Delval, Raymond. - *Les Musulmans au Togo*
M. B. G. Martin

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mments changed, as he demonstrates conclusively, but he argues that the demand for kola nuts was inelastic (p. 76), when he shows elsewhere that in fact the market was highly elastic, even at a time when the overland trade to Northern Nigeria—hitherto the largest market—was collapsing. Indeed Arhin is not entirely accurate in his analysis of the changing commercial patterns. He states that merchants welcomed colonial caravan taxes because these levies replaced higher and more erratic tolls levied before the colonial era. However, the main overland trade was virtually finished by World War I—expansion in kola sales was a result of increased consumption in Northern Ghana and Upper Volta. Northern Nigeria obtained its kola supplies—also in larger quantities—by sea from the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and then from Southwestern Nigeria. The development of kola production in Akim which could have served the northern trade before 1874, apparently was a relatively new phenomenon after 1874, although Arhin suggests otherwise. Hence the growth of the kola trade by sea—which Arhin discusses but does not analyse fully—was evidence of a major change for the markets of Northern Asante.

One of the most intriguing discussions in the book is Arhin’s preliminary analysis of the shift from kola production to cocoa. After demonstrating the similarity in tools and materials of trade, he suggests that kola producers shifted to cocoa, even though the market for kola was greater than ever. Kola producers had gathered kola on lineage-owned land, often forming buying cooperatives to purchase slaves or acquire pawns to supplement the existing sources of labour. Although Arhin states that producing units were still relatively small, holdings of slaves and pawns sometimes resulted in the accumulation of a score or more individuals. Furthermore, some of the most successful cocoa farmers were those people who had been particularly successful in kola production and trade. Clearly, a fuller study of the transition from the precolonial Asante agricultural economy—based on kola exports—to the colonial economy—based on cocoa exports—is a fascinating and important topic of research. It is hoped that Arhin will soon examine this aspect of the transition to colonialism.

Paul E. Lovejoy


M. Raymond Delval’s book is divided into seven sections: (1) A history of the Muslim penetration into Togo; (2) and (3) Muslim settlement in Togo and its demographic dimensions; (4) large Islamic centres in Togo; (5) traditional Islam; (6) modern Togolese Islam, and (7) an additional chapter which M. Delval added to bring his book up-to-date after its initial completion in October 1974, covering four more years up to the end of 1978.

It should be said at the outset that the twelve pages which M. Delval devotes to the history of pre-colonial Islam in Togo do not do justice to the scale of this problem. He draws largely from secondary sources, dating from the 1960’s; all of which are listed in the bibliography. Although some of these, like Levitzon’s Muslims and Chiefs in West Africa (1968), are still of much value, a lot remains to be done on the history of Islam in Togo, so that anybody wanting more on this theme will have to refer—among others—to the publications of Ivor Wilks on Asante or to Enid Schleifkrot’s study of zongo—Muslim settlements within towns, or quarters, often populated by Hausa. The German colonial archives (Potsdam) and other German sources, might still yield some materials, and the use of research still continuing in Dagomba, Gonja, Mamprusi, and other parts of Northern Ghana and Upper Volta might have helped to give a clearer picture. In any case, the
Islamic history of German (and French) Togoland might be seen as an annex to the history of the Dyula trading diaspora in many regions of West Africa, which spread Islam as it moved along.

It is surprising to see the name of C. H. Becker, the 'father of African Islamic studies', masquerading under the title of 'le professeur Bacquer' (p. 23). One might also ask if Germany really did adopt 'une politique de soutien de l'Islam'. Probably the reason for excluding missionaries was to lessen perpetual squabbling over their 'territories' within a colony, as was done in Tanganyika, after Protestant and Catholic elements fought out this issue repeatedly in the Reichstag.

M. Delval is on much firmer ground with his survey (sections 2 and 3) of Muslim populations in Togo. Out of a total of two million in 1970, the Muslim population was about 12%, i.e. about 226,000. In a country where there are many more women than men, the Muslim population was increasing rapidly compared to other groups. The biggest Muslim groups are Hausa, Chamba, Kotokoli, Bassila, Peul/Fulani, Nago and Yoruba. In all of these groups, the degree of islamization is reckoned to be over 70%, reaching 98% in the case of the Hausa. The Mosi and Chokosi also have a very numerous Muslim element; over 50% in the case of the Mosi. For the uninitiated, the 'Cabrais' of this book are simply the people of Kabre, most of whom are concentrated near Lama-Kara, with another group further south around Atakpamé. Many of the groups mentioned here are originally foreigners; it is difficult to be certain as to how many Hausa, say, are permanent residents in Togo.

Section Three, on Muslim settlements in Togo, is the core of the book. Here M. Delval has carefully gone to most major Muslim centres; the photo opposite p. 96 shows him interviewing some local Muslims. Did he do all of these interviews in French, using local interpreters? M. Delval travelled to the centre and north of the country where the Muslims are concentrated, and discovered some useful bits of historical information, such as lists of chiefs and imams, supplementing those in other sources and useful for comparisons. For example, his information about Sansanne-Mango, its Wattara founders and links to Kong in the Ivory Coast are of much value.

In Section Four, M. Delval has a great deal of useful information about the Muslims of Lomé, its Muslim centres, their links to Muslims in Ghana, and other themes.

The last three sections, on traditional Islam, Islamic modernism in Togo, and the 'additif' must be read together for the best comprehension of contemporary Islamic issues in Togo. Against a background of an older local Islam which is largely Qadiri in Togo, traditional Togolese Islam is essentially represented by three factions of the Tijaniya, the very small one which follows al-Hajj Malik Sy; another, more traditional, following the more militant line of al-Hajj 'Umar Tall, and finally that of Ibrahim Nyass, of Kaolack in Senegal. When a Togolese Muslim organization, the UMT (Union musulmane du Togo) was founded in 1963, it quickly turned out to have reformist tendencies. It was first associated with Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's policies in Egypt and his ideas of Egyptian 'guidance' for African Muslims. Some scandals over funds within the organization led to a reorganization, at which point the leadership turned more radical.

At the same time, certain Egyptian professors of Arabic in Togo began to preach against 'maraboutage'. By this, they meant small practitioners of Islamic traditional magic, persons who wrote gris-gris (charms) and hujub (amulets on paper) and sold them to the credulous, often at high prices.

However, the main target of the reform movement was the Kaolack Tijaniya, or the tarbiya. Rather than 'education', this term meant a special mystical initiation into the brotherhood. The reformers attacked this as a 'deviation' from Islam. Those Tijani who prayed with their arms crossed in mosques became targets of the reformers, and ultimately, of the Togolese police. This led to several aged
and respectable leaders of the Nyass group within the Tijaniya being arrested and imprisoned in 1972. Here the Togolese dictator, Col. Gnassingbé Eyadema, a non-Muslim, intervened on the side of the reformers against the Kaolack Tijani, so that they were mostly forced underground. These pressures were relaxed after a time, but they seemed to many observers to be a real threat to religious liberty in the country. As M. Delval makes clear from his 'additif', reform continued through 1978, only this time it swung away from Egyptian initiatives and towards the influence of Libya and Saudi Arabia. Saudi influence was soon eclipsed by that of Libya, particularly with a visit from Col. Qadhdhafi in September 1977. These details more or less bring M. Delval's book to its end, as he only describes events to the end of 1978.

It is of interest that in neighboring Ghana, similar events took place. There, too, the Kaolack Tijani tendency was quite powerful, but was opposed by so-called 'rejecters' (Arabic, munkirān, Hausa, munkirat). But in the Ghanaian case, the reformers and 'rejecters', who made almost precisely the same sort of attack on traditional Islam and its values, had been educated in Saudi Arabia, and were in part financed by the Wahhabi there. Indeed, some of them called themselves 'Wahhabi'. In Ghana there was likewise a similar major split in the Muslim community between conservatives and reformers going on at the same time. But, as Mervyn Hiskett shows in an article in African Language Studies XVII, for 1980, on the Kaolack Tijani jamā‘at al-fayyāda (‘community of grace’), the net result has been a reexamination of their Islam by all Muslim factions in Ghana, with a move towards intellectual regeneration and renewal, in keeping with the traditions of religious tolerance within Ghana. Probably something similar will come out of the clash between reformers and modernists in Togo, in keeping with the tradition of religious tolerance in that country.

B. G. Martin


Voici un grand livre d’anthropologie politique. Depuis 1964, J.-C. Muller a effectué un long travail de terrain chez les Rukuba, une ethnie nigériane de 12 000 âmes qui possède une organisation rituelle particulièrement raffinée. La société rukuba est divisée en cinq sections rituelles localisées, chacune constituée de plusieurs villages. La notion de chefferie s’applique adéquatement à la gestion politique de ce territoire. Le titulaire d’une chefferie de village est en même temps un chef de clan.

Les Rukuba sont des agriculteurs sédentaires qui cultivent surtout des céréales. Les chefs eux-mêmes se livrent au travail de la terre. Le groupe de production domestique, formé par la famille étendue, représente l’unité économique de base. La société rukuba se trouve divisée en deux moitiés exogamiques de base, entre lesquelles s’effectuent les mariages primaires. En revanche, les mariages secondaires, qui concernent les jeunes filles déjà mariées, unissent des individus de la même moitié mais d’unités prennes d’épouses différentes. Idéalement, un village coïncide avec une unité prenne d’épouses, celle-ci ne devant point être confondue avec le groupe de filiation. Il arrive cependant qu’un village comprenne des membres des deux moitiés exogamiques : dans ce cas, la moitié la plus importante numériquement fournit le chef du village. Les membres de la moitié minoritaire servent d’assistants rituels : « les groupes d’assistants rituels sont vus comme des excroissances […] une entorse au modèle idéal » (p. 18).

Je ne m’attarderai pas sur les caractéristiques du système de parenté et d’alliance, car J.-C. Muller vient de publier un ouvrage consacré à ces questions, *Le bon usage du sexe et du mariage*. Je note seulement qu’il existe un mariage préfé-