Dependency and Development: Some Problems Involved in the Analysis of Change in Colonial Africa.

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Control over advanced mechanical and social technology enabled the West to extend an empire over most of the world by the end of the nineteenth century. This imposed new demands upon old societies. Soldiers and administrators had to be paid, commerce to make profits, railways to carry produce and missionaries provided with converts to literate religions. As administrative, trading and missionary frontiers followed the explorers, functioning territories emerged controlled by light-skinned people with an absolute faith in the superiority of their culture and of their corresponding right to rule the dark-skinned inhabitants.

This process initiated a continuing revolution of many phases, many styles and many implications. External dominance and internal dependence created a situation which inevitably "transformed the entire social fabric of the people whose countries are now under-developed." Export oriented economies had to be created, traditional social structures undermined, and existing political authorities to accept their subordination to the foreign invader. This occurred as surely under systems of indirect as direct rule. In the latter no real attempt was made to reduce the impact of the new situation, in the former new functions and norms generally conflicted with traditional practice. "To the extent that chiefs were able to assimilate the

1. See K. Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, London, 1951, p. 6, for discussion of "social techniques" and "social inventions".
5. See, for example, L. A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, Cambridge, 1956.
bureaucratic norms established by the central government, they became alienated from their subjects."1 Equally significant, these changes in social, economic and political structures meant the emergence of new social forces in indigenous society whose interests could be expected to conflict on many levels with those of both the colonial and traditional elites. Although it may have dragged "individuals and peoples through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation"2 in the process, imperialism in Africa as in Asia began to fulfil "a double mission [. . .], one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia."3

The revolution is everywhere incomplete. Technology has been only partially and selectively adapted, old and new, internal and external forces continue to confront one another, sometimes competing, sometimes collaborating. Change is inevitable and the possibility of emancipation now exists. But there is no guarantee that change will take progressive forms, or that it will benefit all people equally when it occurs. There has been a general tendency to take an optimistic view and assume that change must take positive forms (hence the general use of terms like 'development' and 'modernisation'), but there seems to be no special reason why this should be so. For some countries and for some groups within all countries, the conditions in which they find themselves will admit of nothing but stagnation or regression. Countries unable to establish favourable exchange relations with the centres of innovation in the developed world, and groups associated with traditional institutions which must decline in the face of modernisation, can expect no coming advantage and cannot therefore be expected to participate in the change process in any positive kind of way. In the West we expect that politics will continue to be characterised by conflict, but we know that it will be mitigated by the degree to which our institutions have been adapted to deal with the stresses of modern life. But in Africa and Asia we can make no such assumptions.

"The age of technology makes questionable what we live by; it uproots us, and it does so all around the globe. And to the great Asian cultures it does so more violently, since they lack the transitional period in which the West was producing the technological world—a world that now, finished and overpowering, engulfs people whom their past culture has neither prepared for nor disposed towards it."4

During the early period of Western industrialisation social conflict was intense and brutal. We can expect nothing else in the Third World. Favourable circumstances might mitigate the level of dislocation in certain circumstances, but it would be unreal to assume that change will occur without it. But it should be noted that while conflict is an inescapable condition of change, all conflict will not necessarily lead to progressive change. It would be as mistaken to hope for change that did not threaten existing beliefs, interests and institutions as to assume that any attack on them will invariably lead to real social improvement. To improve reality we must understand it, we must understand in particular the way in which the action of concrete institutions impinges on a social situation and tends to advance or retard the development of the society concerned.

Social scientific study of these phenomena must start from the assumption that these processes must be studied historically, since present opportunities are determined by past decisions, and man's capacity to act must be assessed in relation to real rather than experimentally created conditions. We must therefore find in our historical experience the variables which influenced particular processes of development or regression in order to understand both the situation of present generations and the way in which past generations handled problems in the same sphere. To do this we require a definition or "type concept" of sufficient precision to ensure that we are talking about the same thing when we move from different stages of the past to the present and on into projections of the future.

Traditional political science has been largely concerned with problems associated with some more or less precisely defined notion of 'democracy', but 'development' (or 'modernisation', its equivalent) relates to much wider issues about which it is far more difficult to speak precisely. In isolation the word implies change and progress; it tells us nothing about how we are to recognise change or what is to constitute progress. It is an essentially evaluative term and is widely used as such to justify the actions of virtually everyone working in the Third World. We are all developers now. But the presence or absence of the term does not, of course, tell us anything about the presence or absence of the phenomenon. Many 'developers' do little more than consolidate the predominance of their class; many illiterates who never heard the term in fact work almost continuously for development. To provide a basis for comparison, evaluation and prediction, our definition must provide objective criteria against which intentions and actions can be measured quite independently of the perceptions of the actors concerned.

Development or modernisation is seen in much of the contemporary Western academic literature as

"the process of change towards those types of social economic, and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and have then spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian and African continents."\(^1\)

Knowledge of "Western complex systems"\(^2\) is thus said to provide a basis from which a model or ideal type of developed society can be derived, and this is then juxtaposed against one of traditional or underdeveloped society drawn from anthropological accounts of small-scale and isolated non-Western communities. The resulting image of developed society is characterised by structures which are said to be, for example, highly differentiated, organically integrated and very productive and by behaviour conditioned by universalist achievement and secular norms. Traditional societies on the other hand are said to have undifferentiated, mechanically integrated and unproductive structures and behaviour conditioned by particularistic, ascriptive and diffuse norms.\(^3\) The position of particular societies on the continuum between traditional and modern can then be quantified through the formulation of social and economic indicators like urbanisation, industrialisation and literacy which enable precise measurements to be made. This procedure has been most effectively developed in economics where national income accounting now has some place in the activities of virtually every central bureaucracy in the world. The assumptions which this model makes about any developmental process are necessarily accompanied by others about the way in which it is most likely to occur. These may include elaborate "stage models" like that developed by W. W. Rostow,\(^4\) they may also assume that modernity will be transferred from developed to developing countries in some preordained and inevitable way.\(^5\) These questions relating to processes are, of course, critical to any analysis of the relationship between advanced colonial powers and backward colonial territories, and must be examined in some detail here. Before doing this, how-

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3. This is a very crude oversimplification of a wide range of literature amongst which the work of Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, Redfield and Almond is clearly of critical importance. My own formulation is largely derived from recent discussions, notably with Richard Sklar, Raymond Apthorpe, Nicolas Lampert, Kenneth Cabatoff, Andrea Hopkinson and John Saul.
5. Some of the literature involved is unsympathetically reviewed in Frank.
ever, it is necessary to look more closely at the philosophical implications of the terms which define the continuum between the two polar types.

This continuum must first be recognised as being predominantly normative in its derivation and use. Although it is argued that these constructs are "empirical generalisations" derived directly from observation of reality rather than from the observers' subjective value system, this claim does not hold up under examination. They are not (and could not be) derived from the observation of all advanced or traditional societies or of all aspects of behaviour in the societies which are so chosen, but are deliberately and systematically selective. The image of "Western complex society" tends to be based upon experience in the functioning democracies, notably in their Anglo-American version. On the other hand the image leaves out or treats as aberrations societies like Nazi Germany, which were undoubtedly Western and complex but hardly conformed to supposedly universal modern norms in much of their public and private behaviour. Again, it can be shown that behaviour even in the most 'advanced' democracies is as much governed by 'traditional' as by 'modern' norms. The ideal types represent dominant beliefs (held by both actors in the society and by academic observers) about how people ought to behave, or as myths used to rationalise behaviour after the event. The actual patterns of behaviour in these societies are seen very differently by their critics than by the members of this particular philosophical school. While Parsons might see the "technique and style of Europe" in terms of a universalistic ethic and achieved status, Fanon finds in it "only a succession of negations of man and an avalanche of murders." And Western complex systems must certainly number Auschwitz, Hiroshima and Vietnam among their achievements.

This means that the ideal type is not derived from any simple observation of the facts (or 'empirical reality') of advanced society, but that the characteristics taken to indicate advancement are derived from a logically prior value system which determines what the observer is to see and count and what he is to ignore. The same considerations apply to the characteristics allocated to traditional society. Such societies also manifest a much wider range of structural characteristics than could ever be included in a single theoretical construct, while those which are often assigned to 'traditional man' often appear to have been derived from little more than the desire by colonial administrators and their academic advisers to explain failures to "adapt to

2. Frank illustrates this point very effectively.
modernity."1 Yet where the structure of opportunity permitted it supposedly traditional people often adapted very quickly and struck observers with the 'modern' characteristics which they demonstrated.2 But the argument can be taken a step further. Similar difficulties would arise even if the model of developed society could be shown to be derived from the simple observation of behaviour in such societies, and if no similar forms of behaviour could be observed in traditional society. The use of ideal types derived from "Western complex systems" as a measuring rod against which to determine progress (another equivalent for 'development') in other systems is to imply a normative preference for the kind of existence found in them. Other societies have existed which have considered themselves to be highly advanced, and have measured their own advancement and other peoples backwardness in relation to quite other qualities and achievements than we use now—for example in terms of religious purity, military excellence, artistic refinement and so on. The decision to use the Western model in preference to any of these is easily understandable, but must be recognised for what it is—a normative, not an empirical judgement. But to say this does not in my view necessarily detract in any important way from its use as an analytical tool.

Since this view will probably be disputed it is perhaps best to digress and say something about fundamental methodological assumptions at this point. This should serve both to clarify my basic position and to lead on to a discussion of how I intend to modify and subsequently use the concept of development.

Analysis presupposes normative assumptions which determine the choice of subject, the selection of evidence, and the criteria against which outcomes are assessed. Ideal types or models embody these assumptions and at the same time relate them to the social facts under observation. They are hypothetical statements about processes;3 idealised descriptions of the "forms of action"4 involved in the functioning of particular institutions. Social science is not concerned with abstract systems of normative assumptions for their own sake, but with their relation to the concrete activities in which they are manifested as an integral part of social life. Although values cannot be deriv-


2. For example P. Hill, Migranti Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana, London, 1963; and material by D. Feldman, P. Rigby and others in Brett.


ed from facts they can only be meaningfully considered in relation to facts; that is in relation to social action. Thus the ideal type is not an arbitrary or purely subjective construct, but is based upon a critical evaluation of reality; it is a statement not of how an institution operates, but of how it ought to operate to achieve the full potentiality intimated by its structures and objectives. Adam Smith, Max Weber and J. S. Mill had no experience of a “free competitive market,” an “impersonal bureaucracy” or a “representative democracy” before they formulated these concepts. But their constructs were not simply invented but derived from the observation of actual economies, bureaucracies, or democracies which, while they did not conform to the ideal in every respect, did so in part and seemed to derive their efficacy from the extent to which they did do so. The value of the model thus lies in its ability to demonstrate the difference between the actual and potential achievements inherent in the operation of a given institution.

But the fact that our view of reality is conditioned by normative assumptions does not imply that there can be no distinction between facts and values, or that perceptions are entirely dominated by “subjective valuations.” Although this ability varies, everyone distinguishes on some level between evaluations and perceptions of reality. For social scientists the problem is more complex since they in fact concern themselves with three different kinds or levels of data: a) ‘what actually happens’, b) what people think happens, c) what they think ought to happen, their legal and moral values.

Although there is no doubt that valuations (and, indeed, the whole structure of the personality) strongly influence perception, it is equally true that individuals with very different values can be made to agree on some of the facts in a given situation, although they will differ with regard to their moral implications. And this is also true for the social scientist who is attempting to understand the whole situation, but he must also take into account the fact that his perspective will differ from that of any of the actors concerned. Beattie cites Lévi-Strauss in asserting that “what actually happens” is itself a “construct of the analyst” and “not necessarily that of the people studied.” And this construct, too, will have a factual and an evaluative component both of which will be related to those of the actors but not directly derived from them. The observer will therefore need to be able to separate four components in his mind—his own values and perceptions of

2. J. M. H. Beattie, “Understanding and Explanation in Social Anthropol-
gy”, British Journal of Sociology, X, 1, 1959, p. 47.
3. Ibid., p. 57; see also Weber, pp. 111-112.
reality, and those of the actors he is observing. His ability to deal ‘objectively’ with his subject-matter will be derived from an ability on the one hand to avoid bias1 in his use of evidence and, on the other, to identify and understand the implications of his own values, to “bring them out in the open and put them in order.”2

The desire to create a “value-free social science” derives from the misleading assumption that “there are no values in the objective sense, only subjective valuations,”3 that while it is possible to talk objectively about facts, values are ‘merely subjective’ and not amenable to rational discussion. But this view is both theoretically untenable and likely to produce its own particular form of bias. The social sciences are a “science of persons” and therefore concerned with qualitatively different problems from those of the natural sciences which are a “science of things.”4 The study of persons must differ from the study of things because social scientists are people and not things. To attempt to be objective by attempting to depersonalise social relations (for example by considering them simply as interacting sets of roles) must lead to reification and ‘false knowledge’. As Laing says:

“It is unfortunate that personal and subjective are words so abused as to have no power to convey and genuine act of seeing the other as person [. . .] but imply immediately that one is merging one’s own failings and attitudes into one’s study of the other in such a way as to distort our perception of him. In contrast to the reputable ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ we have the disreputable ‘subjective’, ‘intuitive’, or, worst of all, ‘mystical’. It is interesting, for example, that one frequently encounters ‘merely’ before subjective, whereas it is almost inconceivable to speak of anyone being ‘merely’ objective.”5

The social scientist derives his understanding of man from the fact that he is a man:

“And though by men’s actions we do discover their designs sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decipher without a key, and be deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads is himself a good or evil man.”6

But beyond this, the assumption that values are merely subjective is derived from an untenable distinction between the individual and his social situation. Values are not invented by individuals (social

5. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
scientists or otherwise) but derived from their position in a historically determined social structure; by their relationship to the traditions of activity evolved in that society and more especially to those relating to the activity of people of their status and function.\textsuperscript{1} The important thing about the social scientist in our society is that he is expected to distinguish his own position from that of the actors he observes. He is supposed to be free to hold any opinions he chooses, he has access to a developed historical tradition of knowledge in his subject and to comparative evidence from a variety of cultures; his economic interests should not depend on the outcome of the conflicts which he is studying in the same way as those of the actors concerned. He is neither capitalist nor worker, politician nor voter, chief nor peasant and should therefore be able to see their situation more objectively than they. But he, like each of them, is a member of society and concerned ultimately with some notion of ‘the public interest’ against which everyone must ultimately attempt to measure his actions. While the observer’s model may not be understood by the actors because actual action goes on “in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness or actual unconsciousness of its subjective meaning,”\textsuperscript{2} it should not include knowledge which differs in kind from theirs. What it should do is incorporate all of their knowledge and raise it to a higher level of generality. In doing so it should expand their level of consciousness and enable them to see the world anew, “as if suddenly awakened in a house with which they had only supposed themselves to be familiar.”\textsuperscript{3} In fact it will usually be found that the observer tends to identify the public interest with that of particular groups or strata in society, and to derive his evaluative assumptions from theirs. Adam Smith spoke for the rising bourgeoisie, Marx for the proletariat, many developmentalists accept the objectives and perspectives of the new political and technological elites. If we accept this then there is no point in rejecting particular models simply because they have a normative component; their value will depend upon their content, the social interests with which they tend to identify, their ability to explain observed phenomena, and the implication of their use for the course of future social action.

All of this suggests that our models of society must ultimately have prescriptive implications. They are to be seen as arguments in favour of particular courses of action based upon assumptions about the ultimate nature of human needs and empirical observation of the effects of part actions upon subsequent situations. Taken together

\textsuperscript{1} I think this view has been best argued by Oakeshott, for example in \textit{Rationalism in Politics}.
\textsuperscript{2} Weber, p. 111.
theory and experience make it possible for us to increase our ability to predict outcomes of changes in behaviour. The objective value of such formulations will be determined by the ease with which significant social groups are able to identify with their objectives, accept their explanations and implement their recommendations. The objective importance of the model of the free market system was derived not from some overriding system of natural law as Smith assumed, but from the political power of the social strata which identified with it. Once they had achieved predominance "no individual in it could escape from it, and hence all rational men had to accept the market concept of justice as the only one." The Third World is still searching for a model of development which will acquire the same status and serve the same purpose for their very different circumstances; it is not clear that their problem is being tackled any more effectively than the classical theorists tackled theirs.

Before ending this digression one further point must be made. The great theoretical models which have served to expand man's consciousness and direct social action were normatively based and produced action which tended to strengthen the position of some classes and undermine that of others. Yet these models characteristically attempt to make universalistic and evolutionary claims for themselves. They are presented in terms of some absolute system of values and stated as though the action which they recommend must invariably take place because of the conditions inherent in the state of society. Thus Veblen shows how Smith assumed "a wholesome trend in the natural course of things" which would lead inevitably to a situation which approximated to his ideal, while Marxism assumes the inevitable victory of the proletariat. But, of course, the actual creation of the free market system depended on the decisions of men, and MacPherson probably overstates the degree to which the assumptions which it incorporated were generally accepted even in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The achievement of this kind of society depended upon the political predominance of the classes which believed in it, and was not attained in the many areas where this predominance could not be established. Thus great care must be taken not to attribute too much to the model; the mere fact that it provides criteria against which rationality can be measured does not in any way presuppose "the actual predominance of rational elements in human life," for

that will depend upon the conjunction of political and social forces in the community concerned. These optimistic evolutionary assumptions have exerted a powerful influence over development studies (we talk incessantly of growth rates, for example, but who ever heard of a ‘regression rate’?), and should be resisted. The fact that we know what development is, does not mean that we will be able to persuade the politically powerful to agree with us, or that they will be able to take the recommended action if we do. But our job is not to anticipate the consequences of our work, only to make it available to those who wish to use it.

This suggests that the formulation of models is not merely an academic exercise but critical to the way we see the world. And the most inclusive model is that of development which must provide images which can be used to interpret any “specific historical practice,” and provide alternatives which can be put into effect and “terminate with social change.”

We must now ask whether the Third World can be expected to use models of development derived from knowledge of “Western complex systems” for this purpose, and are immediately faced by an intense contradiction. Can the Western ideal be used like this by peoples whose contact with the West has taken the form of conquest, enslavement and subjection to various forms of social, economic and political subordination for four hundred years or more? Europe created the enlightenment at home while its subjects extracted the wealth of the tropics by murder, torture and deceit. As a result Europe is often seen by those it subjected as the builder of underdevelopment, not development, the imitation of European models, an invitation to “mortifying setbacks,” not the key to progress. And these facts cannot be isolated from the work of academic model-builders because the achievements of Western social thought have been as potent an instrument of control as its military and industrial technology. Western culture, dominated by the scientific approach in this sphere as in many others, has claimed and enforced a general superiority “to any and all other systems of civilised life.” Whatever their past achievements, colonised man was made to learn the colonial culture; they studied the histories of Europe and not their own because they were told that there was “no African history to teach [...], only the history of Europeans in Africa.” And there can be little doubt that these assumptions were widely accepted; this cultural

1. Marcuse.
3. Fanon, p. 252.
dominance created a “dependency complex” which led many colonial peoples to accept “the characteristics assigned to them by the dominant group.” To the extent that they did so, they denied themselves the possibility of liberation; instead of resisting they carried the guns which maintained the colonial system. If the acceptance of Western assumptions was the source of their powerlessness, how can it now serve to free them from their underdevelopment?

And yet it is impossible to escape from this contradiction by denying the significance of the Western tradition. Even its strongest critics have refused to do this. Marx believed that Western society had created “more massive and more colossal productive forces than [...] all proceeding generations together,” and Fanon that “all the elements of a solution to the great problems of humanity have, at different times, existed in European thought.” However dubious the means used to acquire them, and whatever the systems of dominance imposed upon the outside world, the West has used its resources to build up a social and material culture more powerful than any other. It is difficult not to agree with Jaspers:

“What came into the world by means of Europe, historically speaking, is valid of itself, independently of its origin. It is not a unique culture but the property of man as such, of man as a rational being. It is identically transferable. Where it has once been acquired, it can, with more or less talent, be cultivated—whether for mere use, for participation in further scientific research, or for technical inventions. The necessary talent is no basic trait or permanent condition of nations.”

To ignore this property is to ignore the possibility of liberation. Even if the state of the world made this possible, an attempt by particular regions to create a new civilisation without recourse to this experience would be a self-defeating task.

How then can the contradiction between Western dominance and the need to adopt Western models be resolved? In many situations it seems probable that it cannot, in the immediate future at least. Underdevelopment will be perpetuated and even intensified by the acceptance of colonial subordination or by a xenophobic rejection of

3. For example, read R. ROBINSON and J. GALLAGHER, Africa and the Victo-
rians, London, 1961, on the contribution of the Indian army to the British system of Imperial control.
5. FANON, p. 253. Note also MAO TSE-TUNG’s assertion that Chinese society was only to change radically “as a result of the penetration of foreign capitalism” (“The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party”, Selected Works, Peking, III, 1965, p. 73).
6. JASPERS, p. 72.
the positive achievements of Western science. But whatever the political and psychological difficulties, the solution must lie between these two extremes. A way must be found to acquire what is valuable in this tradition without sacrificing the ability to resist foreign dominance in the political, economic and cultural spheres. Indeed, the ability to resist will depend upon the ability to integrate at least some of the techniques which could otherwise be used to control them. The possibility of doing this will not simply result from the desire to do so, but from particular configurations of political, economic and social forces at the national and international levels. Many Third World countries are dominated by indigenous and external forces whose interests are opposed to modernisation—until their power is broken no change will take place. But even where positive change is politically possible it will only occur when certain intellectual conditions are met. Good intentions are not sufficient; they must be backed by an adequate “critical theory of society” which takes full account of the productive potential created for the world by Western experience.

Theoretical adequacy must be achieved on two levels. Firstly, it must involve a genuine understanding of the Western tradition, and more especially, one of the critical or negative elements in that tradition. This tradition is no monolithic structure, but had developed through its ability to maintain “the power of negative thinking—the critical power of Reason.”

We can broadly distinguish two general tendencies in modern social thought; the behavioural school which makes use of structural-functional categories with Parsons as its primary modern source, and Almond and Easton its leading exponents in political science. This school is primarily concerned with problems relating to the stability, persistence, or maintenance of given systems, it uses the concept of a “stable equilibrium” as “a defining characteristic of structure.” With this starting point “all categories terminate in the existing order,” since systems must be evaluated in relation to their ability to adjust or adapt, rather than to change in any revolutionary way.

2. F. Riggs, *Thailand, the Modernisation of a Bureaucratic Polity*, Honolulu, 1966, discusses this question with regard to Thailand’s ability to escape colonisation in the nineteenth century.
6. Parsons, p. 84.
The best that can be hoped for is a consideration of the possibility of a “moving equilibrium,” a dubious concept when one considers the need for radical transformation facing the countries of the Third World. The acceptance of this equilibrium model tends to reduce the ability to criticise the structure of power which has determined both the present and the past relationship between the colonial and colonised peoples; it serves to perpetuate their dependence and subordination. Its theoretical inadequacy and dangerous practical implication are clearly exposed in Frank’s article already cited.1 But while it is relatively easy to reject these formulations, it is less easy to produce a coherent alternative which will lead to a viable programme of action. The basis for such an alternative exists in the liberal, humanist and Marxist traditions which start from conflict assumptions and which have in some degree and at certain times referred to the ‘negation’ rather than the maintenance of the existing order.2 It is no accident that the theories which have most readily been taken over from the West derive from this radical tradition, for example the Marxism of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, and the revolutionary humanism of Fanon. These theories incorporate an understanding of the Western achievement, but start from the assumption that Western dominance must be destroyed before true liberation can occur; both of these elements must be present in some form before effective action can be taken.

Secondly, major theoretical problems have to be surmounted before Western institutions can be successfully transplanted from one society to another. The mere existence of a body of advanced technical knowledge does not provide any basis for advancement even where the capital is available to acquire the physical assets involved. The new technology will only make a positive contribution where it is relevant to local needs and can be adapted to suit local conditions. This is as true of welfare oriented institutions like modern hospitals as it is of economic and political arrangements. The technical knowledge which creates the ability to run machines or heal diseases must be accompanied by “practical knowledge” of the circumstances of time and place which will enable them to be utilised with greatest benefit. This means that the understanding of Western models must be backed by an equally profound understanding of the nature of developing societies—unless this occurs, the result will be the creation of expensive but use-

1. Frank, “Sociology of Development”.
3. See, for example, M. King, “Aspects of Medical Care in Developing Countries”, Paper presented to Institute of Development Studies Conference in Social Planning, University of Sussex, April 1968 (mimeo).
4. Oakeshott, pp. 7 ff., draws a useful distinction between practical and technical knowledge.
less monuments to Western technology. Carried out in this way, the adaption of Western models is not an imitative and dependent activity; it is a creative process which must ultimately result in the evolution of new social forms and autonomous models of thought. When this is achieved the West in turn will come to the Third World for models, witness even now the influence of Ghandi, Mao and Guevara on contemporary European thinking.

Any colonial history, if it is to transcend “the horizon of the existing social order,”¹ should start from a theoretical position which refuses to accept the actions of the dominant colonial classes at their own evaluation, but should not induce an uncritical rejection of the achievements of the period since these, however inadequate, must provide the foundations for the next generation. Bearing this in mind, it is now possible to suggest what appears to be the most useful normative assumptions for the analysis of development before going on to consider the critical factors involved in any process of social change.

I am primarily concerned with three aspects of change—those relating to the structure and size of economic production, the nature of the distribution of the social product, and the location of control over social processes. These concerns embody a set of related normative assumptions—that production be maximised, distribution equalised and control decentralised. The issues raised by these assumptions can be discussed in relation to the corresponding analytical categories—growth, equity and autonomy.

Growth, however difficult to measure,² can be used in the sense familiar in the literature on economic development, and taken to relate primarily to growth in the monetary economy and therefore to the introduction of modern technology and the expansion of production for the market. But most economic analysis tends to focus exclusively upon the analysis of growth, and to ask few questions about the distribution of its benefits. But such questions are critical for an analysis which does not see development purely in economic terms. Ethically it is possible to argue that economic growth is of little value where its benefits are appropriated by a small minority. This means that distribution must be judged in relation to its equity—its tendency to equate performance with reward. It appears to be necessary to accept quite large inequalities in rewards, especially during periods of rapid growth (even Marx accepted that “the cry for an equality of

². See P. J. D. Wiles, The Political Economy of Communism, Oxford, 1962, Ch. xii on problems of measurement.
wages rests upon an absurd mistake,"¹ but it should be possible, however roughly, to determine whether particular inequalities are in fact “necessitated by genuine social needs, technical requirements, and the physical and mental differences among [ . . . ] individuals.”² Structurally the nature of the distribution of the social product is critical because it exerts a fundamental influence upon the process of social and political change. A process of cumulative causation can be shown to operate in these matters;³ those classes which are able to appropriate the bulk of the surplus will, by so doing, increase their ability to influence the future structure of production and the institutions of social and political control; those who cannot will find their influence progressively reduced. These processes of upward and downward mobility, resulting in class formation and social control operate in all societies, but are very visible and of critical importance in societies undergoing radical transformation of the kind induced by colonial penetration. Unless we understand the implications of last changes in this regard it is impossible to understand the contemporary disposition of political forces.

Autonomy is used here to incorporate the wide range of assumptions implied by words like ‘independence’, ‘freedom’ and ‘participation’.⁴ It defines a particular kind of exchange relationship, one in which complete equality prevails; in an autonomous situation neither party can impose its will upon the other. Its polar opposite is one of dependency in which one party determines the situation for the other—in this case the pure colonial situation. The use of this term raises a wide range of implications. Firstly, it must be positively defined; it does not simply imply the absence of “overwhelming concentrations of power”⁵ of the liberal tradition, but suggests the ability of any individual, group or State to act independently in a given situation because of an ability to control the techniques which structure that situation. An illiterate has no autonomy with regard to a trained bureaucrat or trader because he cannot understand their environments, yet depends upon their services. Thus that autonomy must be related to a given level of social and mechanical technology. Colonial populations were autonomous with regard to their precolonial structures, but dependent upon colonial structures which were imposed upon them and which depended upon skills which they had not

². Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. 49.
³. On this point, see Veblen and also G. Myrdal et al., The Principle of Cumulation, in Etzioni.
⁴. It is used in this way with regard to personality types by G. Jahoda, White Man, London, 1961, pp. 107 ff.
acquired. This condition will only end when they have assimilated these skills and become “truly masters of all the material means which make possible the radical transformation of society.” Secondly, autonomy must depend upon the ability to innovate at the level of the most advanced technology. At present innovation is virtually monopolised by the West. Since many of the benefits of “growth industries can be virtually monopolised by the first country to innovate,” dependence will finally disappear only when the Third World, like Japan, has acquired the ability to produce new forms on equal terms with the developed world. This, of course, implies that colonial dependency relationships do not end with the termination of formal legal control, but continue for as long as the situation of substantive inequality persists.

The difficulties involved in the use of these three concepts are considerable. They each present major problems of measurement and are even more difficult to use together since they can come into direct conflict with each other. In the short term it might be necessary to sacrifice equality for growth by centralising power in order to enforce maximum rates of saving and investment; alternatively it might be necessary to forego some measure of growth to maintain independence from external sources. But in the long term they can be shown to be functionally interrelated—autonomy must depend upon continued economic growth, this in turn will depend upon the ability to resist the dominance of groups whose interests are opposed to the changes which growth must bring. Both are only likely to continue where broad strata of the society can participate effectively in political, social and economic development on terms which they accept as equitable. This degree of complexity makes simple definitions and refined measurement impossible—all we hope for are rough approximations and broad generalisations. But this seems preferable to the alternative of “sacrificing the relevance of subject matter to the elegance of analytical method; it is better to deal imperfectly with what is important that to attain virtuoso skill in the treatment of what does not matter.”

It is necessary now to consider the kinds of structures involved in the colonial situation, the way they relate to each other and the dynamic factors which cause movement in one direction or another.

Interaction in the early stages of colonial administration was determined by the dominance which the agencies of foreign control were able to assert over the indigenous structures which they overran. The latter exhibited a wide range of social forms, but from the Euro-

1. Fanon, p. 250.
pean point of view were all in relative terms small-scale, isolated and technically backward. And their internal differences were of limited importance when compared with their general subordination to the dominant structures introduced in virtually every sphere of life by the new rulers. New administrative, economic, religious and educational institutions were extended and consolidated, establishing new centres from which radical change in rural society was bound to flow. These centres were controlled by a new class of expatriate whose ends and methods were determined with reference to the European metropolitan centre; these, in turn, imposed new demands upon local society and established the limits within which the now dependent indigenous structures would be free to operate. The precolonial formations were not entirely incorporated by the new colonial system—they were required to change in favour of new demands only up to the point but no further than that required for the purposes of the colonial political economy. The dependent structures were expected to provide for the maintenance of law and order, the production of cash crops, the collection of taxes and the unskilled labour required by the new economic and administrative system. Beyond this the new authorities encouraged the perpetuation of 'traditional' values, these being seen as fundamental to the maintenance of the 'traditional' or 'tribal' social order. The maintenance of this order, in some attenuated form, was fundamental to a system which did not have the desire or the resources to modernise the whole of its new domain in any basic way. But the continued survival of these dependent structures should not be taken as proof of the continued existence of some earlier 'traditional' society. The changes imposed by colonialism were partial but fundamental—they undermined the old structures at their most vulnerable points. The chief might still command his people, but he now deferred to the district commissioner. When faced with a threat to his authority his ultimate recourse lay with the colonial state, not the precolonial social and political sanctions. The old closed economy was broken open, the old verities challenged and new demands created by the authority of Western religion, education and medical services. These dependent structures drew such independent authority as they had from the past, but they survived in the present only because the colonial power did not choose to destroy them. But their hold on the future was wholly problematical in the face of the changes introduced by the new institu-

1. This analysis follows Frank in part (see Capitalism and Underdevelopment...).
2. See APTHORPE.
tions. For the future the critical question was not the nature of traditional values but access to the modern resources embodied in the dominant colonial structures. These were distributed very unevenly; their impact upon dependent society varied very sharply as a result. Their presence or absence in the form of roads, schools, etc., initiated chains of cumulative causation which led some individuals and groups to move forward very rapidly, others to stagnate or even regress in relation to the changes taking place in society as a whole. These movements were fundamental to the developmental process on all levels, it is only possible to come to terms with contemporary configurations when they are properly understood.

This suggests that we begin with a dualistic typology which assumes the existence of dominant colonial and dependent indigenous structures, the former introducing the dynamic element into the situation and deriving their objectives from the metropolitan centre, the latter serving the former and exercising an independent authority derived from earlier social forms only within the limits set by the demands of the metropolitan centre. In the period up to the Second World War this system gave every appearance of stability in most parts of tropical Africa. In its most enlightened guise it was characterised by the paternalism of the colonial agent on the one hand, and the apparently willing deference of the African subject on the other. As a system it lent itself to analysis in terms of equilibrium models and was so studied by anthropologists and other more or less academic advisers to the colonial authority. But this harmony was more apparent than real; the appearance of colonial law and order overlaid a deep-seated contradiction. I would wish to argue here that the original relationship can only be understood in relation to this contradiction, and that it was to be the forces which it released which were to create the need for “the suppression of the old society by the new one.”

This, once again, requires some methodological explanation.

While much social analysis starts from equilibrium assumptions, I would argue with Leach that “real societies can never be in equilibrium,” and further that the degree of conflict involved in colonial society was of a particularly intense kind. The relations between colonial and dependent structures were characterised by great inequality, however cordial the day to day interactions of the parties concerned. The expatriates might have been happy to exercise their paternalism indefinitely, but the African population could not be expected to accept their dependence in the same spirit. During the initial stages of penetration the indigenous populations were in no position

to challenge this situation short of suicidal wars or rebellions like that forced upon the Zulu in Natal at the end of the nineteenth century. But the new situation was a dynamic one; the interaction between new structures and old gave rise to new structures and new forces which were bound ultimately to challenge the colonial political order. The colonial power was forced, in its own interests, to transfer certain skills and resources to the indigenous population; they built railways, roads and schools, introduced new crops and revolutionised the system of economic exchange.¹ For the coming generation reality was not necessarily dominated by a system of monolithic and exploitative control, but incorporated some opportunities to acquire the skills required to exploit the new situation "as a means of social advancement."² Their success in so doing created new resources, new demands and new classes, and so altered "the structure of society itself."³

But this process took place within a general framework or grievance derived from perceived exploitation. The emergent classes were given access to these opportunities on very unequal terms; where their interests conflicted with those of the colonial authorities the latter could be expected to use their power to ensure their own preponderance.⁴ The emerging indigenous classes perceived reality in terms of inherited inequality, blocked economic opportunities and social discrimination. This was bound to create a desire to resist and replace the colonial structure; the new skills gave them some of the resources with which to attempt this. Thus we can see the broad historical process in dialectical terms; during the first stage colonial and dependent structures were juxtaposed in conditions of intense but, after the period of initial colonisation, for the most part unexpressed conflict, this relationship subsequently gave rise to new social forces which were ultimately to stand in opposition to both. Thus the first stage of colonialism terminated in a second during which the battle was to come out into the open and be fought on different terms. Originally the district commissioner and chief divided the territory between them; once this situation had matured both, from their different perspectives, faced the nationalist politician and the new forces which he represented. But it should again be noted that the process was not one of pure conflict, but an interaction in which "convergent and

² Leach, p. 8.
³ Ibid.
divergent currents [. . . ] were inseparably interwoven." The emergent forces depended upon the resources made available by the colonial state; their opposition to it derived from the limits which that state sought to impose upon their ability to acquire them. It was the conjunction between these positive and negative elements which introduced the dynamic elements into the situation.

To understand the contemporary situation one must therefore understand the implications in structural terms of the first stage of this process, that of the period during which colonial control was consolidated and the new administrative and economic structure given its original form. This stage is critical in relation to the present because the foundation of the emerging indigenous structures which should be concerned to produce fully autonomous structures, in the sense of that term set out earlier, were created then. The distribution of modern resources by the colonial power determined the life chances of the rising generation; the emergence of a new political, economic and social elite depended upon their allocation. The configuration of forces during the second stage of colonial control (and, indeed, after independence) depended upon the nature of this allocation and can therefore only be understood in relation to it.

Again it is important to note that this approach does not imply the existence of some inevitable ‘law of historical development’. Western dominance was bound to induce conflict and change, but the scale, content and direction of change depended upon particular circumstances—the nature of the colonial presence on the one hand and of the precolonial formations it confronted on the other. It would be reassuring but excessively optimistic to anticipate “the inevitability of emancipation through social conflict.” Emancipation occurs only where the circumstances are favourable; in many places the lack of physical resources, the dominance of reactionary classes or the weakness of the colonial presence seem likely to hold up progress for as far ahead as anyone cares to look. Our problem is to identify both the positive and negative factors and thus improve our ability to make realistic assessments about future courses of action.

This leads into the consideration of a final methodological problem. I have suggested a model through which we can identify the fundamental interactions and the historical stages of any developmental process in a colonial situation. To take the analysis a step further it

is necessary to identify and abstract the dynamic factors in the situation, the variables which will influence the actual outcomes of particular interactions in particular situations and produce movement in one direction or another.

At any point in time most social action will take place in relation to an established and unequal distribution of resources, regulated through a complex system of social control.¹ The bulk of these resources will be devoted to the maintenance of this existing structure, to “simple reproduction” in the Marxist sense,² and will take the form of immobile capital assets, goods required to meet existing levels of consumption or values “embedded in fixed, ascriptive, relations and groups.”³ But in every society there will at some time at least be a margin between actual consumption and actual production; there will also be some possibility of moving existing resources from one use to another. The control, sources and scale of these “free-floating resources”⁴ will determine the nature of the change process; allocated to particular purposes they will set cumulative growth processes in motion, taken from existing uses they will induce cumulative processes of decline. These positive and negative processes taken together will, over a shorter or longer period, revolutionise the whole structure of social relations. The critical factor in social change, therefore, is not so much the absolute level of production but the composition of the surplus which can be appropriated and put to new uses. Its size, source and allocation will determine the speed and direction of change and must therefore provide the primary focus for analytical attention.

The size of the actual surplus at any point in time will be determined by the difference between actual consumption and actual production. But it would be misleading to confine attention to the actual surplus as though this constituted an absolute social category. Any surplus, economic or otherwise, is not absolute but relative to the social situation. Its size will depend upon the prevailing interaction between values, power and technological capacity, and will change with a change in any of them. A surplus can only come into existence where a new opportunity has been identified, it will actually be made available only where the relevant group has sufficient social control⁵ to appropriate it, and it will produce new assets only where the technological capacity exists to exploit it. The interaction between

¹. This discussion is drawn from my “Politics, Economics and Rationality”, pp. 59 ff.
⁴. Ibid., esp. pp. 27 ff.
the consciousness of new objectives, social control and technical capacity will determine "what things and how much a given society produces, who is responsible for production, how much is consumed and in what proportion by the various groups in the society [and] how much is saved or diverted from consumption and for what purposes . . ."1 The identification of new needs, changes in institutional control, or technological innovation will alter the size of the surplus and its implications for the future. Thus the actual surplus appropriated at any time will only constitute a small part of the potential surplus available if underutilised resources were brought into use, productivity increased without a corresponding increase in consumption, or vice versa.2 The existence of a potential surplus is a critical factor in the competition between groups at any point in time—this will take the form of an effort to obtain control over the institutions through which these additional resources can be captured and redirected.

Changes in the movement of resources must therefore be understood in relation to both sacrifice and appropriation, that is to the transfer of assets from one part of society to another. Identification of the source of supply will suggest areas of likely relative downward mobility. Where one social category constantly gives up a larger relative percentage of its assets than it obtains in return, its relative position in the social structure will deteriorate. This will be true even where its absolute level of income is rising, but more slowly than that of other section of the community:

"A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arrive beside the little house and it shrinks from a little house to a hut [. . .]. Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature they are of a relative nature."3

The analysis must also take account of the fact that surplus can be derived from internal or external sources, assets can be transferred from the metropolis to the colony and vice versa. New resources can therefore be created at the periphery without any internal sacrifices; on the other hand internal resources can be sacrificed without creating any corresponding growth in local assets.

If the source of free floating resources indicates areas of downward mobility, their allocation determines potentialities for growth.

2. See Baran, Ch. II on the notion of "potential surplus".
Particular groups in society will appropriate some portion of the surplus and convert it into new productive resources in the form of "additional capital." This ability will depend upon control over any or all of a wide range of factors—for example, access to military technology, religious sanctions, or socially necessary skills. Its effects will be to cumulatively expand the ability to control resources and hence to advance their relative social position.

This very bald statement requires some further development. Firstly, it is clear that concentration upon control over the surplus enables us to give concrete empirical content to the conflict model outlined earlier. Change occurs because certain groups are able to utilise the surplus and advance their position relative to that of others in the society. To understand this process we must be able to isolate the factors which provide them with this ability, the constraints within which they are able to operate it, and the scale and productivity of the resources to which it gives them access. This requires first that we identify the critical groups which are competing for resources within any given political system (in this case the colonial, dependent and emergent structures outlined earlier) and secondly that we establish the terms on which the leading groups are able to extract them from the rest. Any surplus will be derived from an exchange relationship—for example that between the tax collector and the peasant, the trader and his customer—to which both parties will make some sort of contribution. The critical question relates to the terms on which this takes place—what profit or loss does each party derive from the relationship? While it can be assumed that each is attempting to maximise his own interest, the degree of reciprocity involved can vary from a situation in which benefits are completely equalised to one in which one party is totally subordinated to the other. Secondly, a concern with control and the ability of some groups to grow at the expense of others should not lead to unrealistic assumptions about their ability to determine all the outcomes of particular decisions and therefore their own future social position. Control is always partial; even the governors of a totalitarian State cannot determine all the consequences of every decision in advance and have therefore to contend with some measure of uncertainty. Dominant groups have to provide subordinate groups with some form of payment for their services—this can, over time, alter their relative positions. Decisions

1. See Sweezy, pp. 79 ff., on the process of capitalist accumulation.
will always have "unanticipated consequences," which may again direct resources towards groups for which they were not originally intended. If this were not the case revolutions would never succeed because they depend upon a change in the distribution of social control which is necessarily against the interests of the ruling class. It is possible here to use the concept of indirect influence to take account of the ability of subordinate groups to benefit from decisions taken either without any reference to their interests (as where they can make use of a road built essentially for some other group) or from those taken by other groups on their behalf whose interests coincide partially with theirs. The broader the issues and the longer the time scales involved, the lower the ability to predict and control outcomes. This is especially true in the general field of economic development where the ability to consciously shape the future is still exceedingly low. Thirdly, when assessing the ability of particular groups to control resources it is necessary to take into account factors built into the structure of the situation which are rarely questioned but which do in fact exert a decisive influence over the life chances of the groups involved. The fundamental assumptions which determine the relationships in any society are rarely brought to the surface, they lie "hidden in the dim depths," and produce unquestioning habits of deference and command. This is the area in which outcomes are determined by "non-decisions;" however difficult, it is the task of the social scientist to bring them to the surface and make their implications explicit.

In conclusion it is perhaps worth trying to relate this discussion of change factors to the methodological considerations outlined earlier. I have argued that change occurs where groups are able to extract surpluses from society and apply them to new uses, and that the primary groups competing in the colonial situation are those which constitute the colonial, dependent and emergent structures which make up the colonial political economy. Thus the nature of the change process will be determined by the relative ability of each of these to get control over free-floating resources; more precisely, it will depend on the terms under which they enter into exchange relationships with each other. Growth will depend upon the relative productivity of the resources transferred from one use to another. It has a general aspect, where it relates to the increase in total social product, it also has a particular aspect in relation to the expansion of one group in

2. Ross, p. 341.
relation to the rest of society. This latter aspect leads to the consideration of questions relating to distribution, equity and changes in social structure, since these can be quantified in relation to the scale and productivity of (or rate of return on) the transferred assets. It should be noted here that the level of conflict in the total situation will be heavily influenced by the tendency for total resources to expand or contract. Where total resources are expanding it will be possible for subordinate groups to be provided with an increase in absolute levels of consumption despite an increase in their relative deprivation. This will not eliminate conflict, as Marx points out in the passage cited earlier, but it may make it easier to contain. But it is important here not to allow the existence of high-living standards in absolute terms to blind us to changes in relative deprivation—this is likely to be highest among relatively well placed groups whose position is either deteriorating or cannot improve fast enough because of the opposition of entrenched competitors. Finally, it will be possible to determine the tendency for autonomous structures to evolve within the colonial situation by determining the ability of the emergent structures to establish favourable exchange relationships with the other structures in society and continuously increase their span of social control. Their ability to obtain the resources which determine the ability to modernise—access to capital, skills and political structures—will determine the point at which they are able to eliminate the influence of both the dominant colonial structures and their indigenous subordinates.