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Christian missions to Africa tended to flourish freest and unfettered where the colonial government was of the same country as the missions and shared similar ideals in matters of religion and politics. Wherever the state and the official religion merged such as in Catholic countries then the presence of Protestant missions in those colonies was tantamount to anti-state activism. Easier it was for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a Protestant mission to exist and proselytise in the colony of a Catholic state.

A question might well be asked: why didn’t Christian missions avoid situations that might lead to conflict? The answer was ready at hand: wherever they could, they did, except for the extreme sectarian groups which tended to thrive on conflict itself, wallowing in it both as challenge to their faith and as avenue to martyrdom. The American Board Missions to Angola, with which this paper deals, like most middle-of-the-road missions, never expected such big political conflicts as those into which they were thrust. These conflicts with the Portuguese revolved around three major issues—the Scramble and its aftermath, “denationalisation”, and labour problems. The three issues agitated the religious and political life in Angola, particularly on the Benguela plateau, and affected to a far-reaching degree the relationship between the American Board missionaries and the Portuguese government for well over forty years.

The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission,¹

¹ ABP denotes American Board Papers. In the American Board Papers there is no consistency of pagination of materials put in the volumes. Some materials are numbered, others not at all. Where materials are numbered they are so indicated in the documentation. Also the titles of papers are documented as they appear on the archival papers. The American Board Papers are in Huntington Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

CCFMS Docs. denotes Canadian Congregational Foreign Missionary Society
Congregationalists from Boston, chose to set up a Christian mission in Angola. The motivating forces behind this decision were probably no different from those which had propelled numerous other Christian missions to come to Africa. Among these were the stated belief that Africa was “the last stronghold of the Prince of Darkness” where slavery abounded and people were demoralised. It was the duty of the missions not only to help right the wrongs done to Africa in the past but also to help develop Africa. Above all, the marching order of the missions was to go unto all the world to preach the Gospel to every creature.

American pragmatism was put to use right from the very beginning. The site for setting up the mission was carefully chosen and even the people among whom the mission was to be planted were not unfamiliar to Dr. John O. Means, the secretary of the Board, who was the driving force behind the Angola mission. When he was a young man and in the United States West Africa Naval Patrol he had got to know about the Ovimbundu of the healthy Benguela Highlands. The selected pioneers were three. William H. Sanders, whose parents were American Board missionaries in Jaffna, Ceylon. He had yearned since childhood to follow in his father's footsteps. W. W. Bagster, son of an English-born missionary father known as 'Bible Bagster' who vowed in the England of the 1840s and '50s to put a copy of the Bible into every English home. W. W. Bagster was the leader of the group. The third member was Samuel T. Miller, little of whom we know except that he was a freed slave who had just then graduated from the Negro institution, Hampton Institute, Virginia. The group did not neglect the diplomatic side of their mission. They sailed for Lisbon on August 5, 1880.

Once there, they made some curious discoveries. After talking to
Government officials and various people, including such illustrious members of the Geographical Society as Messrs. Capelo and Ivens who had just returned from their trip across the middle of Southern Africa, they were surprised to learn that their assumption that Portugal controlled the Benguela Highlands was wrong. They were told that the Government could not be responsible for their safety if they ventured outside the coastal fringe of the colony. It was a disputed question whether or not the interior belonged to Portugal. But the missionaries were determined to go into the interior at all costs. One more issue leapt to view: utter confusion among the Portuguese colonial hierarchy. When the missionaries asked for such a simple thing as a permit to get their goods into the colony duty-free, they found this impossible. It was impossible merely because the colonial Minister referred them to the governor-general of Angola who then passed them on to the colonial secretary who finally said he was not sure whether this matter was within his jurisdiction and simply refused to act.

Fish stinks from the head. This type of lack of coordination and administrative confusion had been among some of the greatest problems that had always disturbed Angola since the sixteenth century. The character of Luanda, the capital, had not changed much since Paulo Dias de Novais brought the convicts there. Governors did not stay long. In their first year, we are told, they visited and studied those influential in the elections and “in the second year, they curse the ministers; and in the third, they pack their bags.” Trade in human cargoes was the Alpha and the Omega of the economics of Angola. Wars upon wars were waged just so as to get these sable cargoes. The main prosecutors of this trade were the degradados (the degraded ones), and their main agents, from the eighteenth century on, were the pombeiros, most of whom were the Ovimbundu. Equipped with guns, the Ovimbundu would fit out large caravans to go raid for slaves. Aside from guns, rum and geribita (a very harsh type of liquor) had the notoriety as the main articles of exchange without which the Africans would not trade. The demoralising effect of all

this *aguardiente* (firewater) had been well painted by Silva Correia, who reported as to how rapidly the Africans would drink up in a short time a cargo of rum from Brazil and how it made them behave “like a multitude of ants, who in one day devour large leaves on a tree.”

Things were virtually the same as they had always been in Angola when the American Board missionaries arrived there late in 1880. The lazy, rum-soaked Africans were found in the streets of Luanda doing some “barbarous dances” and lolling about the shops longing for drinks for which they were too lazy to work. Here was the missionaries’ paradise. There was drink, there was laziness, there were barbarous dances which probably symbolised the lewdness of the African mind. Bagster expressed the opinion that the Portuguese unreliability and irresponsibility had rubbed off on the African, so that he himself was as unreliable as his overlords.

The presence of the missionaries on the coast created quite a whisper campaign. They were put at arms’ length and under constant surveillance. Few believed the missionaries when they said they were going into the interior to preach. For, throughout the nineteenth century, the Portuguese priests in Angola were the butt of jokes among the local Portuguese population. Governor Melo reported in 1800, for instance, that the Carmelites and the Franciscans were doing nothing. He also reported the following year that the various convents were no more than factories. The Franciscans were greedy and lax. The clergy had become a millstone around the neck of the state. In 1834 the Portuguese government had closed all the religious Orders. At that time there were three priests in Angola—a Carmelite in Bango-a-Quitamba, a Carmelite in Luanda, and a Capuchin elsewhere. There were two dozen African priests. About twenty years later the latter had almost disappeared, there being only five secular priests—two in the See of Angola and Congo, two in Luanda parishes and one in Benguela. Those who remained up to the 1870s and 1880s were so cowardly they usually pretended illness as to avoid being stationed away from Luanda. When the missionaries reached Bandalu at the end of March 1881, King Ekuikui was equally skeptical about them. He was supposed to have wondered aloud: “You will not buy wax, rubber, ivory or slaves, what are you here for?”

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2. Sanders to Means, 22 November 1880, ABP encl. 15.
3. Bagster to Means, 10 February 1881, ABP encl. 152.
5. Ibid., p. 298.
6. Ibid.
was a perfectly justified question. After all, for centuries the only Europeans to come to the interior of Angola were the Brancos (Portuguese traders). The missionaries must be nit-wits or fools, *afulu.*

The forces at work at the time were not quite clear either to the missionaries or to the Portuguese and to the Ovimbundu. Yet all three parties were in the warming cauldron of the Scramble. Only a few years before, Verney L. Cameron had crossed Southern Africa, ending his trip in Angola. He had charged again and again that there was slave trade in Angola and that the Portuguese had kept out foreign capital and enterprise. The Portuguese, he said, were "morally accomplices of slave traders and kidnappers." And Angola was a hotbed of corruption.\(^1\) The Portuguese reacted to this rather sharply, charging Anglo-Saxon arrogance and conspiracy to denude Portugal of her colony.\(^2\) The suspicious attitude of the Portuguese to the missionaries was quite understandable. At this time, even Catholic priests from other countries were put under strict watch. The Portuguese, for example, distrusted one French priest, Padre Duparquet, who was active in Mossamedes from 1870 on. He was accused or rumoured to be an English agent planted there to spread Anglo-Saxon influence in the area.\(^3\) Only about a year before the debates precipitated by Cameron's charges, the Portuguese government had been snubbed by not being invited to the International Geographical Conference at Brussels on September 12, 1876.\(^4\) The Portuguese had reacted to this by trying to organise their own Expedição África Portuguesa (Portuguese African Expedition), the aim of which was to gain a road to the east coast by passing through Bié.\(^5\) The details of this expedition do not concern us; it is, however, necessary to point out here in passing that Bié was also the final destination of the American Board missionaries. In the proposed expedition Capelo and Ivens fell out with Serpa Pinto who went alone.\(^6\) He remarked later that Bié was "the primary strategic place of Western Africa" upon which the security of trade in the interior, the autonomy of the province of Benguela and the Portuguese monopoly of the trade of Southern Africa depended. He then warned of British and Belgian intentions of diverting interior trade from Angola, which, if not checked, would isolate and kill the province of Angola.\(^7\) The importance of Bié to the Portuguese could not, therefore, be overestimated.

1. Cameron, pp. 246, 324, 335.
2. Diario de Noticias, 1 and 2 November 1877.
3. For a biography of Duparquet, see Grande enciclopédia portuguesa e brasileira, Lisboa, 1930, IX, p. 35.
4. J. Scott Keltie, The Partition of Africa, London, 1895, p. 120.
5. Diario de Noticias, 21 November and 29 December 1877.
As the missionaries moved inland they started to meet overt opposition, primarily from the degradados. One, Eduardo Braga, who had already scared their porters away on the coast, went into the interior to create trouble for them with several Umbundu chiefs. He almost succeeded in undermining the not unfriendly reception they had secured from Ekuikui of Bailundu. While the missionaries were away exploring outside Bailundu, Braga told Ekuikui that the irrigation ditch which they had dug to bring water into their gardens was actually a conduit into which gunpowder would be sprayed and led into the chief’s place to blow him up. The mission was plundered and the missionaries forced to flee toward the coast. Braga had exploited the chief’s desire for guns and rum, which the missionaries had refused to give. The mission had by then grown to include Messrs Stover and Fay, who were despatched home to take the matter to the Prudential Committee of the American Board. At the same time other missionaries petitioned the governor-general of Angola. While all this was going on, F. S. Arnot of the Plymouth Brethren Mission to the Congo just happened to pass near Bailundu, when he heard of the case. He then challenged Braga, who was also at hand, forcing him to expose his own lies.

The missionaries were in the thick of their first crisis with the Portuguese government. In Boston, diplomatic action was set on foot and publicity was given to the issue of the expulsion. The missionary organ, *The Congregationalist*, October 1884, was not far wrong in holding the Portuguese government responsible and in averring that the eyes of all Christendom were upon Portugal in the matter and that it would be to her everlasting shame if she did not act promptly, justly, and speedily to right the wrongs that had been committed. Secretary of State Frelinghuysen expressed the desire of the United States government that any pertinent punitive laws of Portugal be put in force so that American citizens should not be hindered at that time and in the future from residing peacefully in a territory under Portuguese control.

Viscount de Nogueiras, Portuguese ambassador to the United States, replied (November 17, 1884) that investigations were being made into the affair and promised that his government would “let no sort of violence whatever go unpunished.” Nogueira’s promised action, however, was no more than diplomatic sophistry. The United

1. Sanders to Strong, 7 August 1884, ABP encl. 56.
4. Papers relating to the expulsion, ABP encl. 54. Frelinghuysen to Judson Smith, 24 October 1884.
States consul at Luanda made it clear to his government that the Portuguese government had no representatives in Bailundu and had no power there to compel the native people, who were nominally Portuguese vassals.\(^1\) The Portuguese power there was “more moral than anything else.”

For an understanding of the Portuguese view, here was what the governor of Benguela himself told the mission in a reply to the petition sent to him. The governor said:

“The whole proceedings of the missionaries appear unnatural, who, in the exclusive interest of the Christian faith should come to establish themselves in the center of Africa, with no kind of remuneration in view; that this unusual circumstance fatally brought upon the missionaries a certain suspicion of reserved political motive, and in this way it is perfectly explicable that not only Eduardo Braga, but all the white traders who go inland, receive instructions to hear from the gentis [the people] what has been and is the deportment of missionaries.”\(^2\)

He went on to say that neither the traders nor the soba (native kings) were instructed to rob, plunder and expel the mission. He said it was only natural that Portugal take precautions for the safety of its land, “since we have seen in a great assembly of representatives from all lands, the free state of Congo recognised which was formed to the cost of our territories.”\(^3\) The chiefs of the International Association, he said, had declared by all possible ways of publicity that never would their object pass beyond that of a scientific undertaking, that they were and always would be far from any political purpose. The Conference of Berlin proved the contrary. The United States was the first nation which recognised the flag of the new state, sending there a diplomat and ships, “who will already have informed your government how far is the reality from the facts [. . .] so fantastically published.”\(^4\) The governor exonerated Braga. The governor-general of Angola, Ferreira do Amaral, wrote to Robert Newton, United States vice-consul (November 18, 1884), noting that the merchants of Benguela were constantly complaining that the missionaries were

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1. Ibid., encl. 77. Also letter of Governor of Benguela to the WCAM, 18 May 1885, encl. 82. The term “vassal” appeared to be a misnomer. W. H. Sanders, veteran American Board missionary, elaborated on this when he noted that the African chiefs did not really understand themselves to be Portuguese vassals. Usually the Portuguese capitão-mor (Government representative in the interior) had no soldiers. He, as well as other Europeans, had to carry to the chiefs what might be called a “tribute” (ociwanda). “The Portuguese Government looked on the chiefs as its subjects. These, receiving what they considered tribute from even the ‘Captain General’ thought the King of Portugal tributary to themselves” (Sanders, p. 44). According to Wheeler (p. 41), the Portuguese could not make native kings vassals but allies.

2. Papers relating to the expulsion, ABP encl. 77.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.
trying to turn the trade from going into Benguela. This, he felt, was the hub of the matter. It must have influenced some unscrupulous persons to provoke the soba of Bailundu by false pretences.1

If the missionaries wanted to return to the interior they were to swear before witnesses and the authorities that they would not enter into politics nor influence in any adverse way the interests of Benguela merchants. The governor-general said he did not have enough forces in Bailundu to guarantee the behaviour of the soba and much less exact payment of the $11,000 which the missionaries claimed. He blamed the missionaries for establishing themselves in the interior without first consulting the Government as to what guarantee it could give for the protection of their persons and their property. The risk they ran was inherent to the vocation in which they were engaged. He then gave permission for the mission to reestablish itself, but gave no guarantee that the soba would not repeat his violence.2 The governor of Benguela was instructed to write to Ekuikui saying for what the mission was in his territory. Ekuikui himself wrote to the missionaries asking them to return, saying that he had been tricked by Braga. The missionaries returned. Ekuikui came himself from his war camp to plant a special tree to assure the missionaries they would not be expelled again.3 Their goods were returned to them and everything returned to normalcy.

The first contest between the mission and the Portuguese government had ended in draw. Each had through diplomacy claimed its own right to existence. Nervous on the eve of the Scramble, the Portuguese wanted a diplomatic claim to Bié, which was important to them for both political and economic reasons. They were afraid of being cheated by the big powers—England and America—with which the missionaries were associated. The missionaries had simply said they wanted to be able to preach. The Portuguese were not convinced about what seemed to them a shibboleth. They knew full well that religion, politics and culture might not be unrelated. And the American mission which came to preach might also propagate American culture with its Anglo-Saxon bias. The small wart might as well be removed before it grew to undermine the body. The Portuguese were subsequently proved right. The mission did in fact grow from the proverbial small acorn to become a mighty oak. For now, however, both the mission and the Portuguese had won their objectives. The Portuguese government had satisfied the demands of the Scramble, the missionaries, those of the Gospel. Yet the crisis of the expulsion had created much bad blood on both sides. It had already so aggravat-

1. Papers relating to the expulsion, encl. 89.
2. Ibid., encl. 82.
ed the suspicious atmosphere of mutual distrust of the one group against the other, that one is forced to ask: could the lion and the lamb coexist?

In the unsettled condition of the Benguela Highlands in the late 1880s, the missionaries, at least, certainly needed the strong arm of the Portuguese government to curb what to them was the intransigent behaviour of some of the African chiefs which was a hindrance to the peaceful work of preaching. For example, when the missionaries got to Bailundu in 1881, Ekuikui was raiding the outlying country as part of the last ceremony of his inauguration. For the following three years there was no peace as the trade routes eastward and westward were being plundered. The missionaries wanted to go to Bie, only to be told by Ekuikui that they could not go. They had found themselves wedged in by Umbundu's political and economic struggle between the Bieans and the Bailundu. Ekuikui had believed that the missionaries would help the Bieans against his own people. There were other irritants—the chiefs were perpetually demanding gifts and would stop at nothing to find excuses to wrest these from the missionaries: for example, when heavy fines had to be paid when Bagster died, Ekuikui promptly accused Sanders of killing him. Sometimes when the gifts were not forthcoming or were judged too small, the chiefs would rain abuse on the missionaries. Rev. Currie recalled his experience with Jambayemina of Bie:

"My present, proving not to be very large, the king threw it to the ground, shouted in his savage drunken rage, called me an ox, a 'Ganguellite' [Ganguella—a term of contempt. The Ovimbundu had a saying that the Ganguellas, their neighbours to the East, were not human beings] [. . .]. He scowled at me and scolded; but I sat meekly on my stool and tried to appear as little concerned as possible [. . .], he took a stick and drove out most of his attendants, locked the gates of his courtyard [. . .] and thus had us shut in. But we were able to leave."

Jambayemina died accidentally, poisoning himself by drinking a poisoned cup he had prepared for someone else. Soon thereafter a threat of civil war hung over Bié when the next king, Chioca, refused to raid the Ganguellas as was the custom. An unknown chief, Chindunduma, declared he would oust the chief. Secretly urged on by some of the old people, Chindunduma declared that Chioca was not properly inaugurated as it was customary for a king to raid the Ganguellas as the culmination of crowning ceremonies. The Bieans were

1. Ibid., p. 22.
2. J. T. Tucker, Drums in Darkness, Toronto, 1927, p. 70. Sanders to Means, 10 March 1882, ABP encl. 27.
3. J. T. Tucker, Currie of Chisamba, original typescript, CCFMS Archives, 1931.
split; most of them, however, sided with Chindunduma, and Chioca was forced to flee. He and his small band of supporters went to regroup about fifty miles away, hoping soon to regain his throne. Chindunduma became the chief. This did not in itself bring the peace which the missionaries wanted. But the days of Chindunduma himself were numbered. Unknown to him, forces were already shaping themselves that would not only affect him but Bié as well and indeed the whole of Angola. These same forces would redound to the benefit of the missions. Chindunduma took the throne in 1886 at the time when the inkling of what was to come was like a cloud no bigger than a man's hand.

The Portuguese were determined to have a forward policy and they were already nursing their *costa contra costa* (coast to coast) dream of joining Angola to Mozambique. Part of this dream included sending Portuguese missionaries inland to off-set the influence of foreigners among the natives. As we have seen above, Portuguese missionary effort in the nineteenth century was virtually nil in Angola. One of the greatest advocates of the resuscitation of their activities at the time of the Scramble was Father Baroso. Baroso believed that first and foremost the missionaries had to be Portuguese nationals because these only could be relied upon to be patriotic. His missionary ideas are to be found in *O Congo*. From 1884 on the Portuguese plans started to unfold, starting with theHenrique Dias de Carvalho's expedition to Lunda region beyond the Kasai. Two years later, Portugal and Germany signed a convention drawing the frontier between Angola and South-West Africa. In 1887, Henrique de Barros Gomes unfolded a map in the Portuguese Parliament in which the territory between Angola and Mozambique was coloured a bright pink. Thus began the incident of the *mapa cor de rosa* which led to the British Foreign Office lodging a complaint to say that the Portuguese should not arrogate to themselves those territories which no power had occupied. Salisbury reminded the Portuguese that according to the Berlin Act no claim to territory in Central Africa could be recognised that was not supported by effective occupation. The following year Barros Gomes sent Serpa Pinto to Mozambique to travel inland, and in 1889 Paiva Couceiro left Benguela to travel to Barotseland and plant a flag in cooperation with Serpa Pinto's expedition from Mozambique.

Racing, so as to be able to meet Serpa Pinto, Henrique de Paiva

Couceiro, accompanied by Captain Teixeira da Silva, after a short rest at Bailundu in late 1889, went on to Bié. His arrival in Bié and his determination to build a fort was a strange demand to Chindunduma, who thought he was on good terms with the Portuguese. He then vented his spleen on Silva Porto who had been capitão-mor (captain major) in Bié since 1886. Chindunduma declared war. Depressed, because he had been superseded by a younger capitãomor, he who had been a morador (dweller) in the interior for years and knew the Africans well, he who had alerted Barros Gomes to the British imperialist moves in the headwaters of the Zambezi—Silva Porto ignited kegs of gunpowder and blew himself to death on March 31, 1890. The officers of the small army and the American Board missionaries could not save his life.1 Paiva Couceiro meanwhile withdrew his forces because he knew he had no chance against Chindunduma. He came back with reinforcements about six months later under the leadership of Captain Teixeira da Silva. The Biéan forces which confronted Silva's were about as equal to them as the British forces which threatened to take on the Anguillans about eighty years later. When the 'war' broke out one hundred and twenty Biéans lay dead. Chindunduma fled, but due to the efforts of Sanders he finally gave himself up. Thus the Portuguese smashed Bié. And the missionaries rejoiced at it. Currie, the Canadian missionary, for example, wrote home immediately to announce the end of the affair: "I am not sorry the Portuguese have taken possession of the country [...], the change will be for the best [...]. So far as we can see the prospects for mission work are brighter than ever."2

The smashing of Bié created an ironical situation—or was it not so ironical? It created a power vacuum. Having taken the country the Portuguese merely consulted their tradition of lack of energy to see things through. It took another twenty years before an effective government was set up. The lack of this effective governmental authority for so long at a time when the missionaries were gradually gathering strength and winning the confidence of the people could not but lead to suspicion on the part of the Portuguese as to what the missionaries were doing. During the period of Portuguese abandonment the mission was the only effective authority in the Benguela Highlands. Sanders put the matter clearly when he said that Africans would rather come to the mission to have their disputes settled than go to the fort, the seat of the captain general, and noted that the people were more deferential and came to the mission seeking authority: "When we sent them on, they would declare that our judgement

1. Sanders, p. 46.
2. Currie to his mother, December 1890, CCFMS Docs.
has been so and so. This got us into [...] trouble, as the Captain
general announced that he, not we, ruled Bié.”

A new era of evangelisation opened for the missionaries. For the
African society also, it was a new beginning. The world had been
turned upside down, a king had been deposed. A spiritual and tem-
poral father of the tribe had been shamed, the society had suffered a
tragic setback. The African society was not going to be the same
again. The spiritual vacuum of their minds was ready to be filled by
the Gospel. One is reminded here of the immediate effect of the
death of Msiri of Katanga upon the work of the Plymouth Brethren
Mission. The American Board missionaries took advantage of the
situation. Whereas between 1880 when the mission first came to
Angola and 1890 when the Portuguese occupied Bié they could scarcely
count on more than twenty converts, from 1890 to 1910 the mission
grew in length, breadth and depth. The missionaries felt they had to
protect the Ovimbundu and make of as many of them as possible
“a tribe of God” resident at the mission station. This tribe must be
carefully watched and guarded against rum and other spirituous
liquors and contamination from a world of sin. This overzealousness
on the part of the missionaries was the major ingredient in the early
Portuguese charge that the missionaries were “denationalising” the
Ovimbundu by making them disloyal Portuguese subjects. This
issue of “denationalisation” then brings us to another stage in the
relationship between the American Board missionaries and the
Portuguese.

The occupation of Bié had created in itself a mini-scramble—the
scramble for the mind and body of the Ovimbundu. The missionaries
wanted the mind while the Portuguese traders wanted the body.
A veritable struggle between the two groups became apparent from
1890 on. Let us use Chisamba, one of the mission stations, as our
example. Whereas previous to the occupation Portuguese govern-
ment was skeletal, Portuguese economic presence became increasingly
manifest after it. In the early 1880s scarcely could a white Portuguese
trader be seen; by the late 1880s, say 1888 for example, there was only
one trader. Eight years later in 1897 there were about fifty traders in

1. Sanders, p. 51. Also Sanders in Kamundongo Report, 1891, ABP.
Currie, for instance, despite the “captain general”’s warning, continued for a
long time to settle disputes between Africans and even between chiefs (Currie to
Judson Smith, 21 April 1901, ABP).

amongst the Umbundu-Speaking People of Angola”, unpublished S. T. M. Thesis,
Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1961, p. 82.


p. 50; and Ruth Slade, English-Speaking Missions in the Congo Independent
State, Brussels, 1959, pp. 165-166.
the district where Chisamba mission was located. But it was not the presence of the traders in itself that irked the missionaries, it was the fact that they traded with the people, exchanging rum for rubber. The missionaries had seen plenty of the evil effects of strong drink on the people. Currie wrote for example that the Portuguese traders infested the roadside with kegs of rum, funnel and cup at the ready to serve the thirsty traveller. Many men were fast becoming 'wrecks of manhood' and even women and children were already taking long strides on the same road to ruin. By 1895 there were six distilleries in the Chisamba area alone.

The missionaries responded to this economic challenge by building station stores where the people might exchange their goods for harmless calico. Grist and flour mills were also installed. The mission stores, however, could not satisfy the needs of the people for new styles of cloth, beads, bracelets, soap, cups, and other articles. The Africans on the mission station also made more demands for rubber in settlement of their wages, thus greatly increasing mission expenses and upsetting mission financial arrangements. In this respect the Portuguese traders could do the missionaries one better since they dictated the current price of goods, which was the value in rubber. The Africans did not look with favour on calico. If they accepted calico they wanted more of it to make up for its deficiencies as compared to rubber. The mission at Chisamba decided to obtain a variety of cloth, beads, bracelets, knives and forks and so forth, hoping this would solve their problem.

But the Portuguese traders continued to win the Africans over. The game was up for the missionaries when the red rubber craze of the late 1890s broke out. It soon became quite clear to the missionaries that an important aspect of this struggle with the Portuguese might well be the Ovimbundu themselves. For centuries the Ovimbundu had been known to be great traders. The red rubber craze

2. Ibid., 1893, 1894. The missionaries appeared to have made a clear distinction between ochimbombo (native beer) and imported spirits. Sanders remarked that ochimbombo might fairly be considered as food to the people. To ask the people to do without it would be a foolish thing. He and his colleagues concentrated on preaching self-control, self-denial and moderation. Total abstinence was not in the early days of the mission a condition for church membership (Sanders to Means, 2 September 1883, ABP encl. 50).
4. Red rubber was an inferior type of rubber which took the place of the real rubber, the trade in which lasted from 1874 to 1886. From 1886 to 1900 the red rubber, which at first brought in little cash, was found to possess qualities which made it as good as the real rubber. The traders in Benguela then began to ask for it. From early 1890 on the export of this rubber from Benguela increased greatly. The Ovimbundu supplied the need (Childs, pp. 207-209).
5. All the travellers from Battell on attested to this (see Andrew Battell, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh in Angola and the Adjoining
was exactly the type of trade that might beckon to them. As soon as
the trade started the people fitted out large caravans to go and exploit
it as their fathers had done before them. “The cry, let us go to the
Nganguellas, was on everybody’s lips. All able-bodied men, women
with children and old men who could carry a gun and follow behind a
caravan collected all the goods they could for barter and started for
the interior.”¹ Fearing that his mission might be denuded, Currie
at Chisamba fitted out Christian caravans. He also infested the other
caravans with mission boys. In the Christian caravans efforts were
made to keep the members of the faith in line by exhortation and Bible
reading, in the other caravans the mission boys proselytised. One of
the Christian caravans reached Barotseland and was favourably
impressed by Coillard.²

The missions lost the economic battle with the Portuguese but
managed, when the red rubber trade subsided, to retain and even gain
more members. The Portuguese, though they had won, soon over-
reached themselves by wantonly abusing native labour, the conse-
quences of which came soon enough. The struggle between the groups
then shifted to the field of labour. The missions, chary of their con-
verts, were afraid to let them go to the fort to work, which was really
the reason for their telling the Portuguese that the mission boys were
needed for work on the mission stations and outstations. They were
also afraid of losing them to the world or having them subject to
Portuguese servitude which to them was bad and approached ‘slavery’.
But the Portuguese were not to be fooled, they started to charge again
that the missionaries were “denationalising” the natives by discourag-
ing them from working.

The term “denationalisation” had no precise meaning. It was
tantamount to anti-state activism. The Portuguese passed the
Tralbalho Obrigatório in 1899 to make all natives living in Portuguese
overseas provinces subject to the moral and legal obligation to work.
Contravening the Act then ipso facto meant breaking a cardinal law
by which the Portuguese were ruling their colonies. One guilty of
such an offence was anti-patriotic if a Portuguese, and anti-Portuguese
if a foreigner.³ This labour system which was the culmination of

¹ Chisamba Report, 1898, CCFMS Docs.
² F. Coillard to Currie, 18 July 1900; enclosed in Currie to Judson Smith,
5 January 1901, ABP.
³ Joaquim Moreira da Silva Cunha, O trabalho indígena: estudo de direito
more than sixty years of groping for what to do with the freed slaves, lent itself easily to abuse. The system was hailed by the plantation owners of São Tomé and Principe who had faced labour shortage because slavery had been abolished. According to the new law, Portuguese officials could call upon natives to work or to be sent to a place of work far away from their homes. Portuguese officials and traders alike simply overreached themselves with the new power within their grasp. The missionaries had charged again and again that the labour system was sheer, naked slavery.

One fine day in May 1902, open revolt broke out all over the Benguela Highlands. The revolt of 1902 remains to be studied in detail. The major causes of the revolt were not only the abuse of native labour already alluded to, but also the fact that the Ovimbundu were losing their economic grip to their new masters. These recently arrived Portuguese had managed in a short time to dictate the pattern of trade to a people who were not used to standing aside for anyone in matters of trade of Benguela Highlands and indeed of Central Africa. The leader of the 'war' party in Bailundu was Omutuyyekevela (Hard squash), in Bié he was Chivava (One who makes other pass through fire). The uprising was badly planned and badly executed and it failed. The missionaries witnessed all of it and even helped the beleaguered Portuguese by secretly sending them food and drugs.¹

Once the revolt was crushed it seemed as if justice would be done the Africans by their Portuguese overlords. The Portuguese government in Benguela Highlands came in for temporary reorganisation. The governor declared martial law and suspended the contract labour system temporarily. An investigation was set afoot by Massano de Amorim, who had led one of the expeditionary forces. Many traders were judged guilty of abusing native labour. The captains of Bailundu and Bié were dismissed. Amorim made a bravado of proclaiming guarantees of human rights and personal liberty. Traders were forbidden to settle or concentrate more than fifteen kilometers from the forts. They could not then take advantage of their remoteness from constituted authorities to act as they pleased. Although Amorim did his work well the traders continued to look for other scapegoats. Many of them believed that the missionaries had contributed to the uprising. They had quickly forgotten the help the missionaries had rendered them at great risk of being labelled traitors to the African cause.

The first outward manifestation of the search for scapegoats came

¹ Mrs. Amy Currie to Mrs. Currie Sr., 14 July 1902, CCFMS Docs. Stover to Homeland Friends, July 1902, ABP. Massey to CCFMS, 25 September 1902, CCFMS Docs. Stover to Smith, 24 July 1906, ABP. Sanders to Smith, 29 August 1902, ABP.
in a letter written by the captain general of Bié in which he questioned the legality of the establishment of the missions. The West Central Africa Mission Conference of 1902 passed a resolution in regard to this, saying that the matter should be referred to the American Board secretary, Judson Smith, and that Sanders, while in Portugal, should confer with the American representative in Lisbon and report back.\(^1\) The mission replied to the Portuguese government, basing their right to establish missions on the Berlin Act (February 25, 1885), Article IV, the Brussels Act (July 2, 1890) and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891. The Portuguese reply came on October 31, 1903. The governor-general replied to Wesley M. Stover as the secretary of the mission. The letter was an eye-opener as to how the Portuguese viewed these treaties and interpreted them. The governor-general said that, in the portions of the province of Angola lying within the Congo basin as it was described in the first article of the Berlin Act, Article IV guaranteed the freedom of conscience and religious toleration to the natives, whether national or foreign. Everyone could worship as he pleased and could erect houses of worship and organise missions. In the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, Article X guaranteed freedom of worship and of religion in East and Central Africa only. According to the governor, Portuguese West Africa was not included in the conventional basin of the Congo. The treaty of 1891, therefore, was different from that of 1885. The treaty of 1891, according to the governor-general, recognised Catholicism as the state religion, and other religions of foreigners were permitted in houses, not in churches. The sixth article did not authorise propagation and teaching of another religion which was not that of the state.\(^2\)

In the light of these interpretations, it meant that the American Board Missions had been illegally installed in Angola. What then should the mission do? Remove itself? According to this writer’s interpretation of the above mentioned treaties, the Portuguese government’s interpretation was awkward. The Portuguese governor-general’s interpretation was tantamount to declaring the missionaries were outlaws in Angola, outlaws upon whom punishments could be meted out by other legal residents. From this time on, Portuguese traders expressed their opposition violently to the presence of the missionaries, and the Portuguese officials winked at such attacks. Examples of Portuguese opposition to the missions could be multiplied, and each and every one of them was the aftermath of the African rebellion of 1902.

When, in 1903, Dr. F. C. Wellman wanted to open a station to be called Sachikela (Bagster), the chefe de posto of Bailundu area refused.

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1. Minutes of WCAM Conference, 1902, ABP.
2. Governor-general of Benguela to Stover, 21 October 1903, ABP.
to let him. The church at Bailundu was affected in another way. Portuguese authorities did not allow all the schools to reopen. The church was demoralised. According to Stover, who was the secretary of the entire mission, there were discipline problems or what he called “gross misconduct” on the part of some church members in Bailundu. In the whole mission field large numbers were manifesting “unchristian” behaviour. For example, when school opened, all the assistant teachers refused to work. “The feeling of bitterness is due to a wave of avariciousness which, since the war, seems to have swept over this entire country [. . .]. The prospect before us is anything but bright.”

He went on to say that one never knew “where he is at” for any length of time. Government opposition was extended to the adherents of the mission. “As long as our work was small and [. . .] was generally supposed as having no effect on the people at large, the government ignored us. But now that the influence of the Gospel is being felt over a large territory, they are beginning to apply their restrictive machinery.” Here then was a missionary’s version of the immediate effects of the Portuguese crushing of the African rebellion as it affected the mission work. How did the new Portuguese dispensation affect all the aspects of African life? How did the Africans try to attune themselves to it and to what degree both in the long and short run? What does the African oral tradition have to say about questions such as these? All these will probably remain unanswered satisfactorily as long as the present political situation in Angola makes it impossible for researchers to uncover these facts.

The Portuguese felt particularly that they should curb the teaching of English which was felt to be a “denationalising” factor. Stover went on to say that the mission dared not teach English lest its schools be closed altogether. Yet the mission did not want to teach more Portuguese than was necessary to satisfy Government demands. He implied that there was fear of doing this, the fear that the native Christians so equipped would run off to the city and encounter all the evils there. “If we were to teach anyone to read and write Portuguese well, it would only be the means of his destruction as but few, if any, would be able to resist the temptation to which one knowing Portuguese would be subjected.” This was no more than a rationalisation of the missionaries’ fear of losing their converts and of their sheer, naked cultural ethnocentrism. Certainly there was nothing either in English or in Portuguese learning that should lead to corruption of any individual.

For some unexplained reason the work of some of the village evan-

1. Stover to Smith, 6 June 1903, ABP.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
gelist was not molested in the least. Stover gave the example of a case where a student went off to start a school all by himself as had been the custom then for years since the mission was founded, and the outstation prospered, even during all this time of Government repression. “All this work is the outgrowth of that begun four or five years ago by Dunbulika, my poor crazy boy who himself died several years ago without seeing any fruits of his efforts.”

Hoping for a lull in the general persecution and obtaining none, the WCAM sent a circular home on April 27, 1904, complaining of the general plight of the mission. Sanders and Dr. Wellman were sent to Boston to explain matters to the Prudential Committee. The mission wanted to know: a) the precise status of the mission under Portuguese colonial law and treaty regulations with the United States government; b) what guarantee could be obtained for the protection of the converts and adherents of the mission in the exercise of their religious rights and liberties. The Prudential Committee continued to insist upon the Brussels Act and the Berlin Act as embodying the rights of the missions. The mission was told to go on propagating its work.

The mission continued to be harassed. Things were bad at Sakanjimba (opened in 1893). Some of the Portuguese traders located themselves close to the station, one “almost within a stone’s throw.” The nearness of Portuguese traders meant the nearness of rum. The Christians accused the slaves of Portuguese traders of stealing from the mission fields. Difficulties occurred more and more frequently. In what the mission called self-defence, a member of the church shot and wounded some slaves of a Portuguese trader whom they say had been stealing from the mission farm. The owner of the slave reported to the fort. The Christian was arrested and jailed without trial. This was the last straw; the mission decided to move to Chilesso.

In 1904, fire of undetermined origin swept the mission huts at Kamundongo. For the next two years, faster than the huts could be repaired, the fires broke out again and again. Suspicion rose to new heights. The finger of accusation was pointed at the Portuguese traders. Stover, as the secretary of the mission, wrote Judson Smith of the American Board, pressing for diplomatic action. Even though the degree of persecution of the Christians was not as sharp as in Bailundu, there was difficulty with the soil. The population of the area began to decrease. The mission lost whole outstations such as the Ochiputui group.

1. Stover to Smith, 3 October 1904, ABP.
2. WCAM to Judson Smith, 27 April 1904, ABP.
3. Sakanjimba Report, 1904, ABP.
4. Stover to Smith, 27 June 1905, ABP.
5. Kamundongo Report, 1905-1906, ABP.
In Chisamba, economic problems also played a prominent role. The ivory trade and the rubber trade were in serious decline. Bié traders suffered serious set-backs in their raids for slaves. These traders were driven across the Congo frontier by Belgian soldiers. As if this were not enough, an epidemic of smallpox broke out, making it impossible for outstation work to go on. But perhaps the persecution suffered by the Christians could be focused around the difficulty faced by the Christian Chief Kanjundu of Chiyuka. There was a fire in the hut of a Portuguese trader nearby and Kanjundu was accused of setting the fire. He was jailed and the mission rallied to his defence. Money was raised locally and in Canada for his defence in Benguela courts.¹

But while matters of persecution seemed to ease somewhat in other stations, Bailundu continued to be agitated. In 1908 the Stover case broke out. This case, the details of which were not clear, centered upon the issue of “contract labour” and was again a fall-out from the 1902 rebellion. The Portuguese believed that Stover had helped spark the revolt. In a letter written by the chefe de posto of Bailundu to W. C. Bell, who was at Bailundu at the time Stover was accused, we have the following accusations:

“He assisted in the maltreating with blows the officials [..] and soldiers sent to get carriers. There further exist complaints in which the natives themselves accused Mr. Stover of having joined in the revolt, and armed and aided the enemies of the government.”²

Stover was expelled from the province under the decree of July 4, 1906, which called for the expulsion of foreigners “who, in any way, should violate the rights of sovereignty of the Province.”³ The American Board took up the matter in Lisbon, London and Washington. The WCAM sent a petition to the governor-general of Angola. Stover, in his own defence, denied all of the charges, saying that there had been adverse sentiment against Protestant missions by the trading elements of Angola ever since the beginning of Mr. Cadbury’s investigation of the contract labour system to the cocoa islands of São Tomé

¹. Chisamba Report, 1902, ABP. I have no facts as to the outcome of the case. Chief Kanjundu of Chiyuka was one of the mission’s most prized converts. Struck down by a long illness for which he got no help from African medicinemen, he went to Chisamba where he was cured by Currie. He then dramatically “burned all his fetishes” and led his entire village into the Christian fold. He became addicted to learning and modernising and forced all his people to adopt modern ways. He became quite known to travellers and won their encomium (Collin HARDING, In Remotest Barotseland, London, 1904, pp. 230-234; Henri Woodd NEVINSON, A Modern Slavery, London, 1906, pp. 149-147).

². Letter of Chefe de Posto Senhor Corvalho quoted in W. C. Bell’s letter to the ABCFM, 11 July 1908, ABP.

³. Ibid.
and Principe. After some diplomatic manœuvreing, Stover was allowed to return to the colony.

Many of the old problems remained. The missionaries, as Stover mentioned, were already plunged into the whole issue of "contract labour". For years they had been campaigning about it to the Board at home, but not openly to the public. Currie, for example, wrote to the CCFMS in January 1898:

"Not for years has there been such a rush for slaves, many poor wretches fell by the wayside from hunger and exhaustion. Some, being unable to go further, were dispatched with their master's hatchet or shot through the back or had their throats cut. Others were hamstrung and left to die of hunger or be torn by the wild beasts. Many of the slaves bought in this immediate district are girls and women." 2

On sending some slave shackles home to Canada, Dr. Yale Massey commented:

"One was left at Chisamba a few months ago. It had been worn during the night and when I got it it was scarcely cold. A dealer was on his way from the interior with a caravan of 'contract labour', which is a legal term—really slaves." 3

What the missionaries did not say openly, a journalist by the name of Henry Nevinson said when he published A Modern Slavery in 1906. Nevinson, a peripatetic journalist who had covered the Greco-Turkish and South African wars, was commissioned by Harper's Magazine to go to Angola and São Tomé to report the condition of labour there. Before going to Angola, Nevinson had the opportunity to hold discussions with H. R. Fox Bourne, secretary of the British Aborigines' Protective Society, and was not without some inkling of what to expect in Angola, São Tomé, and Principe. Nevinson visited these places between 1904 and 1905 and got plenty of his materials from the missionaries and he himself wrote up quite an exposé of the system of Portuguese "contract labour". The system, he said, was nothing but pure slavery. He pointed out that people were tricked into signing up, they worked for more than seventeen hours a day under appalling conditions. Many people never returned to their homeland again. 4 Legally, the system was quite simple and looked innocent enough. According to law, a native and his prospective employer

1. Stover to George L. Lorillard, US Chargé d'Affaires, Lisbon, 21 December 1908, ABP.
2. Currie to CCFMS, January 1898, CCFMS Docs.
4. NEVINSON, pp. 27-29, 35-36, 48.
would appear before a magistrate or some other representative of the Curador General of Angola. This latter personality was to certify that the contract was free and voluntary. The pay of the labourer was to be agreed upon. The labourer was to do such domestic or agricultural services as his employer might require. He was to work nine hours a day and rest on Sunday. A two hours rest period was taken out for lunch. The contract was to last for five years in the first instance and could be renewed if both parties so agreed. The children born during the period were to be free and could not be used for any type of work.¹

He described how the “contract labourers” were actually obtained:

“An agent [...] goes wandering about among the natives in the interior. [...] He comes to the chief of a tribe [...] and, in return for so many grown men and women, he offers the chief so many smuggled rifles, guns, and cartridges. [...] The chief selects suitable men and women, very often one of the tribe gives in his child to pay off an old debt, the bargain is concluded, and off the party goes. The labour merchant leads it away for some hundreds of miles, and then offers its members to employers as contracted labourers. As commission for his own services in the transaction, he may receive about fifteen or twenty pounds for a man or woman, and about five pounds for a child. According to law, the labourer is then brought before a magistrate and duly signs the [...] contract.”²

Life in a typical plantation began at 4:30 a.m. and ended about 9:00 p.m. The people worked in rows, advancing gradually. Overseers stood hard by, sometimes with guns.³ Nevinson noticed many irregularities. For example, to get contract labourers, the interpreters would ask the people “Do you like fish?” to which the native would reply “Yes”, and this would be taken to mean that he had consented to go to São Tomé. The worst infraction was that the people were never returned to their homeland.⁴

Nevinson lambasted the British government for allowing such a thing to go on and also mentioned that the missionaries dared not say anything openly against the system for fear of being driven away from the country. Upon his return to England, he wrote a series of articles and made speeches all over the country. He was supported by several eminent men like H. G. Wells and Ramsay McDonald. He was said to have called upon William Cadbury, the manufacturer of chocolate, to uphold his principles as a Quaker by boycotting São Tomé cocoa.⁵

The significance of Nevinson’s involvement in the “contract labour” matter was that he helped bring the issue squarely before the Western

¹. Ibid., pp. 27-29.
². Ibid., p. 29.
³. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
⁴. Ibid., p. 48.
European public. There were private persons, such as Cadbury, who knew about the conditions in Angola at the time when Nevinson made his survey. In fact, as far back as 1901, rumour had called the attention of Cadbury Brothers Ltd. to the unsatisfactory labour conditions in the Portuguese colonies. In the spring of 1903 Cadbury went to Lisbon to investigate the subject. The Association of Planters of São Tomé denied the charge and told Cadbury he could go into these provinces to make his own investigations if he had any further doubts on the subject. The Ministry of Marine and the Colonies made light of the matter and assured Cadbury the abuses existing in the provinces were trivial and unavoidable and that whatever abuses were found would be remedied by a labour decree. This was passed on January 29, 1903. Not satisfied with its promised reform, Cadbury set out to investigate, assisted by Joseph Burtt. There is no need here to go into the details of what they found. It was aptly summarised in this statement:

"The system of obtaining and treating labour connected with the cocoa industry of these islands [..] is indefensible [..]. Enough was seen to show most clearly that although during our visit a few Serviçãos were for the first time allowed to return to the mainland, the whole system of 'recruiting' slaves in the interior of Angola remains absolutely unchanged, and needless to say, it is here that the root of the evil lies."  

What else was said had confirmed Nevinson’s observations and those of the missionaries.  

The work and travels of Cadbury and his men, Burtt and Dr. Horton, created a storm in the Portuguese press. The Lisbon correspondent of the Liverpool Standard wrote to his paper on October 12, 1907, that considerable resentment was aroused in Portugal because it was said the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce alleged that the Portuguese government connived at slavery in Angola. The merchants of Liverpool, therefore, were not buying cocoa and other products from Portuguese Africa. The Portuguese government then instructed its representatives to inquire into the origin of this story. Another Portuguese newspaper, the Novidades of Oporto, called São Tomé "the best proof of the colonising genius of the Portuguese nation, and so envy creates the calumny that at every step is directed against the system of recruiting labourers for her agriculture." Cadbury, on

2. Ibid., pp. 73-75.  
5. Novidades, Oporto, 12 October 1907.
behalf of the English cocoa makers, made a statement to the São Tomé and Príncipe farmers on November 28, 1907, pressing for the instituting of free labour for the labourers.\textsuperscript{1} Upon returning home he and the other cocoa buyers boycotted Portuguese cocoa.

The whole issue created more animosity for the missionaries because of the stand they took, but the Portuguese tried not to cause too much trouble because the issue had become international in scope. In Portugal itself, toward the end of 1909, there was political confusion so that the whole issue of “contract labour” was subordinated to home politics. In 1910, a republic was proclaimed and there was hope that things would be better. The American missions, by now, had been in the colony for thirty years, during which time they had established themselves and laid the pattern for future development. The missions and the Portuguese government were both entering a new era and the relationship between them was also entering a new stage.

The new Portuguese republican government brought in its wake drastic reorganisation in Angola. There was, however, some time lag before the effect of the new government was felt. For example, on January 14, 1911, the Municipal Chamber of Benguela sent out a circular letter saying it knew that the missions were always attempting to avoid the fulfillment of Portuguese laws and were conspiring against Portuguese sovereignty. The municipalities were to be calm and not take the law into their own hands because it might lead to international complications for the Portuguese government. The citizens should continue to observe the behaviour of the missionaries in everything which could indicate a disrespect for the law, and attack upon Portugal’s free sovereignty. All citizens should be energetic and boldly accuse those guilty of such anti-Portuguese activities. The information so gathered would then be coordinated in Benguela and sent to Portugal.\textsuperscript{2}

Yet almost at the same time when this circular was being issued, the republican government at home was trying to convince the missionaries through some of the mission representatives that the missions had nothing to fear from the Government. Representing the interests of the American missions in Lisbon, Bishop Hartzell of the Methodist Mission in Northern Angola interviewed the President and Ministers of the new republic on matters of religious liberty and education. The meeting took place on January 25, 1911. Dr. Alfonso Costa, Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, told Hartzell that the republic government was not anti-religious, but it was anti-Jesuit and anti-reactionary. He said he knew that Protestantism stood for

\textsuperscript{1} Cadbury, pp. 112-115.
\textsuperscript{2} Circular letter, Municipal Chamber of Benguela, included in ABP Docs., 1910, encl. 50.
intelligence and for education and liberty among the people and for the uplift of public morals. The Portuguese government, he said, was especially anxious to have as much help as possible along these lines, in their efforts to overcome the results of Jesuit “reactionary” influences. The republic proposed to give freedom of religion to all—Catholics, Protestants, Jews and to those of no faith. A law to this effect would be promulgated. Religious organisations would be expected to furnish the Government with their rules and regulations, methods of work, and information as to how funds were raised. No religious organisation would be allowed to levy taxes on the people: funds raised would be strictly voluntary contributions. The religious organisations would be allowed to hold property—build their own buildings and own their own property. As regards education, the missions would be allowed to teach their faith, but in schools founded by the Government this would not be so.

Bishop Hartzell walked away from the conference convinced of Portuguese forthrightness and sincerity.¹ He did not realise that the Portuguese ministers had charmed him in the usual diplomatic fashion. He did not, for example, ask what the Portuguese ministers meant by the Portuguese government being “anti-reactionary”, nor did he realise that when mission societies furnished the Government with their rules and regulations, methods of work and so forth, the Government was in the initial stage of trying to control the work of the missions. Nor did he ask for a curb on the perfidious activities of the Portuguese traders of the interior, matters which had for years agitated the missions. Hartzell had a trump card but did not play it well. Coming to the conference table as he did with a personal letter from President Taft, he should have pressed for the utmost benefit of the missions. He should have realised that the fledgling Portuguese republic had much at stake and wanted to present a shiny image to the outside world. As matters turned out, the missionary representative missed one of the greatest opportunities the missions ever had in their entire history in Angola.

The Portuguese themselves realised they had to repair their image, and they were only too happy no one compelled it at a price. In the period between the proclamation of the republic and the outbreak of the First World War, Portuguese Solons began to cherish the idea of better governing the colonies. Decentralisation was what they wanted. This would help cure what ailed the Lusitanian outposts. Several things ailed the colonies, particularly Angola. There was lack of money, lack of vigour and power both in Government and on

¹ Bishop Hartzell. Report of interviews with the President and Ministers of the Portuguese Republic on questions of religious liberty and education, 25 January 1911, ABP.
the part of the administrators. One of the foremost Portuguese law-
makers, Almeida Ribeiro, as Minister of the Colonies, brought before
the Portuguese Parliament the necessary ideas for administrative and
financial reforms. With his wry humour Almeida Ribeiro said:

“One day we hear or read about the need for centralising everything in the
metropolis because our financial men are incompetent and our colonists lacking
in initiative. The next day, we find proposed as an infallible panacea, the granting
to the colonies of self-government of the English type, with fully fledged
parliamentary institutions. Occasionally, even plans for federation have been
mooted, an idea completely utopian. Thus we give the appearance of a people
which is hesitant in defining principles, which almost always fails to take account
of the practical side of the problems; then if it does succeed in defining the
principles, it is at a loss to discover the exact formula for putting them into
effect; and, finally, when that formula is found, does not persevere in its appli-
cation.”

The bill for effective administration of Angola was passed into law
in 1914, but Ribeiro's observation came out only to be too true. The
Portuguese government had no energy to carry through the provisions
of the law. In two respects only the bill was effective, as regards the
administration in general and the native people (indígena) in partic-
ular. The bill called for decentralisation. More power was to be
given to the actual administrator in the field. In the case of Angola,
for example, the high commissioner could act without having to cable
home for the opinion of the central government.

The bill defined the native as an individual of colour and who did
not fulfil three specific conditions: a) of speaking Portuguese or one of
its dialects, or some other “civilised language”; b) of abandoning native
uses and customs, and c) of carrying on some profession, trade or
industry, or having private means sufficient to maintain himself.
After fulfilling these conditions he would be regarded as a citizen of
the republic, no longer subject to the laws and regulations made specif-
ically for those regarded as “natives”. Portuguese citizens would
then be guaranteed complete enjoyment of all civil and political rights
granted in the colony to those born in the metropolis. Civil relations
between natives must be governed by their own customs as long as
these were not in conflict with Portuguese definition of the fundamental
rights of life and liberty.2

The chosen administrator who had the opportunity to rule Angola
at this time was José Mendes Norton de Matos. A man of energy and
resolution, Norton de Matos took his work seriously. He moved swift-
ly to deal with the three problems that dominated political thought

1. Almeida Ribeiro, quoted in Egerton, p. 98. See also João Lopes Car-
neiro de Moura, Administração colonial portuguesa, Lisboa, 1910, pp. 259-260.
at the time—consolidation of administration, native policy, and economic development. Norton de Matos began to cut the districts of Angola into various circumscriptions. The administrators of these were for the native people, administrative, judicial and military authority. The administrador, in many respects, was a modern projection of pater familias. In his status, however, the Portuguese administrator was more authoritarian than the average British district officer. Each administrator was appointed by the governor-general of the province, and he was responsible to the governor of his district. Norton de Matos surrounded himself with competent administradores.

With the use of Regulamento das circunscrições da província de Angola, Norton de Matos outlawed the obnoxious labour system.¹ He believed that relations between administrators and the Africans must be founded on justice. African ways of life were to be respected unless they conflicted with Portuguese ways of life. He wanted Africans to be encouraged to work as independent farmers and not to be farmed out to private plantations. He believed that the first concern of the Portuguese in the colonies should be for the African. In a series of proclamations he made clear the Government’s position on labour.² The culmination of these proclamations was Decree No. 40 of August 3, 1921. This decree furnished us with the thinking of Norton de Matos. The guidelines for it were based on high-sounding principles. It affirmed that the best, the easiest and the most fruitful manner of securing native workers was that which resulted from freedom of choice, “of a pure and simple application of common right to labour contracts.” The only method to attract the native to work was to pay him well, to feed him well, and to surround him with commodities and comforts superior to those which were usual in the condition in which he habitually lived and to treat him with respect, sympathy, goodwill and justice.

Forced labour was necessary, however, for the execution of works of the state, but even this form of labour must be invested with conditions which would tend toward the betterment of the material and moral life of the Africans. Wanton forced labour he saw as a means of hurting not only the Africans but the Portuguese colonists as well. No competition would be established when the administrative authority became transformed (which it must) into a fountain for providing labour. Stimulus to better wages and the better treatment of the natives would be obliterated. He went on to say that, from the middle of 1913, it was the aim of the government of Angola to make the native African an agriculturist:

2. Provincia de Angola, Portaria No. 91, 18 April 1918; No. 306, 18 September 1918; No. 81, 31 March 1920.
"an independent and free artificer, possessing a glebe of land, a small workshop, with professional instruction and instruments. In this way he would be able to live in relative comfort and produce more than was necessary for his sustenance and inundate the market with foodstuffs and articles of every kind."¹

Even for the state public works, Norton de Matos fixed minimum wage and hours of work. The people were to work nine hours a day and be paid 20 angolaires for men, and 15 angolaires for women (1 angolaire = 2 cents). No minors were to be employed unless their parents were present. The state was to provide food for the workers while they were going to and from work. Where the journey to work was long, the railroad must be used. Night work must not exceed six hours. Women and children must not work at night. Near large groups of workers, a hospital must be installed, rules for camps, hygiene and medical treatment were laid down. Maximum period of work must not exceed six months. And nobody could be re-recruited without having been at least four months in his own home country.²

The labour codes of Norton de Matos aroused the ire of many old-fashioned colonialists and traders. Many pamphlets were written to praise or damn him. He was called names such as "Caligula"—one author titled his polemics "Caligula in Angola". The main charge against Norton de Matos was that he was an Anglophile, aping the English and selling his country down the drain.³ Much as it was criticised, the labour code of Norton de Matos was a true Godsend for the Africans. The condition of the country itself was changing fast, perhaps too fast for the Africans. Trade, which had been the mainstay of the Ovimbundu, was no longer lucrative. By 1911 the Africans were finding that carrier jobs were no longer profitable for them. The slave trade had declined through international agitation, the red rubber had been exhausted, and the construction of the Benguela railway had rendered the Umbundu caravans useless. And, since the Government had come and was determined to be effective, the Africans had to cooperate. Norton de Matos did not mention taxes in his labour codes but as a colonial administrator he knew these had to be collected. To be able to pay them, the Africans had to have stable and reliable work. Agriculture and the trades would easily furnish these means. The Ovimbundu were now condemned to staying on one spot, a thing unknown to these restless people in the past.

The government of the republic, through its representative in

¹. Provincia de Angola, Decreto No. 40, 3 August 1921.
². Provincia de Angola, Decreto No. 41, 3 August 1921.
Angola, trod even harder on the toes of the Catholic missions. The republican revolutionaries of 1910 enacted a "Law of Separation" which created lay missions to serve as substitutes for religious orders in the colonies. The Government devoted more than half the number of articles in its thirty-two statutes to the question of missions overseas. It was felt that replacing the religious missions with secular ones would help speed the civilising work which the Government felt called upon to do for the good of the indigenous races. The Law of Separation freed the state from all the promises made to the church by the late monarchist state. It therefore cut off state subsidy for the work of Catholic missions in Angola and elsewhere in the Portuguese colonies. This state of affairs was to last for nine or ten years.\(^1\)

If such a thing could be done to the Catholic church, which was tacitly acknowledged to be the state church of Portugal, one could hardly expect better treatment for Protestant missionaries and missions. Yet from 1910-1919 one could say that the Portuguese government treated them better than they did the Catholics. Government treatment, however, was one thing, that of the traders and merchants was quite another. In Angola there had always been the ambiguous situation of the highest authorities having good relations with the missionaries while the local officials where the mission stations were located were at loggerheads with them. The missionaries, however, tended to take the behaviour of the local administrator to mean the sanctioned policy of the republican government. To some extent they were right. If logic were to be followed, local officials should reflect the policies of the power that sent them to that location. The relationship between the American Board missionaries and the Portuguese at this time hinged once more upon what the Portuguese usually charged, "denationalisation". It was not a new charge but an old one with a new dimension to it. We shall deal with it in its right place. Let us for now turn our attention to the missions.

In 1911, on the occasion of the thirty years of the missions' existence in Angola, the Prudential Committee sent a delegation out to come and see for itself what the mission had accomplished. The delegation was loud in its praise of what the mission had accomplished in every area of mission work, particularly in literacy and translation work. The best all-round mission was Chisamba.\(^2\) However, there were things that ought to be reshaped also. Up to then, each of the five mission stations—Bailundu, Kamundongo, Chilesso, Chiyaka and Chisamba—had developed independently. The delegation noted that:

1. Rego, p. 176.
There had been no connectionalism in our church system and, consequently, only a faint sense of fellowship [. . .]. There had been little of the sense of corporate responsibility in the work of evangelizing the Ovimbundu."¹

This problem of corporate feeling struck at the very heart of the Congregational Church policy. The Congregational Church policy has been known to encourage fierce independence on the part of the individual churches. The deputation wrestled itself out of the difficulty by advocating that the mission should centrally manage such affairs as related to the common interests of the church. For example, the autonomy of the local churches should be limited in matters pertaining to conditions of membership, standards of discipline, the choice of pastors and the regulation of salaries.²

The educational system was to be reorganised to provide for girls and women, a perennial deficiency of early mission education. School age should be fixed, tuition should be charged either in labour or in kind. The teachers were to be paid so that they should have more incentive for their work. Better school buildings should be built. "With one or two exceptions the school buildings and equipment are disappointing, [. . .] the word ‘disreputable’ may not be too strong."³ Above all, an institution for higher training was to be built. It was to be an institute for fitting the mission-trained people for service; it should be in the Umbundu society what a college was in America. But then the delegation warned that it should not be misunderstood as far as the educational philosophy and standard of the proposed institution: "Anything approaching so-called ‘higher education’ is not in our thoughts."⁴

The decision of the mission to build an institute was to be of tremendous significance to the work of the whole mission. It became a basis for more cooperation between the ABCFM and the CCFMS, and in the long run cemented them together.⁵ It was to enhance the education of the Ovimbundu and it also brought the first thaw in the chilly relationship between the missions and the Portuguese government since the time of the Nevinson and Cadbury labour investigations. The new government, as we have seen, wanted agriculture developed. This was one of the pet projects of Norton de Matos. The missions also wanted to develop the institute along the lines of the "Tuskegee idea"⁶ where agricultural and other industrial arts would be taught,

² *Patton and Bridgeman*, p. 30.
⁵ "Basis of co-operation between the Canadian Board and the American Board in connection with the contemplated Training Institute", undated CCFMS Docs., circa 1911-1912.
⁶ Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Institute in Alabama was an object of
among other subjects. Here we see a coincidence that made for cooperation between the Government and the missions. The significance of the Ovimbundu becoming agriculturalists meant the end of the “roving disposition of the people.” This would redound to the benefit of the missions which could then evangelise more, while the Government could carry on its policy of developing Angola generally. The Portuguese were quick to realise the significance of the mission wanting to build such an institution. The missionary appointed to look for possible sites reported from Chiyaka in 1912 that the officials of the province

"were much interested in our plans [...] especially in our agricultural scheme. The governor kept me one hour and a half, talking on the best way to help the natives. Henceforth, he wants the government officials to consult with the missionaries [...] it is a pleasure to see some straightforward Portuguese official having at heart the betterment of the natives."

The governor speedily granted the concessions and even allowed Neipp to go and survey the land himself. Seizing the advantage of the good humour that the governor was in, Neipp got the governor to agree to a quit rent of 10 reis, instead of the usual 300 reis. The mission secured 10,000 hectares (1 hectare = 2 1/2 acres) for only $1000. The missionaries were thrilled.

The timing of the founding of the Currie Institute (opened 1914) could hardly be more propitious. The campaigns of Cadbury, Swan and Nevinson had had their effect. The new government in Portugal, eager for a good diplomatic image, had for the moment prohibited export slavery and the new administration had smiled on the mission’s efforts. The secretary of the mission, writing in 1912, rejoiced as he said: “With slavery and rum done away with, the opportunity for mission work has increased immensely. The most sanguine among us had scarcely dared hope to see this day and yet so it is.”

The tactics of the missionaries was to try to maintain the ongoing sunny atmosphere. This, however, was almost wrecked by the exigencies of the coming war. The perpetual crises in the European national relationships before the outbreak of the war had their echoes in Angola. There were rumours in 1912 that Germany, with Britain's connivance, aimed to seize Angola. Tempers rose and attention was focused on admiration throughout America at the time as an example of how education for the Blacks ought to be conducted and structured. American missionaries carried this idea to their mission fields.

1. H. A. Neipp to Barton of ABCFM, Chiyaka Report, 1912, ABP.
2. T. W. Woodside in WCAM general report, 1912, ABP.
the missionaries again. Portuguese tempers cooled only when the British government repudiated such rumours. In 1915 war hysteria engulfed the colony. The whole country was under martial law and Angola’s southern border was in jeopardy. Despite all the preparedness of Portuguese General Eça, the Germans smashed the Portuguese forces at Mossamedes, taking sixty Portuguese prisoners. Only the arrival of South African troops under Botha saved the situation for the Portuguese. In Benguela Highlands where the missionaries were, the war had slight effect as far as actual combat was concerned. Many Ovimbundu were, however, recruited into the army. It became difficult to distinguish between war measures and wanton behaviour on the part of local Portuguese officials. There were difficulties with the Government in Sacikela, Bailundu and Chilesso.

Merlin Ennis reported from Bailundu that one hundred men were recruited from the Bailundu outstations under the direct order of the governor, and he observed that no other soldiers were recruited from the area. Ennis averred that this discriminatory recruitment was a reaction against the Kuanyama revolt which was directed against the Portuguese in favour of the Germans. Curiously enough, the governor of the district blamed the revolt on Dr. Cammark and Rev. Stover. The governor called them to his headquarters and scolded them. Jornal de Benguela (November 3 and 4, 1916) attacked the missionaries. The article was written and signed by the governor of Bié. The missionaries were accused of stabbing the Portuguese in the back. They were also accused of telling the people that Portuguese culture and morals were inferior. These charges were preposterous and false, as the missionaries could neither speak nor understand the Kuanyama language.

Protests by Sanders, Tucker and Bell resulted in nothing. Instead matters got worse, the chefe of the area around Omungu—not far from Bailundu and Sacikela, came to the outstation and registered girls and children for taxes. The chefe came to build his camp right in the middle of the station while he carried on this registration. Then, through his interpreters, he accused the missionaries in front of all the natives assembled, of

"over and again teaching English laws, English songs, English language and to bow down to the English flag. They [the people] were solemnly assured that the Portuguese were the original warriors [. . .] that one could lick ten Englishmen and holler for more."
Much as admissions could be made that the Portuguese were too often cantankerous in their dealings with the American Board missionaries, the fact ought to be stated that the latter tried always to teach as little Portuguese as they could get away with. Veteran missionary W. H. Sanders put the matter well when he said:

"The real way to keep on good terms with the rulers is to teach a reasonable amount of Portuguese in our higher schools, maintain friendly social relations with all the Portuguese with whom we have contact, for which knowledge of their language is needed by all, and the use of common sense."1

The trouble was that some of these missionaries did not want to learn the language at all. The reason for this was difficult to document. It might be they believed that Portugal was effete. It might also be due to the experience of these missionaries when they went to Portugal to learn the rudiments of the language. While in Portugal, they forwarded plenty of reports to the American Board about the superstitious way of life, the filth and the immorality of Portuguese people.

Then again the whole issue of Protestant morality as opposed to Catholic way of life must not be overlooked. It must have struck deep into the subconscious behaviour of the American Board missionaries. To reject this religious issue just because it cannot be documented is to fail to see reality as it existed. It is a matter of fundamental truth that since the Reformation, Catholics and Protestants from or of European descent had always been at loggerheads, overtly or covertly. In Angola their meeting happened to have sparked some flames. And since Angola happened to be then a Portuguese (Catholic) country, Protestant missionaries could never win any arguments.

This was precisely the point that the American Board executives did come to accept, even though it was a hard pill to swallow. The difficulties which the missionaries ran into during the war years could not be eased by running to the United States government for help. It was high time the missionaries themselves became diplomats. Ever since 1910 this point had been realised. Tucker, who was the first principal of Dondi Institute, said that when he was about to leave for Angola, in 1911, Dr. Barton, secretary of the American Board, told him:

"Mr. Tucker, missionaries are likely to be very lax in regard to the formalities which should make the relationship between foreigners and governors of the country in which they live. Some of our missionaries avoid officials except when they have some difficulty or some protest to make. Avoid that attitude. Develop relationships with officials, make all possible contacts."

1. Sanders to Bell, 4 June 1920, ABP.
days go to greet the officials and leave your visiting card. Put on your best suit of clothes, preferably black, and wear a top hat.”

Tucker went an extra mile cajoling and encouraging all and sundry not only to be diplomatic but to try to learn Portuguese as well. And it was rather interesting to note that he pointed out to the other missionaries that Norton de Matos was of English forebears who had much in common with the missionaries. He should therefore be trusted and the missionaries should also cooperate with him. Tucker himself got to know the language and culture so well he could easily be called a Lusitophile. To show that the Portuguese were probably justified in demanding that more than token Portuguese be taught he looked into the textbooks of the stations to uncover other things that the missionaries had been doing. He wrote to Barker of CCFMS as follows:

“The attitude of the majority of our teachers, who are almost entirely ignorant of Portuguese, has been one of hostility to the teaching of Portuguese. At Chisamba they always have a big Christmas entertainment. Last year some of the Dondi students learned a Portuguese hymn to sing for that occasion but they were forbidden to do so because it was Portuguese [...]. A new geography primer was being translated by one of the Bailundu ladies [...] . It was a literal translation of an American school geography. Washington was the centre of the universe. Special stress had to be laid on Guam [...], a small coral island in the Pacific acquired by the U.S. after the Spanish war [...]. Portugal [...] was dismissed in a curt manner in two sentences, whilst Angola was hardly mentioned. Go right through our Umbundu arithmetic and you will find them based on models other than Portuguese which is the official method obtaining in the country.”

By the time the war was over Portuguese patience had worn thin. Norton de Matos turned from persuading the missionaries to forcing them to do the Government’s wish. He had, since 1914, offered the missions five hundred hectares of land to any mission station on condition that the missionaries taught the Portuguese language on full scale. The missions had politely refused the offer. If the missionaries thought they could get away with merely teaching as little Portuguese as possible they were mistaken.

The Portuguese could not be fooled for long by the empty pronouncements of the American Board Missions. On December 9, 1921, Norton de Matos, the high commissioner of Angola, handed down a decree on education—Decree 77. The purpose of the act was “to regulate and oversee the action of the missions of religious propa-

2. Tucker to Barker of CCFMS, 5 July 1921, CCFMS Docs.
3. Minutes WCAM Conference, Dondi, 14 March 1914, ABP.
Subsections 3 and 4 of Article I stated categorically that the missions were supposed “to teach the Portuguese language [. . .]. Not to teach any foreign language.” Article II stated, “It is not permitted to teach native languages in mission schools”. Article III stated, “The use of the native language is only allowed orally in religious instruction and, as a help, during the elementary period of teaching the Portuguese language.” No book or pamphlet could be published except in Portuguese. No books for religious teaching were permitted in any language other than Portuguese. The Portuguese text, however, might be accompanied by a parallel version in the native language. Native teachers of outstations must possess an identification card (bilhete de identidade). The decree was very far-reaching. It was as if the mission could make no move in any way without feeling the weight of the Portuguese government.

American Board missionaries were stung to the quick. Tucker and his colleagues requested and obtained an interview with Norton de Matos for March 24, 1922. The group made several requests. The high commissioner allowed the missions to publish hymn books, a few in Portuguese and a few in Umbundu. He turned down the mission’s request for the use of the vernacular as a medium for education in the lower grades. The mission cited Portugal’s Decree No. 5778 of May 10, 1919, to buttress their request. This only elicited the reply to the effect that the high commissioner would not change Decree 77. Teachers with little knowledge of Portuguese could teach as long as they continued to improve their Portuguese. They could give explanations of knotty points in Umbundu. Missionaries could write in the native language as long as such letters were meant to give spiritual counsel. Ordinary letters should be written in Portuguese; pastoral letters in both languages. Norton de Matos gave concession for a new mission to be opened in Galangue district. He disassociated himself from the activities of the late governor of Bié who had recently given the missionaries so much difficulty.

At the mission conference that year, the missionaries affirmed their support for the Portuguese government of Angola but they passed a resolution to the effect that in the teaching of religion and in the daily administration of medical relief in the hospitals and dispensaries the use of the native languages was essential. The resolution also said that until Portuguese was acquired it was absolutely necessary that books be given to the people in the only language they understood, Umbundu.

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1. Interview with Norton de Matos as regards Decree 77, ABP encl. 30b, 1920. Tucker held another interview with the governor-general on 23 September 1922. Nothing new was gained (J. T. Tucker, occasional paper, 3 October 1922, CCFMS Docs. and ABP).
2. Memo WCAM Conference, May 1922, ABP.
It was a fine resolution but it could effect nothing. Norton de Matos had decided who was to be the real boss in Angola. As had been noted above, he had stamped his authority vividly upon the rank and file of Portuguese colonists to the point that he was attacked in hundreds of pamphlets. Decree 77 should be seen as final mopping up of what was left to be done. In this behaviour he was not without company. In Mozambique only shortly before Decree 77 was passed Governor Andrade demanded that Portuguese be taught and put his demand to effect. Schools that did not teach Portuguese had to be shut down. Eighty-nine outstations belonging to the Church Missionary Society and the English Wesleyan were closed. The English mission appealed to their consul only to be told that the Portuguese had a perfect legal right to demand that Portuguese be the medium of instruction should they so decide.¹

Among the American Board Missions, the decree had less effect; only a few outstations in Chisamba and Bailundu were closed. However, the psychological impact of the education act was that throughout the mission world of Angola it became the dominant topic of discussion even to the extent that the American Board and the Methodist missions which had up to now (1920–1922) acted independently of one another began to think of acting together to deal with the Government. The discussion of Decree 77 overshadowed even the issue of “contract labour” which seemed to spring out upon the missions again. At this time the mission board wanted to launch some protest—through diplomatic circles, not only about the issue of the teaching of Portuguese but also about that of “contract labour” and allied affairs. Tucker wrote to warn the CCFMS, “My advice regarding diplomatic action is like advice to those about to get married: Don’t.”² Of the issues, that concerning the teaching of Portuguese was already lost. The Portuguese government had asserted itself as possessing sovereignty in Angola and the missions had to exist within that basis.

Conclusion

When two elephants fight grass is trodden down. The Portuguese government and the American Board Missions were the elephants, the Ovimbundu the grass. The Portuguese and the American missionaries fought—the one ostensibly for the political control of Angola, and the other ostensibly for the spiritual control of the Ovimbundu. But a strong under-current was the struggle to culturally control the

¹. Tucker to Moore of CCFMS, 24 May 1921, CCFMS Docs.
². Ibid.
Ovimbundu. The Portuguese and the missionaries both consulted their traditions; the Portuguese a tradition of lethargy in colonial affairs until a revolution shook it and the worm turned to awake to its responsibilities. The awareness of these responsibilities was also contributed to in a large way by the Protestant missionaries' moral and evangelical fervour to fight against rum, slavery and a general daring to criticise the state.

The Portuguese could not understand this. In their tradition church and state worked together and criticised each other, if at all, quietly. And when the missionaries instinctively assumed that the language of the Gospel be in English, Lusitanian pride was hurt. The missionaries discovered that the Portuguese were just as conscious of their heritage as the Americans were of their Anglo-Saxon background. This consciousness on the part of the Portuguese runs right through this entire paper. At first it was the suspicion as to what the Anglo-Saxon missionaries were up to and then again various charges were made under the cloak of “denationalisation”.

The antithesis of “denationalisation” was patriotism. Any act or behaviour that might help build up the Portuguese overseas province was a mark of favour. It came as no surprise that the missions and the Portuguese government cooperated best when the mission was to carry on schemes that might help build up Angola. Similarly the missions were happiest when the Portuguese occupied Bié and provided a somewhat more stable atmosphere for the spreading of the Gospel. The missionaries were also happy when the Government tried to curb rum, slavery and the wanton activities of the traders. At all events, the cooperation between the two was at the expense of the Ovimbundu. The major thing here appeared to have been the remaking of the Ovimbundu into sedentary, agricultural people, rather than their remaining itinerant traders.

In the relationship between the missionaries and the Portuguese government, the Portuguese had the upper hand because the missionaries had from the beginning assumed that Portugal had sovereignty over Angola. The mission had no political aims. If it had, it could well have acted as the agent of a foreign government and taken the Benguela Highlands for that government on the point of getting there first. The missionaries continued on the assumption that Portugal owned the interior of Angola, which was subsequently confirmed by diplomacy that confirmed the right of the mission to exist where it was. But the right of existence also carried responsibilities with it. When the mission was young it screamed and appealed for diplomatic action whenever it faced some difficulties. It soon learned, however, that diplomatic action was like a two-edged sword. It focused world attention on an issue and it usually left a feeling of bitterness between
the mission and the authorities. The mission started to come of age when it realised that it could not be running to America for help at every turn. Having assumed from the beginning that the sovereignty of Portugal obtained in Angola, it had to put up or shut up over the language question. It had to render unto Caesar the thing that was Caesar’s or it might have no chance to render unto God the thing that was God’s.