Continuities and Discontinuities in Race Relations: Evolutionary or Revolutionary Change.
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I

This paper discusses the significance, for evolutionary or revolutionary change, of continuities and discontinuities between groups in the culture and structure of a society. Theories of evolutionary change stress the significance of continuities in culture and structure. These theories are appreciably influenced by Durkheim's theory of change in the forms of solidarity, and increase in its strength, with the progressive division of labor, as societies move from the mechanical solidarity of segmented structures to the organic solidarity of functional and structural differentiation and interdependence. Theories of revolutionary change emphasize discontinuities, as in the Marxist conception of revolution arising from the polarization of classes; or the discontinuity in the situation of the déclassé may be seen as shaping individual propensity for revolutionary action (Olson, 1963: 531); or conditions conducive to political 'extremism' may be found in the detached situation of certain occupational groups, such as longshoremen, lumbermen and dockworkers (Lipset, 1960: 87-88); or an explosive mixture of continuity and discontinuity may be seen as a stimulus to revolutionary action, as in theories of status incongruity or status disequilibrium (Galtung, 1964).

The theories derive initially from the context of western industrial societies, experiencing the impact of class conflict, not race conflict, the societies being for the most part racially homogeneous. What then is the significance of these theories for racially plural societies?

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which incorporate the racial sections on a basis of inequality (Kuper and Smith, 1969)? Are the effects of continuities and discontinuities similar in class structured racially homogeneous societies and in racially plural societies?

In considering this problem, I shall use the revolutions in Zanzibar and Rwanda as case studies. Both these societies included racial sections, which had lived together for centuries and might therefore be expected to have established continuities in culture and structure. In neither, however, was the division of labor much advanced. I shall therefore include some reference to an earlier study of continuities and discontinuities in South African society, in which there was the beginning of a revolutionary movement in the period 1952-1964 (Kuper, 1969a).

By continuities and discontinuities, I refer to the social distance between racial sections. Are persons of different races incorporated, as members of their racial sections, on a basis of inequality, or are they incorporated as individuals on a basis of equality? Are they segregated or assimilated, culturally differentiated or homogeneous, and is there inequality or equality in access to, and distribution of, power, status and material resources (Kuper, 1969b: 473-479)? Thus the dimension of discontinuity-continuity is conceived broadly, and not specifically as expressed in the division of labor and its consequences.

II

The analysis by Durkheim of the social consequences of the progressive division of labor has inspired many of the theories of evolutionary change in class and race relations. The polar types in Durkheim's theory are, at the one extreme, the relatively undifferentiated segmented society characterized by mechanical solidarity, in which segments may readily detach themselves, since they are substantially self-sufficient, and, at the other extreme, the functionally differentiated and highly specialized society of organic solidarity, in which there is so great an interdependence that the detachment of a part threatens the disruption of the whole. This is a conception of the progressive division of labor as stimulating, and as expressing, a more integrative and enduring solidarity.

Durkheim's thesis is readily translated into a persuasive theory of evolutionary change. With the progressive division of labor, individuals are detached from their original segments and drawn together in relationships transcending the segmental divisions. As these new horizontal relationships increase in number and diversity and scope, the original vertical segmental divisions become less salient and largely
dissolve in the interdependent structures resulting from differentiation and specialization.

The process may be viewed theoretically as one of continually progressive evolutionary change. Alternatively both ends of the continuum in Durkheim's theory may be seen as excluding the possibility of revolution, the potential for revolution being located at some point in the process of change. In the latter approach, the segmented society, with its vertical divisions, may be portrayed as pre-revolutionary. The advanced industrial society (or post-industrial society), on the other hand, may be conceived as post-revolutionary, characterized by a great continuity of most diverse statuses, interwoven in complex mosaics of interdependence. The rationale for this conception is that the society has transcended the possibility of revolution, either because it lacks the stratified social basis for class revolution as a result of continuity and interdependence, or because the 'modernized' society has in addition the capacity to respond effectively to social pressures for change. As for revolutionary potential, this is located at a stage in the progressive division of labor, varying with such factors as the nature of the initial structure, the degree and rate of economic change, the extent of mobility, subjective reactions, and indeed a host of other variables.¹

A third approach to the relationship between the division of labor and revolution, combines the perspectives of Durkheim and Marx. Thus Gluckman associates the progressive division of labor with varying tendencies to different forms of civil strife, as for example feuding in simple segmented societies; irruptions of segments or rebellious war in segmentary States (Gluckman, 1969: 402); and revolution as well as rebellion, where there has developed a closely interwoven network of economic dependence (Gluckman, 1965: 164).²

Durkheim's theory was developed in the context of a racially and ethnically homogeneous society, and it dealt with movement from the homogeneity of the segmented society to the heterogeneity of the functionally differentiated society, as a result of processes internal to the society. It is applied, however, to the very different situation of ethnically and racially plural societies.³ Gluckman (1969: 402), for example, sees as inherently unstable those societies in which vertical divisions between territorial or ethnic segments are inadequately cross-

¹. See the discussion by Germani (1966: 364-394), in a somewhat analogous context, of the variables affecting the social and political consequences of mobility, including radical opposition.

². Gluckman uses revolution in the sense of changes in the structure of power, and rebellion in the sense of changes in the incumbency of positions of power.

³. The term 'plural society' is used here to refer to societies characterized by racial and/or ethnic cleavages. For a general discussion of the concept, see Kuper and Smith (1969, Parts I and IV).
ed by the development of links of 'organic', utilitarian, economic interdependence, and he comments that without that interdependence, civil war is endemic in the system. The general expectation in the application of Durkheim's theory to racially or ethnically plural societies is that conflict between the original sections will decline as horizontal structures of relationship increasingly cut across the vertical racial or ethnic divisions. This is the theoretical basis for the prediction of evolutionary change to racial integration and democratic participation in South African society, if economic growth is sustained.

III

Some indications of the role of continuities and discontinuities may be derived from the analysis of the revolutions in Zanzibar and Rwanda. In the case of Zanzibar, there is a wide range of interpretations, the major conflict of interpretation being between those who view the revolution as a struggle of the oppressed classes against the class of oppressors, the Arab oligarchy, and those who see it as a revolution by Africans against Arabs. In the case of Rwanda, the social structure was less complex than in Zanzibar, and less calculated to stimulate in its interpreters the projection of their own personality inclinations. The range of interpretations is therefore more limited, perhaps involving different emphases, on caste or class or race, rather than sharply divergent interpretations. In both situations, the difficulties of interpretation are heightened by the interweaving of racial and economic differentiation.

In the Protectorate of Zanzibar, comprising Zanzibar and Pemba Islands, the four main racial and ethnic segments at the time of the revolution in 1964, were the Shirazi, Mainland Africans, Arabs and Asians. The Shirazi were the oldest established and the most numerous section. They had arrived from the mainland of Africa many centuries earlier, and they claimed to have intermingled with Persians who had migrated to Zanzibar in about the tenth century. They most nearly correspond to indigenous African groups. However membership of the Shirazi sections was partly a matter of self-identification, and the Shirazi included ex-slaves, who had been brought to the islands, and descendants of slaves (Middleton and Campbell, 1965: 15-20). The total population of the Protectorate, according to the

1. The most authoritative accounts of the background to the Zanzibar revolution are to be found in the studies by LOFCHIE (1965 and 1966).

2. See KUPER (1969d) for a discussion of the relations between economic and racial differentiation in Zanzibar and Rwanda, and problems of interpretation.
1958 Census, was some 299,000, that is, over 165,000 on Zanzibar Island and almost 134,000 on Pemba. In 1948, Shirazi constituted over half the population on each of the islands. Probably, this proportion had not greatly changed by 1964.

The second largest section was of Mainland Africans, representing relatively recent migration from the mainland, and including many migrant laborers. Mainland Africans comprised almost one-fifth of the total population in 1948, a fourth of the population on Zanzibar Island, and about one-eighth on Pemba.

Arabs, of varied origin, had settled on the islands over many centuries, but more particularly after 1830, when the Sultan of Oman decided to locate his capital on Zanzibar Island (Lofchie, 1969: 287). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, until the establishment of the British Protectorate of Zanzibar in 1890, the island was under Arab rule, and the British continued to support the Sultan and the Arab ruling oligarchy. The Arabs were the third largest section, comprising about a sixth of the total population, less than one-tenth of the population of Zanzibar Island, and over one-fourth of those living on Pemba. There were thus almost three times as many Mainland Africans as Arabs on Zanzibar Island. On Pemba Island, on the other hand, Arabs were more numerous than Mainland Africans, a ratio of over two to one.

There have been Indians on the islands for many centuries. They were a small population, 6.1% of the total in 1958, essentially urban, and the great majority lived on Zanzibar Island.

The crude, stereotypic view of Zanzibar prior to the revolution emphasizes the discontinuities between the sections. Arabs are categorized as the ruling stratum, the senior bureaucrats, the large plantation owners, Indians as merchants and financiers, and Africans, both Shirazi and Mainland, as fishermen, cultivators and laborers. There were certainly marked discontinuities in power, in occupation and in education. Lofchie (1969: 293-309) presents tables, based on a survey in 1948, which give quantitative measures of social structure—landownership, occupational status, and access to higher education—“to illustrate the close coincidence between racial community and economic class in Zanzibar” (p. 302). Certainly the owners of the large clove plantations were Arab and Indian, the upper professional and upper middle occupational categories (such as owners of large commercial firms, top professionals, administrators, teachers, newspaper editors, and retail shopkeepers) were mostly Indian, but also Arab, and much higher proportions of Asian and Arab schoolchildren were in the upper standards of the schools.

1. Ibid.
But there were also many continuities in economic position. The economy was little developed, resting largely on the marketing of cloves, subsistence agriculture and fishing, with some employment by Government and in commerce, but little in industry. Inevitably, there was poverty among all sections, and many Arabs, Indians, Shirazi and Africans shared the same class situation. It is clear from the tables presented by Lofchie that there was a considerable overlapping in landownership and occupation. The great majority of Arabs (5,515, or 92% of Arab landowners) owned small plantations, with less than a thousand clove trees, being in the same economic situation as the Shirazi landowners; or if the level of the small plantation is taken as less than 250 trees, then 3,630 Arab owners (60%) were in the same landowning stratum as 20,275 (91%) of Shirazi, Mainland Africans and Comorian owners. In the distribution of non-agricultural occupations, the upper stratum was Indian, and the upper middle was appreciably Indian, but the great majority of Indians were in the middle strata of skilled manual workers and of uncertified clerical and administrative personnel, and in the lower middle stratum of venders, peddlers and semi-skilled workers. The Arabs constituted the top-ranking Government administrators, they were appreciably represented in the upper middle and middle (non-manual) occupations and little represented in the skilled manual category, but the overwhelming majority (8,000, or 82% of Arabs in non-agricultural occupations) were concentrated in the lower middle and lower categories (semi-skilled workers, peddlers and laborers) in about the numbers that would be expected in terms of their proportion of the total population. Mainland Africans were concentrated in the manual occupations (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled), but they were also represented in the upper middle and middle (non-manual) occupational levels. Shirazi were distributed over a wide range of occupations, but most heavily in the lower middle and lower occupational categories. In education, relatively few Shirazi children were in the highest classes of the schools, but the proportion for Mainland Africans was almost commensurate with its proportion of the total population, though appreciably below that of Indians and Arabs (see Appendix, pp. 379-380).

What then is to be said of the pattern of discontinuities and continuities? The discontinuities were marked at the level of the Arab oligarchy, as Lofchie demonstrates, and at the level of professionals and merchants, mostly Indian. There was discontinuity also in occupational patterns, most of the cultivators and fishermen being Shirazi, and most Mainland Africans being employed as laborers in Zanzibar City or as squatters or seasonally on clove plantations. And finally the presence of an Indian middle class contributed to discontinuities
between the racial sections at the upper occupational level, by impeding the upward mobility of other sections (Lofchie, 1969: 300).

At the same time, there were marked continuities, in the sense that many persons of different races followed similar occupations and shared roughly the same life situation. Common occupational and life situation may have the most varied consequences, dependent on a great many factors. They may provide a basis for common interests and for class action, as when workers are massed together in large industries, but they may inhibit, or at any rate not be conducive to, communal action if the workers are in the separate work situations of small scale businesses and domestic labor, as in Zanzibar, or if they are in competition for wage employment, or for the same urban market for agricultural produce.

In addition to continuities in economic situation and education, there were continuities in culture and in group composition; Lofchie (1965: 71-72), in discussing factors making for integration, emphasizes common language and religion, Swahili being the common language, and Islam the main religion. More than 95% were Muslim in 1948 (Lofchie, 1965: 71-72), the great majority being of the Sunni denomination. Almost two-thirds of the small Asian population were either Muslims of the Shia sect or Hindus; and there was a substantial section of Ibadhi Muslims among the Arabs, most of the Arab elite being Ibadhi, not Sunni. About 2,000 of over 57,000 Mainland Africans were Christians. However, adherence to Christianity may have been understated (Lofchie, 1965: 72), and there was a widespread stereotype of Mainland Africans as a Christian group (Lofchie, 1969: 307-308).

Some continuity in group composition resulted from interbreeding between the races, and the acceptance of persons wishing to identify with a particular racial section. Lofchie (1969: 296-297) shows how large numbers of Swahili (persons of mixed Arab-African descent and Islamic faith) changed their identification to Arab in the period 1924-1931, with some measure of acceptance. This avenue of movement into the Arab section by self-identification was difficult however for Africans, and Lofchie (1969: 298) argues first, that upwardly mobile individuals accepted into the Arab elite group reinforced the racial aspect of political domination and the social division of labor, and second, that not enough people were involved in change of identification to alter the racial character of social stratification. However that may be, it is clear that there was some continuity, or fluidity, in group composition, between Arabs, Shirazi and persons of mixed Arab-African descent.

Probably relatively precise measures could be given of many aspects of continuity and discontinuity, where extensive census and other
population data are available. This was not the case in Zanzibar, and the difficulties are increased by the fact that the categories of African and Arab were combined in the 1958 Census. Given this paucity of data, there may be greater validity in statements of relative continuity between sections. Thus, it seems clear that the maximum continuity was between Arabs and Shirazi on Pemba Island, and that the maximum discontinuities were on Zanzibar Island, between Mainland Africans and Arabs, and Mainland Africans and Indians.

On Pemba Island, a different experience of Arab settlement from that on Zanzibar Island was expressed in the historical belief among Pemba Shirazi that they had entered into a voluntary relationship with Arabs, and that they had not been subjected to an enforced subordination (Lofchie, 1965: 170, 244-245). There were always Shirazi as well as Arab plantation owners on Pemba, there was more social acceptance, intermarriage and concubinage between Arabs and Shirazi than on Zanzibar Island, and by reason of kinship ties, men from outlying parts could move to the clove areas and take part in the clove industry as small growers (Middleton and Campbell, 1965: 35-39). In addition, there was a common language and religion. In relative terms, these constituted relations of greatest continuity between sections.

Maximum discontinuity characterized the relations on Zanzibar Island between Mainland Africans and Arabs. Many of the Africans had been born on the mainland of Africa, and there must have been appreciable numbers of recent immigrants among them. Mainland Africans tended to be the poorest section of the population. They were employed predominantly in the towns, either in domestic services or in manual work as Government laborers; those engaged in agriculture were usually squatters on land to which they had no permanent rights (Lofchie, 1965: 83). The great majority of Africans lived in the Ngambo ('the other side') section of Zanzibar City and in its peri-urban environs in coral houses roofed with petrol tins, under conditions in invidious contrast to those prevailing in Stone Town, the essentially Arab and Indian section of Zanzibar City. The conspicuous consumption of wealth by the small Arab elite would be particularly visible in Zanzibar City (Lofchie, 1965: 77, 87, 88). Middleton and Campbell (1965: 19-20) describe Mainland Africans as largely Christian or pagan, and comment that they were cut off from much of the social life of the country because few of them were Muslims. The evidence of the censuses is quite to the contrary, but it may be misleading. Certainly almost three-fifths of the small Christian population in 1948 was Mainland African (Lofchie, 1965: 72). To these discontinuities must be added the discontinuity in milieux between Africans from countries on the mainland struggling for independence,
and caught up in nationalist and Pan-Africanist movements, and
Arabs dominating an island enclave off the East Coast of Africa in
an era of emancipation from colonialism. Finally, there was the
historical cleavage resulting from the Arab role in the slave trade.

Sharp discontinuities in culture and milieu, and in political and
historical roles, were the basis of the great discontinuity between
Indians and Mainland Africans. Also the main traders and financiers
were Indian, and they seem to have been perceived, or stereotyped,
as a wealthy trading class, though only a small proportion of Indians
belonged to this class.

IV

The discontinuity between the racial sections in Rwanda is imme-
diately conveyed by the frequent description of the traditional society
as a caste or feudal society. Its origins were in about the sixteenth
century, when waves of immigrant pastoral Tutsi began to establish
their domination over the agricultural Hutu and the Twa, by a com-
bination of peaceful means and conquest. The Central Region was
the area with the longest record of continuous contact between Tutsi
and Hutu, and it constituted the ‘core area’ of traditional Rwanda
(Lemarchand, 1966b: 601). In the north, Tutsi control was not firmly
established until the 1920’s (Lemarchand, 1966b: 599), with the assis-
tance initially of the German, and later of the Belgian, administration.

The traditional system of Tutsi domination rested on the structure
of the State and on the system of clientage. Power was vested in the
divine king, the mwami, and it radiated from him to the court, the
territorial administration of hill chiefs and chiefs of province, and
the military organization, in final analysis the source of restraining
power. This State structure was in the hands of Tutsi (Maquet, 1964:
555). The system of taxation and of clientage supported the State
structure of domination. Taxation fell unequally on Hutu and Tutsi,
the former being required to provide agricultural produce, heads of
cattle and services, while the latter made less onerous contributions,
consisting of pastoral products. Under the system of clientage, the
clients rendered services and produce in exchange for protection and
the use of cows. Maquet (1964: 557) writes that by means of this
double mechanism of taxation and feudal obligation, the Tutsi stratum
appropriated the surplus of agricultural production.

The discontinuities then, in the traditional system lay in the monop-
oly of power, wealth and privilege by the Tutsi, and in their domina-
tion, as a pastoral warrior stratum, over a peasant, serving population.
This domination was supported by the German administration, and
by the Belgian administration, until shortly before the revolution. As a result, sharp discontinuities persisted in the structure of the society. It was these discontinuities which Hutu intellectuals stressed in the Hutu Manifesto of March 24, 1957, which acted as a preamble to the revolution. Hutu leaders declared that the sources of conflict lay in the political monopoly by the Tutsi race, a political monopoly which, given the structure of the society, became also an economic, social and cultural monopoly, to the great despair of the Hutu, who saw themselves condemned eternally to the role of subordinate manual workers (Nkundabagenzi, 1961: 22-23).

This picture of discontinuity is a broad structural stereotypic view of the relations between the Hutu majority (about 85% of the population of two and a half million at the time of the revolution) and the Tutsi minority (about 14%). It ignores the many continuities between the sections. As in Zanzibar, power and wealth were the prerogative of a small oligarchy. The mass of Tutsi had no access to power, nor prospect of power. The country was poor, the economy little developed, and based mainly on subsistence agriculture and herding. Foreigners controlled industry and commerce, and these sectors, and agriculture, provided very limited and modest employment for workers and peasant laborers (Kuper, 1969d). There was only a small professional stratum. Inevitably, many Tutsi lived under the same economic conditions as the overwhelming majority of Hutu. A survey of standard of living of sample populations of Hutu and Tutsi, excluding however chiefs, sub-chiefs, and functionaries and bureaucrats living in the urbanized zones, showed little difference in the value of subsistence production and monetary revenue, but somewhat greater differences in the production of milk and the distribution of cattle (Leurquin, 1960; Kuper, 1969d). There was clearly appreciable continuity in standard of living and economic situation.

Continuities in culture must be added to the continuities in standard of living. Maquet (1964: 554) characterizes these continuities as inclusion in a political unity under the authority of the same sovereign, a common language, the sharing, in very large measure, by Hutu of the Tutsi system of values oriented to cattle, and participation in the same economic system. There was some interbreeding, but, in contrast to Zanzibar, without intersectional mobility by self-identification and affiliation. The main discontinuities were between Tutsi elite and Hutu, and between Tutsi and Hutu generally in terms of the collective prerogatives appropriated by the Tutsi collectivity.

1. I have omitted reference to the small number of Twa, a marginal, somewhat ‘pariah’, population.
These discontinuities naturally dominated the perspectives of Hutu political leaders in the early stages leading to the revolution.

It was in this context of continuities and discontinuities in structure and culture, that the revolutions took place in Zanzibar and Rwanda, and the problem is whether it is possible to analyze the consequences, for the revolutionary process, of these continuities and discontinuities.

V

The revolutions in Zanzibar and Rwanda followed very different courses, and they resulted in very different social systems, but they shared in common the expunging of minority racial domination from the structure of the society.

In Zanzibar, on the 12th January 1964, about a month after independence, there was a nine-hour revolutionary struggle, confined to Zanzibar Island, in which a small revolutionary force captured the police armories in the African quarter of Zanzibar City, occupied the radio station and seized the capital. They were led by a Mainland African, John Okello, and they were overwhelmingly Mainland African. It was Okello’s deliberate policy to recruit his supporters largely from Mainland Africans. The force included a nucleus of policemen, and again, in recruiting these policemen, Okello was especially interested in men from the mainland; he felt that Zanzibar Africans (i.e. Shirazi) could not be trusted, since they were strongly connected with, and even related to, Arabs on the island, and might well be spies (Okello, 1967: 119).

On the days immediately following the revolutionary seizure of power, violent mobs came out into the streets of Zanzibar City. Their precise composition is not known but they must certainly have been appreciably Mainland African, since large numbers lived in Zanzibar City and its environs (Middleton and Campbell, 1965: 21): they would also have included many Shirazi, more particularly Hadimu Shirazi. There was no revolutionary struggle on Pemba Island.

Arabs were the target group. No reliable information is available of Arabs massacred. Okello (1967: 160) gives a figure of 11,995 enemy soldiers and persons killed, and 21,462 enemies and stooges detained, as compared with six of his soldiers and 1,631 African civilians killed. Lofchie (1969: 325-326) writes that several thousand Arabs on Zanzibar Island lost their lives, and that the total decrease in the Arab community attributable to loss of life, repatriation and emigration probably amounted to about 10,000 persons. There was looting and burning of Arab and Indian shops and some Indians were killed. Many Arab properties were expropriated.
The inheritors of the revolution were the Afro-Shirazi Party and Umma. Both these parties had been established in the period of sharp political conflicts preceding independence, conflicts Lofchie (1965: 269) describes as characterized by elemental and irreducible racial fears. The Afro-Shirazi Party had attempted to unite Mainland Africans and Shirazi (Lofchie, 1965: 10). Umma was a small radical party, Marxist in ideology, non-African in composition (Lofchie, 1965: 277): it had seceded from the Arab-dominated Zanzibar National Party in 1963. It was a revolutionary party, but there is no way of knowing whether Umma, and the Afro-Shirazi Party, would in fact have organized a revolution against the coalition government of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party.

The Zanzibar Gazette carries declarations of the policies of the revolutionary government. Presidential Decree No. 5 (25 February 1964) declared the People's Republic of Zanzibar a Democratic State dedicated to the rule of law. Presidential Decree No. 6 (25 February 1964) proclaimed that a primary objective of the Zanzibar People's Revolution was to end all economic, social or legal privileges and disabilities which had in the past divided various citizens, and to promote equality, reconciliation and unity: it declared every citizen equally entitled to the rights, privileges and protections of citizenship in so far as duties and obligations of citizenship were assumed, but reserved the power to legislate for special relief or other preference to economically, culturally or socially underprivileged categories. It would seem that the Government is developing a socialist program, with aid from Chinese and Russian communists. Large numbers of Indian civil servants have been replaced by Africans, Indian properties are being expropriated, and Indians are leaving the islands. As to the Arab communities, their power was destroyed in the early period of the revolution.

The Rwanda revolution was more protracted. Luc de Heusch (1964a: 424) conceives that the conflict was initially social and thereafter political and that, finally, increasingly, it took a trend toward racial conflict between those described throughout the country as the 'longs' in opposition to the Hutu, the 'shorts'. Lemarchand (1966b: 609-610) draws a distinction between the Central Region and the Northern Region, suggesting that the revolution expressed social conflict in the former, and ethnic conflict in the latter.

Prior to the revolution, there had been a slow process of economic change under Belgian rule. Demographic pressure on resources increased as the result of a decline in death rates. The growth of a monetary economy, with the development of cash crops, mining, industry and trade, gave rise to a stratum of wage earners, a rural proletariat. Small numbers of Hutu, educated through the Catholic
missions, entered the professions. Reforms introduced by the Belgian administration, and particularly steps taken in 1954 for the progressive abolition of the cattle-leaseing contract (ubuhake), had begun to modify the traditional rights of Tutsi patrons over Hutu clients. The economy, however, still rested essentially on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism, with exchange of products, in a traditional system of subordination and clientage.

The catalysts of revolution were the tentative steps taken by the Belgians to democratize the society, and the struggle for power in the movement toward independence. The immediate preamble to revolution was the Hutu Manifesto of 1957. At this time, however, there does not appear to have been a developed ‘class consciousness’ among the mass of Hutu, though there was an oral popular literature of tales and proverbs which expressed an irony and a realism toward the Tutsi (Maquet, 1964: 558-559), and the cult of Kubwanda presumably symbolized the questioning of the social order (De Heusch, 1964b: 133-146). In the year following the Hutu Manifesto, two Hutu political parties, Parmehutu and Aprosoma, were established. Tutsi leaders responded by founding, in 1959, a Tutsi party (UNAR) with some Hutu participation. This received support from the newly appointed mwami, who became identified with Tutsi interests. About the same time, Tutsi progressives and Hutu founded a party, RADER, with the goal of reconciling the two enemies. Tutsi-Hutu conflict led to an assault by Tutsi on a Hutu sub-chief, Hutu and Tutsi reprisals and counter-reprisals developing into a Hutu jacquerie and a civil war in which rival bands organized for massacre. There began a large scale emigration of Tutsi to Uganda and Tanganyika, and the traditional structure disintegrated in violence. Order was restored by the Belgian administration.

In 1962, after Parmehutu electoral victories and a referendum, the Republic of Rwanda became independent. The Government took repressive measures against the opposition parties, both the Hutu party, Aprosoma, and the Tutsi dominated party, UNAR, on grounds of conspiracy with the representatives in exile of the ancien régime. There were commando raids by Tutsi over the borders and Hutu reprisals, those following the raid in December 1963 being described by De Heusch (1964a: 425) as a veritable genocide. He comments that the Tutsi exiles were divided into at least two factions, one of

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1. See comments by De Heusch (1964c: 99) on the 1956 elections to the electoral college. The above account mostly follows the articles by De Heusch (1964a and c).

2. D'Hertefelt (1960b: 114-135) analyzes the political developments immediately prior to the revolution, commenting upon the policies of the political parties. See also D'Hertefelt (1960a: 403-438) and Lemarchand (1962: 333-357).
which resolutely condemned the military incursions across the borders, and that, inside Rwanda, UNAR had broken its ties to the monarchy, and declared its desire to collaborate with the Republic, while the leaders of both UNAR and RADER continuously condemned the Tutsi terrorist raids. Nevertheless, “according to the technique of amalgamation,”¹ all Tutsi were considered to be in solidarity with the extreme wing of the Tutsi exiles. This offered “le plus malencontreux des prétextes à la politique d’extermination des Tutsi” (De Heusch, 1964a: 424).²

This was a revolution then of the Hutu, of peasants in mass movements, of militant strata of rural proletariat, and of intellectuals in positions of political leadership. It received much support from the Belgian administration and the Catholic Church. Targets of the revolution were the Tutsi, apparently without discrimination. It is impossible to know how many were massacred. United Nations sources gave an estimate in 1964 of 150,000 refugees in neighboring territories. These included not only Tutsi but also Hutu serfs who accompanied them into exile. Hutu now hold the positions of power in a one-party State under a government committed to rapid economic and social change, with technical assistance from the West. The constitution passed in 1961, proclaims Rwanda to be a democratic and sovereign State, and asserts the equality of all its peoples, without discrimination by race, clan, color or religion. Private property is declared inviolable, and all communist activity and propaganda are forbidden.

In practice, the democratic idealism of the constitution is modified by the persistence of traditional structures in “the thermidorian syndrome.” Lemarchand (1966a) comments that the Hutu leaders made use of the clientage form of relationship, within their own group, for revolutionary purposes; that these types of traditional relationship persist after the revolution in structures of patrimonial power deriving from the President (in much the same way as patronage devolved in the past from the mwami); and that they persist also in other networks of client relationships, such as the party, the bureaucracy and technical assistance, and in the revival in the north of traditional Hutu structures of clientage based on land tenure. Also at variance with egalitarian norms is the growing discrepancy of income and perquisites between high-ranking civil servants and Government officials on the one hand and Hutu peasants on the other, a discrepancy between the new ‘ruling class’ and the masses undoubtedly wider than at any time during the ancien régime (Lemarchand, 1966a: 322).

¹ “Selon la technique d’amalgame” (De Heusch, 1964a: 424).
² Roux (1969: 48-62) gives a more sympathetic account of the Government’s difficulties, referring to the inadequate armed forces, poor communications and complicity of Tutsi within Rwanda.
Lemarchand (1966a: 318) concludes that the ideological guide-lines of the revolution have had relatively little effect on Rwandese society, and that the eviction of the Tutsi caste from its dominant position has not been accompanied by major changes in the structuring of roles. However, he qualifies this conclusion by reference to changes in the functions of clientage, and to changes in political structure consequent upon an electoral system with a popular vote, and the introduction of a National Assembly and a ‘mass’ type of political party.

VI

Continuity and discontinuity were clearly relevant to the course of the revolutions in the two societies. In Zanzibar, the main conflict was between Mainland Africans and Arabs, sections set apart by maximum discontinuity. There was considerable discontinuity between Arabs and Hadimu Shirazi, and this was also a relevant factor. The Hadimu were the section of Shirazi most exposed to expropriation of land, which resulted in an exodus from the fertile areas occupied by Arab plantation owners. Hadimu Shirazi had felt the direct impact of Arab domination and incessant demands for labor (Lofchie, 1965: 40-47). At the same time, there was continuity between Africans and Hadimu in Zanzibar City, where Hadimu migrants became socially and politically assimilated into the Mainland African community (Lofchie, 1965: 250).

On Pemba Island, there was great continuity between Arabs and Shirazi, and this was expressed in the voting behavior of Pemba Shirazi, and their intermediate and vacillating position in the political struggle. It would seem that their non-involvement in the revolution was related to these continuities. In the case of Mainland Africans, there was more continuity between them and other sections in general mode of life on Pemba Island than on Zanzibar Island, but probably also more social exclusion. Lofchie (1965: 250) writes that on Pemba “the mainland African, not the Arab, is more commonly regarded as an alien and an ‘unknown stranger’.” The fact that Mainland Africans on Pemba Island did not engage in revolutionary violence may be explained quite simply in tactical terms. They were a smaller population than the Arab, and could not count on Shirazi support. In the settlements they established in some of the more remote parts of the north of the island, they formed a series of small communities, each isolated from others by residence and tribal origin (Middleton and Campbell, 1965: 20). Communications were poor and there was no central focus of power, which the revolutionaries might capture.

In Rwanda, the relevance of continuities and discontinuities may
be seen in the varied patterns of revolutionary struggle in different regions. Lemarchand (1968b: 27, 41) mentions strong pro-monarchical sentiments among the Hutu of western Rwanda, matching the traditional acquiescence of Pemba Africans (Shirazi) to Arab supremacy, and he relates the recent and harsh conquest of the northern Hutu, and the persistence of traditional Hutu authority, to the higher pitch of revolutionary fervor, and the restorative rather than innovative goals, in the north. Peasant jacqueries erupted above all in the north (De Heusch, 1964c: 108; D’Hertefelt, 1960c: 452). Marcel d’Hertefelt (1960a: 438) shows that in the 1960 elections, that is after the Hutu jacquerie, the revolutionary party drew support from the Hutu, and the traditionalist party from the majority of the Tutsi, but in certain regions also from the Hutu. These continuities, however, or the founding of RADER by Tutsi and Hutu with the object of promoting reconciliation, affected only the course of the struggle for power, and not the final reversal of the power relations between the two groups.

Both revolutions brought about the downfall of dominant racial minorities, but in other respects the results of the revolutions are very different. In Zanzibar, there is a radical restructuring of the society along communist lines, while in Rwanda many of the traditional forms of relationship and authority persist. Perhaps the internal structures of the revolutionary sections, the continuity or discontinuity between leaders and followers, may be relevant. In Rwanda, the intellectual leaders of the Hutu revolt were socially distant from the masses; in Zanzibar, leadership seems to have arisen from the strata which were active in the revolution.

VII

What suggestions then may be derived, from the foregoing discussion, as to the role of structural and cultural continuities and discontinuities in racial revolutions? Are there grounds for the argument that racial revolutions are distinctive, and that theories of evolutionary and revolutionary change in class structured societies may be somewhat misleading when applied to revolutionary conflict between racial groups?

In retrospect, revolutions often seem inevitable:2 but in Zanzibar the continuities between Arabs and Shirazi, and between Shirazi and

1. See also Lemarchand (1966b: 592-610) and D’Hertefelt (1960a: 419).
2. The analyst who asserts the inevitability of a revolution which has already taken place thereby claims to demonstrate his own capacity for accurate prediction, albeit that the demonstration is ex post facto. There is frequently also an ideological implication in the assertion.
Africans, might well have provided a central core for evolutionary change. In any event, in both Zanzibar and Rwanda, the division of labor was quite rudimentary, and Durkheim's theory is concerned with a division of labor moving progressively toward a system of complex, differentiated, interdependent structures. The significance of continuities should be tested in more economically developed societies, such as the racially plural and industrialized societies of the USA and South Africa. Perhaps, under these conditions of greater economic development and interdependence, continuities may more effectively resist revolutionary impulses.

There are obvious difficulties in the application of models derived from Durkheim's theory to the integration of racially and ethnically plural societies, and there are many examples of predictions, based on conceptions of the organic solidarity of interdependence, or of cross-cutting relations, but not fulfilled in situations of racial or ethnic conflict. Thus Himmelstrand in 1966, at a time immediately preceding the Hausa-Ibo conflict, derived from a modified Durkheimian model a prognosis favorable to ethnic integration in Nigeria. Or by way of further example, Le Tourneau (1957: 112, 126), in an analysis of the Muslim cities of North Africa, attributed the greater harmony of relationships in Algeria to the fact that the French settled inside the Algerian cities, instead of in separate cities as in Morocco; he was obliged to add a footnote regarding the fragility of the inter-ethnic relationships, since the revolution overtook publication.

The application of models derived from Durkheim's theory may be more appropriate to class structures than to racial structures. Class relations are appreciably constituted by the division of labor; they are intrinsic to the social system, arising out of the process of interaction. Race relations, on the other hand, have an extrinsic reference, apart from the interaction, and are less fully defined by the division of labor. To be sure, race relations are also substantially constituted by interaction within the society and they are also substantially intrinsic to the society; and there is generally a very clearly defined discriminatory division of labor, which is fundamental to the structure of race relations. But there is still an extrinsic point of reference, the racial difference preceding the establishment of the society, and being associated, in the great majority of cases, as in European colonization, with cultural differences and pre-existing settled communities: and the content and salience of race relations are generally more extensive and persuasive, ramifying more widely outside the division of labor, than class relations.

1. “[9 bis] Les événements survenus depuis 1954 ont montré la fragilité de la cohabitation algérienne” (p. 126).
2. See KUPER (1969c).
The implications of these differences are that revolutions are more likely to be endemic in racial structures than class structures; and that the progressive division of labor, and continuities and interdependence in other social aspects, are less likely to reduce revolutionary potential. The rationale for these implications is as follows.

The horizontal structures of relationship which cut across the initial vertical segments in the homogeneous society of Durkheim's theory, may coincide with them in the racially plural society; and they may do so, even where the social division of labor is far advanced. Thus in South Africa, where the division of labor is highly advanced, the vertical segments were transformed into politically dominant and subordinate strata. There are, to be sure, many deviations in South Africa from patterns of horizontal exclusion, outside the political domain, as in overlapping of occupational and educational achievement. But continuities in the division of labor do not necessarily modify exclusion and discrimination in other sectors, and South African society has been characterized for a generation by a dialectical opposition between increasing continuity in the economy and increasing rigidity in the political structure, presumably a situation of heightening revolutionary potential.

The first problem then is that the vertical divisions may be transformed into horizontal racial divisions, disconnected coexistence becoming an interdependent structure of domination and subordination. These horizontal divisions would correspond appreciably to class divisions, conceived purely as structures. However, in class structures, the horizontal divisions largely replace the vertical segmentary divisions, whereas in racial structures of this type the horizontal divisions are superimposed upon the initial segmentary divisions. The second problem, in the derivation of a model of evolutionary change from Durkheim's theory, is that at the stage of the horizontal division of the society into a system of stratification, upward mobility has different consequences for class structured and racially structured societies.

In the class structured society, upwardly mobile individuals are more likely to be lost to their initial class. In the racially structured society, the upwardly mobile member is still identifiable by the cri-

1. This corresponds to the description by Weber (1958: 189, translated from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1922): "A 'status' segregation grown into a 'caste' differs in its structure from a mere 'ethnic' segregation: the caste structure transforms the horizontal and unconnected coexistences of ethnically segregated groups into a vertical social system of super- and subordination."

2. The continuing discrimination against Blacks, and the extent to which they are excluded in the USA is a further indication of the way in which racial division may persist with the most highly advanced division of labor. For discussion of this aspect, see Kuper (1969a) and Blumer (1965).
terion of race. If upward partial mobility (Germani, 1966: 372 ff.), in the sense of an incongruity between upward mobility in some statuses, such as occupation or education, and barriers to mobility in other statuses, such as access to power and social acceptance, stimulates revolutionary attitudes, then these are much more likely to develop in racially structured societies, because of the persistence of racial identity, the wider ramifications and more extreme discontinuities of racial status, and the greater likelihood of partial mobility and status incongruity.

A situation which might be expected to generate revolutionary potential at an early stage in the division of labor, is the upward mobility of a small section, say an educated elite, frustrated in aspirations for complete mobility, and having available for revolutionary mobilization, a subordinate racial majority. Even where the division of labor is greatly advanced, and there has been much mobility and increasing continuity, the mobile individuals in systems of race relations are more readily recovered, and may be drawn back into revolutionary struggles by the most deprived strata, as is perhaps the situation in the USA. Racial identity provides lower strata with greater opportunity to recover or neutralize members of their race who are seeking to assimilate or conciliate in a process of upward mobility.

The continuities discussed in this paper are continuities in social phenomena associated with race, but not continuities in race itself. Perhaps, the intermingling of races, continuity in the distribution of racial characteristics, and recognition of a wide range of racial diversity, may correspond to the horizontal structures transcending the initial segments in the progressive division of labor. Perhaps this is a situation reducing revolutionary potential, and Durkheim's theory should be applied also to the progressive division of race, and not only to the progressive division of associated aspects of the racial structure.

APPENDIX

Tables 1, 2 and 3 below give ratios for landowning, occupation and education, between the proportion of a population to the total population, and the proportion of that population in a particular landowning, occupational and educational category to the total numbers in each of those categories. A ratio of 1 indicates that the presence of a population group in a particular category corresponds to its proportion of the total population. This may serve as a crude measure of some socio-economic inequalities between the populations.
Table 1. — Landowning (1948)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of clove trees on shamba*</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Shirazi</th>
<th>Mainland Africans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,000 or more</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-2,999</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250-999</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-249</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than 50</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The measure used, for value of the landowning, is the number of clove trees on plantations.

Table 2. — Occupational Level of Populations in Non-Agricultural Pursuits (1948)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational level*</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Shirazi</th>
<th>Mainland Africans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle (non-manual)</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle (manual)</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Upper level is composed of top professional men, senior administrators and owners of large commercial concerns; upper middle level—auxiliary professional workers, retail store owners; middle level—non-manual, uncertified professional workers, clerical personnel and manual skilled labor; lower middle level—vendors, itinerant peddlers and semi-skilled workers; lower level—unskilled manual workers.

Table 3. — Education (1948)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Shirazi</th>
<th>Mainland Africans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standards I-VI</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards VII-IX</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards X-XII</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: LoFCHE (1965, Tables 5, 6, 8); 1969, Tables 3, 4, 5), derived from Batson’s survey (1948) and figures for numbers in the different population sections.
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