bantustans viable. Instead, the emphasis has shifted towards the establishment of a relatively small number of growth points, most of which are likely to be either satellites of the metropolitan centres or of existing medium sized industrial towns. Where possible, these growth points are being encouraged in areas close to the Bantustans to make them accessible to working-class commuter belts within their boundaries.

There has been a shift from negative sanctions to positive incentives. Instead of prohibiting the expansion of black employment in the core industrial areas—the effect of Section 3 of the Physical Planning Act—there is greater use of employment-linked subsidies, tax relief, the relaxation of health and safety regulations, and exemption from wage determinations.

The success or otherwise of this industrial location strategy will depend crucially on where exactly industry and population are located. If it entails no more than the expansion of existing metropolitan industrial zones and residential areas—urban concentration rather than deconcentration—, the prospects will be far less unfavourable than attempts to find some compromise between unrestrained spatial concentration and the orthodox border industrial decentralization/cross-border commuter programme. The concept of deconcentration is sufficiently vague and flexible to allow for a range of spatial alternatives along this continuum. Since 1984 the policy of industrial deconcentration has been directly linked to an 'employment strategy' which conceives of the deconcentration areas as sites particularly suited to the growth of informal sector activities.

28. Decentralization is the term used to describe traditional dispersal policy, the aim of which was to foster Bantustan economies. It entailed the attempt to induce industry to locate in remote border areas. Deconcentration refers to the policy of encouraging industrial dispersal mainly on the outer peripheries of the metropolitan centres. The economic viability of the Bantustans is a subordinate aim of this policy, its major rationale being to counteract external diseconomies associated with the concentration of economic activity within the metropoles.


30. See, for example, South Africa 1981b.
and small businesses (South Africa 1984b, 1984d). The reasoning behind this approach is that employment growth can be encouraged by relaxing wage, health and safety regulations and fostering labour-intensive, small-scale economic activities in such areas. The link between the industrial location policy set out in the Kleu and Croeser reports is through the creation and spatial location of employment. The urbanization strategy set out by the PC report is designed to dovetail with industrial location policy through the establishment of residential areas adjacent or readily accessible to deconcentration industrial zones. This shift in emphasis is clearly designed to lift the costs of industrial dispersal from the State and capital, and place them squarely on the shoulders of the working class. The union movement is alert to this intention and will undoubtedly respond by seeking to negotiate national minimum wages and working conditions.

Industrial decentralization policy in South Africa has for three decades been directly associated with the aims of territorial apartheid. The evolving industrial dispersal policy adopted since 1982 attempts to dissociate itself from this heritage by reorganizing its system of disincentives and subsidies within spatial units constructed on the basis of economic and physical considerations. These new development regions cross-cut, encircle and fragment the Bantustans, thereby integrating their populations into new planning units centred on the metropolitan areas.

These development regions have the potential to dissolve and eventually supersede the existing racial and ethnic foundations of planning, administration and political representation in South Africa. And the deconcentration strategy lends itself in principle to a number of possible political arrangements: deconcentration areas may remain subordinated to the political authority of the Bantustans; they may in time be drawn into the ambit of metropolitan government; or, as is most likely in the short to medium term, they may be subjected to some form of joint local government.

However, there is little doubt that the present government seeks to retain residential segregation as the basis of political representation, whether at the second (regional) or third (metropolitan) tier of government, and is attempting to weave ethnicity and race into the fabric of the planning regions through the policy of residential and industrial deconcentration. Where geography allows, new deconcentrated areas are at present being sited in locations which are at once on the metropolitan peripheries and on the Bantustan borders, and old commuter areas already located in such areas are being redefined as deconcentrated areas. Examples are Ekangala on the East Rand, Umlazi and KwaMashu near the Durban-Pinetown area, Mdantsane near East London and Onverwacht/Botshabelo near Bloemfontein. This racial dimension will not be lost to the opposition.
3 - Documentary Controls

Historically, opposition to the pass system has focused on a number of points: that the pass book is issued only to black people; that it has to be carried and produced on demand for inspection by police and certain officials; and that it is associated with the enforcement of racially discriminatory restrictions over movement, presence, residence and employment in designated areas.

Addressing these objections, the PC report (South Africa 1985b: § 9.127) recommends that the reference book system should be abolished and replaced by a uniform identification document for all citizens of South Africa to be kept on the person and produced on demand, but that failure to carry it should not be made a criminal offence.

These recommendations represent significant concessions to objections that have been levelled against the pass system for decades. However they do not on their own guarantee that all controls of the kind associated with the traditional pass system will disappear. While the commission is clearly concerned to disassociate the new system of personal identification from controls over labour mobility, employment and residence rights, it is adamant that a system of identification be maintained—inter alia for what it calls security reasons—and advocates measures to ensure that such a system is effective.

In this connection, the report (ibid.: § 9.158.1) refers approvingly to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, which empower any peace officer to ask for the identity and address of any person suspected of a crime or subject to legal arrest. These substitute measures provide ample leeway for the police and other law enforcement authorities to maintain control measures which require the carrying and production of identification documents; measures, in other words, which will be regarded by many as the continuation, if not extension (because all race groups would then be included) of the pass system.

An issue of importance in assessing any mooted reforms to the pass system is the position of the institutions responsible for enforcing the pass laws: especially the courts, police and Development Boards. The report (following the recommendations of the Riekert Commission) envisages a process whereby the Boards are gradually dismantled, with their separate functions being re-allocated to different branches and levels of government (black commissioners courts to justice, labour bureaux to manpower, housing and policing of townships to local authorities, and so on).31

31. Steps have already been taken in this direction: magistrates courts have replaced black commissioners courts, the labour bureaux are now under the authority of the Department of Manpower (though the Development Boards continue to run them on an agency basis), housing branches of the Boards are
Neither the future of the pass officers within the Boards (previously the municipal police), nor the question of the South African Police is clearly addressed by the report. Steps have already been taken by government to train black policemen to take over the law enforcement functions of the Boards. There is nothing to suggest that the 'black-jacks'—as these municipal police are known to township residents—will be received with any less hostility than are their white predecessors and mentors. As regards the South African Police, the other repressive State agency traditionally associated with the enforcement of the pass laws, the Commission gives no insight as to how its practices might be altered to meet past criticisms.

The pass system cannot be adequately grasped merely as a set of laws. It is a system which is deeply imbedded in the organization and practices of the Development Board bureaucracy, the courts and the policing apparatuses of the State. The PC report goes some way towards recognizing this in its recommendation that the Development Boards should be dismantled and replaced by an Urbanization Board. But it falls far short of demanding what ultimately is essential if the pass system is not merely to go: the abolition not only of laws, but of the bureaucratic machinery of pass control; the dismantling, reconstruction and reorientation of all these institutions towards new purposes in a newly constituted society.

4 – Housing, Squatting and the Siting of Residential Land

The concept of orderly urbanization entails a modification of the radical distinction between insiders and outsiders, which provided the foundation of the urbanization strategy set out by the Riekert Commission. The emerging policy envisages not only the accommodation of a far larger permanent urban population, but also, and crucially, a far more highly differentiated population in terms of housing, infrastructure, municipal services and living conditions. Commuter populations and squatter communities in Bantustans on the peripheries of the metropolitan centres are perceived as part of regional labour markets of these centres, while the Bantustans themselves are seen as component of wider regional economies rather than as potentially independent economic entities in their own right.

The question of the siting, provision and standard of housing is at the very centre of the urbanization strategy set out in the PC report. Its main elements are as follows: to lower the cost (and standard) of officially approved housing; to reduce State provision of subsidized housing and

being devolved to the Regional Services Councils, and many other functions are being taken over by the black local authorities.
instead encourage private construction and ownership; to foster unequal housing standards (to meet differences in ability to pay and in needs); to provide differentiated municipal services within and between residential areas; and to promote a process of dispersal or deconcentration of residential areas around the metropolitan centres (South Africa 1985b: § 9.133-9.141).

Existing townships should, according to the report, be expanded to accommodate natural population increase, and new residential areas (referred to as ‘catchment’ or ‘deconcentration’ areas) should be established on the peripheries of the metropolitan centres to cater for the inflow of arrivals. In the siting of settlements care should be taken to make them readily accessible to employment, whether in deconcentrated industrial zones or near the established industrial and commercial centres. A chapter of the report is devoted to the question or urban transport costs and means of reducing them by judicious siting (ibid.: ch. viii).

Within the existing townships, infrastructure and services will be improved and maintained at a relatively high level, to be paid for by a population expected to earn higher salaries and wages. In the newly established, dispersed residential areas, lower standards of accommodation, infrastructure and services will be tolerated, with the aim of eventual upgrading.

A distinction is drawn between ‘squatting’ and ‘informal settlement’. Squatting is defined as settlement which involves illegal occupation of land and non-compliance with health and building standards. It is called ‘informal settlement’ if it is legal both in respect of land occupation and of housing, health and related standards. The recommendation of the report is that informal settlements should be ‘ordered’, that is brought under State regulation through the siting and provision of residential land, and the redirection of new migrants or resettlement of existing squatter communities in such residential areas (ibid.: § 8.41). As a model of planned informal settlement it points to Onverwacht/Botshabelo, an ethnically organized resettlement area to the east of Bloemfontein. Onverwacht, significantly, is one of the ‘dumping grounds’ set up in the 1970s to accommodate workers and their families expelled from farms in the OFS.

To areas such as Onverwacht, illegal squatters and new urban arrivals will be diverted and supplied with sites and minimal residential services. Here they will be allowed to erect their own dwellings within the framework of regulations set by the central State. In this manner, the PC report hopes to relieve the local authorities of the responsibility for providing housing, and to impose this obligation on squatter families. The

32. The term ‘dumping grounds’ was originally coined by C. DESMOND (1971) to refer to re-settlement areas set up in the 1960s.
role of the local authorities is thus to shrink to provision of the minimal infrastructure and services to maintain health standards, and to enforce health and safety regulations.

The aim of the strategy of ordered informal settlement is thus essentially to re-establish State authority over communities resisting influx and residential controls, by relocating them (or pre-empting their formation) in spatially dispersed and racially (and, if present official policy continues, ethnically) segregated residential areas. At the same time the policy makes a virtue of necessity by not merely accepting, but encouraging the self-construction of dwellings. The obvious aim is to relieve local and central State of responsibility for a major item in the costs of African urbanization.

The report stresses the need for extreme haste in the allocation and siting of new land to cope with already mushrooming squatter communities in the major centres and to divert new-comers from the towns. However rapidly the authorities move to set up such deconcentration areas, any efforts to relocate squatters are likely to be met with strong resistance if these are in distant and costly locations compared to the areas in which they had chosen to settle.

The housing strategy set out by the PC report is undeniably an advance on the present policy of frozen township family housing, resettlement and cross-border commuting. And no doubt elements of the policy of informal settlement would find a place in the short run in a housing programme concerned with the needs of the mass of South Africans. However, the desirable elements in these recommendations are subordinated to a planning framework whose principal aims lie elsewhere: to reduce the costs and increase the efficiency of labour reproduction, to displace the costs of urbanization from employers and the State onto the working people, and to create a pattern of spatial dispersion of population which fragments and politically disorganizes South Africa's subordinated people. To the extent that these aims are given priority over housing needs, the PC strategy will surely meet with determined resistance.

A number of difficulties and objections, all of which depend on the manner in which the policy is implemented, can thus be foreseen. The removal of State subsidies and privatization within existing townships may have the effect of de-stabilizing settled urban communities—an effect the report is concerned to avoid (South Africa 1985b: § 6.28). Families which cannot afford to buy houses or pay unsubsidized rents (at this stage the majority of township dwellers) would become vulnerable to removal. Ironically, they have at present some protection under Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act. Abolition of this section would entail not only the removal of influx control, but also the potential residential de-stabilization of people with rights of permanent residence under the Act. Their protection necessitates that a policy of
extending positive rights to individuals to stay and work be adopted, coupled with subsidies based on the ability of families or households to pay rents and service charges. The unemployed, the handicapped, the aged and single-parent families should clearly be eligible for special form of housing assistance. (2) The needs of migrants and recent urban settlers also call for a massive programme of State assistance in the form of infrastructure, services and cheap building materials, on a scale far greater than envisaged by the PC report. (3) Finally, the acquisition and siting of residential areas will be decisive in determining the cost of living there. Onverwacht/Botshabelo as model does not augur well for the PC report’s urbanization strategy in this respect. In addition to cost considerations, the location of such areas will be politically sensitive. If their deconcentration follows the existing pattern, namely their establishment far from the core residential and industrial zones, it will be opposed as racial segregation—whether or not this takes place within the framework of the Group Areas Act.

5 – Direct Control Measures:
Squatter, Health and Trespass Laws

It would be wrong to assume that direct controls over movement and settlement play no part in the thinking of the PC report. Its central recommendation is that influx control and the pass laws must be replaced with indirect controls: the siting of residential areas, provision of housing and fiscal incentives and disincentives. But it argues that such measures, on their own, would not be enough to ensure that urbanization is kept orderly. Accordingly, it gives attention to the use of a number of direct control measures. These include laws against squattting, health and safety measures, trespass and vagrancy laws (ibid.: § 11.88.1-5).

The report notes several advantages attached to the use of these laws. Most of them already exist on South Africa’s statutes, they are widely used in other countries and can be presented as racially neutral. The issue at stake here is the manner in which such laws are deployed against urban populations. While it would no doubt be relatively simple to excise racial clauses from the existing Slums and Squatter Acts, their application will inevitably fall most heavily, and in some parts of the country exclusively, on black people. This is certain not merely because it is amongst them that the greatest unemployment and poverty exist, but because it is ingrained in the law-enforcement agencies, as presently constituted, to discriminate against Blacks in favour of Whites. Only a change in their personnel, organization and aims would obviate this.

Reports from research groups monitoring removals indicate that there are already moves afoot to substitute traditional influx control measures with orders under the slums and squatters laws. In the Eastern Cape
and the Transvaal, court orders and attorney’s letters issued by soldiers at the dead of night are replacing the traditional pass raids by Administration Board officials. Threatened prosecution is no longer being made on grounds of illegal presence, but rather of erecting and living in unsafe and unhealthy structures, or occupying land illegally. Instead of deportation to a Bantustan, some residents are being offered sites in newly laid out deconcentration areas. These offers are backed by the threat of prosecution and heavy fines for refusal.

If this is what deracialization and deregulation are to mean, these reforms will surely be no more acceptable to the urban poor than the hated pass system.

6 – Employment and Unemployment Strategies

The PC report turns the Riekert strategy on its head by calling for the deregulation of traditional controls over employment, the fostering of small businesses and informal sector activities, and the abolition of employment-related influx control measures. As in the case of squatting, activities previously seen as threatening urban control systems are now presented as a means of resolving the urban crisis. The PC report calls for the legalization, promotion and regulation of the informal and small business activities as a means of generating employment and incomes in and around the urban areas.

‘With the necessary deregulation and adjustment in standards, small businesses could promote a measure of orderliness in the process of urbanisation, at the same time contributing to successful urban functioning through initiation and training in urban practices’ (South Africa 1985b: § 5.48).

And further on:

‘The creation of employment in urban areas can be promoted by, among other things, making policy adjustments where necessary in respect of artificially and unrealistically high standards of health, safety, and urban development requirements and by providing more flexible wage and salary structures, in terms of which greater bargaining in conjunction with productivity, is possible’ (ibid.: § 5.52).

One of the consequences of the implementation of the insider/outsider strategy was that it tended to raise urban wages relative to rural ones, thereby increasing urban labour costs and creating pressure for people to move to town. The policy offered by the PC report is intended to reverse

33. My thanks to Mark Swilling and members of the Transvaal Regional Action Committee for information on this shift in removal policies.
this trend by opening up labour markets and subjecting protected work forces to the competition of outsiders. The details of this policy have been set out in reports of the National Manpower Commission (NMC) and in the white paper on 'An Unemployment Strategy for South Africa'. Their aim is to lower the costs of labour reproduction and to foster differentiated labour markets within and between regions to meet the differing requirements of industry. The intention is to establish a more highly skilled and better paid work force in the core metropolitan centres, and low-wage (including reduced social wage) markets in the deconcentrated areas on the metropolitan peripheries.

The promotion of employment, through the deregulation of production and the loosening of markets within a newly constituted regional framework, is increasingly being linked to the reformulation of industrial relations policy. Recent moves on the part of the NMC and the Department of Manpower seek to dismantle and restructure industrial relations in a manner which will make them accord more closely with the regional industrial and residential location strategy accepted by the report. In a memorandum circulated in September 1985, the idea is mooted that applicability of Industrial Council wage determinations should be restricted only to organized parts of industries and not automatically applied to whole sectors (South Africa 1985a).

The aim of this memorandum is to foster a process of differentiation within the work force in terms of wages and conditions of work, and to structure this process to accord with the aims of industrial and residential dispersal within and between regions. One of the motives for this orientation is to prevent the gains of strong industrial unions—which are largely based within core metropolitan areas—from automatically spreading to peripheral areas—the Bantustans and border zones in particular—through the mechanism of Industrial Council wage determinations. The effect of such a policy would be to generalize the system presently in force whereby all Bantustans and certain prescribed industrial decentralization points are exempted from the wage determinations arising out of Industrial Councils.

This strategy does not constitute a frontal attack on the rights of unions to organize all workers, rights fought for and won over the last decade and half. The aim is rather to erode the gains made in the wake of the Rickert/Wailhahn concessions, when economic expansion and influx control strengthened unions in wage negotiation and raised the cost of labour. The manpower apparatus of the State seeks to weaken the unions by exposing workers to stronger market pressures and by reinterpreting the meaning of freedom of association so as to favour the

34. See, for example, SOUTH AFRICA 1983, 1984a: chapters on Employment Creation. See also SOUTH AFRICA 1984d.
rights of individual over organized labour. It seeks, above all, to protect and entrench rights attached to the ownership of the means of production: especially control over the labour process, hiring and firing and the right to relocate production.

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The urbanization strategy set out by the President’s Council will be examined with considerable scepticism, if not suspicion, by all who oppose apartheid. And rightly so, given the origins and functions of this body, set up as midwife to the Total Strategy, a reform programme conceived by the State in the immediate aftermath of Soweto. It is indicative that the greatest achievement of the PC to date is the aborted tricameral Parliament, a racially constituted structure that has played no small role in deepening the crisis of the apartheid State.

It is indeed difficult to imagine more unpropitious origins than these for an urbanization policy for a future South Africa. Nevertheless, critics of the report who probe no further than its parentage are bound to miss their mark. One criticism which some will undoubtedly seek to direct at it is that it builds disguised influx control into the urbanization strategy, for example in the form of industrial and residential dispersal. What the PC report proposes is not the old system of influx control in disguise, but rather a strategic shift in the aims and basis of State management of the urbanization process. Failure to recognize the policy of orderly urbanization as embodying strategic shift in government thinking will merely weaken the opposition’s capacity to respond forcefully to the initiative.

If fault is to be found in the report, it will not be in some subliminal wish on the part of the commissioners to retain influx control or the pass system. Nor, in my view, do the recommendations inherently predetermine the urbanization strategy towards racial and ethnic segregation or its corollary, political fragmentation—though they are open to use to these ends. Rather, the weaknesses in the document lie in its faith that deracialization of State structures, liberalization of markets and privatization of housing are in themselves capable of providing fundamental solutions to the urban crisis in South Africa. The report falls far short of addressing the urgent material needs of the impoverished urban and urbanizing communities because its primary aims are not to see that they are met, but on the contrary to release employers and the State from all responsibility in meeting the costs of urbanization.

A fundamental weakness lies in its failure to take up a question that is crucial in determining what content is ultimately given to urbanization strategy: the nature of South Africa’s political system and the classes that hold power within it. Its origins notwithstanding, an examination of findings and recommendations of the report does not show that the urban-
ization strategy in all its facets is irretrievably predisposed to the continu-
ation of racial oppression and economic exploitation. It is open to alter-
ative interpretations and uses, and the practical form it is finally
given will depend crucially on the question of which forces in South
Africa are capable of acquiring, or holding onto, State power, and how
this power is employed.

The PC report attempts to address the economic demands that have
come out of the townships: especially the lack of housing, of infra-
structure, of services, and the problem of unemployment. The report
also addresses the demand for abolition of the pass laws, but leaves the
machinery responsible for implementing these laws intact. What it
avoids is any consideration of the political frustrations of Africans in the
towns. This is a serious weakness. For the ruling classes, the success of
the urbanization policy depends on the political incorporation of Africans.
Past attempts at co-optation have been bitterly opposed. There is every
reason to believe that an urbanization strategy implemented in the ab-
sence of full and unqualified political representation for all South Africans
will not succeed.

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