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If the Dogon...*

There are German scholars who so much admire Shakespeare that they sometimes call him 'our Shakespeare'. I have something of this feeling about the Dogon. Yet, would Dogon studies strike this note of sympathy if they had been actually carried out by the English? If the Nuer had been studied by the Missions Griaule how much more would we know about them today. How much poorer our knowledge of Dogon culture, if we ourselves had studied them.

Some of the differences between the two schools of ethnography depend on concentration of time and effort. It is true that Evans-Pritchard was only able to study the Nuer for a very short time. The poverty of their recorded cosmology partly reflects this. Compare his two brief visits with the many years of dedicated teamwork of the Missions Griaule. But it is certain too that very different points of view inspired the two kinds of ethnography. What would we know of the Nuer if they had been in the French Sudan—and of the Dogon if they had been on the banks of the White Nile? It is hard to imagine because the Dogon now seem so unmistakably French, so urbane, so articulate, with such philosophical insight. The very themes central to their philosophy are themes in the main stream of Greek and Christian thought. For example, their reflections on sexual dualism echo those of Plato in very similar vein. And their use of anthropomorphic symbolism for the corpus politic and the mystical body is a preoccupation of Christian philosophers as well. Nuer myths, by contrast, are as crude as their way of life. Their manners are blunt, not to say rude. Their cosmological ideas are confused. To complete the contrast, the Dogon work out their metaphysics in terms

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of speech symbolism, the Nuer use more concrete cattle symbolism. The man whose personality and initiative give him a little leadership they call ‘the Bull of the herd’. The British, too, use a bovine metaphor to designate the man whose confident buying gives a lead to the stock market. “The market is ‘bullish’,” they say, or: “Today bulls were active.” The Nuer may one day feel satisfaction that the national sobriquet of their ethnographers is John Bull. Thus while the Dogon seem pre-eminently susceptible to the literary and aesthetic investigation at which the French excel, the Nuer seem only apt for the discoveries in primitive politics and kinship which interest the British. Yet I long to subject each tribe to a fusion of the British and French techniques of research.

Of all the plays of Shakespeare it is said to be Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, for which the Germans feel such strong affection. Of all the books on the Dogon it is Mme Calame-Griaule’s Ethnologie et langage which draws me to Dogon studies. This great book is not a linguist’s book about a language. Rather it is an account of Dogon reflections on language in general and their own language in particular. Out of their reflections on speech, the Dogon have created a symbolic structure uniformly embracing their entire universe. The grain of millet in its husk—the human foetus in its placenta—, the world in its atmospheric envelope, are each analogs of the others. The constituent materials and morphology of speech are seen to correspond to those of cereals, of man, of woven cloth, of the whole cosmos. The same intricate harmony of images is drawn down and across from one level of experience to the next. Reading it is like gazing through a microscope at a flourishing form of life, confusingly alien and familiar. The lens through which the Dogon see themselves is their theory of speech.

Many primitive cultures use one relatively narrow range of experience for developing a symbolic code. Nilotic peoples do this to some extent with cattle symbolism. Lienhardt has shown how such primary experiences as those of colour are mediated for Dinka children by prior reference to cattle colours; a man’s image of himself is mediated by his identification with an ox, his experience of society is summed up in a series of animal sacrifices which give material for profound reflections on the nature of life and truth (Lienhardt 1961). Ndembu develop something comparable by reflecting on the common qualities of juicy elements in men and trees; different coloured saps are classified with blood and milk and bile, and from their likenesses a cosmic harmony is derived (Turner 1966). The Bushmen, reflecting on the morphology of human and animal bodies, have developed what Lévi-Strauss has called anatomical totemism. And so on. But the originality of the Dogon in this list is that the intellectual unity which they
confer on experience is derived from reflecting on the nature, power and effects of language.

On first view this would presuppose a degree of self-consciousness about the processes of thought which would lift their culture clear out of the class of primitives. It is not fantastic to hope that the fully recorded epistemology of an ancient West African culture should produce a kind of break-through for us. It could at least produce a new perspective such as that produced in European art at the turn of the century by the impact of African sculpture. If traditional African art had an effect on the artistic vision of Europe at that time, it was because it was welcomed in French artistic circles. Conversely I predict that if African linguistics are to make a stir in modern Europe, the greatest impact is likely to be through Anglo-Saxon appreciation. For we regard ourselves as the home of several kinds of linguistic studies. Linguistic philosophy, let’s face it, was born in Austria but naturalised British. Linguistics have several roots in our country, though the richest flowering has been in the United States. I can bring home to you our special claim on the Dogon by mentioning a few points of controversy to which their reflections make a definite contribution.

First, consider the support they lend to Malinowski. His main contribution to linguistics was to discover the relevance of social context. The stone he thus threw into the pond has made big ripples, but there are a few linguists who are not convinced. In this argument the Dogon come down clearly on the side of Malinowski. They have no doubt that language is a social activity and should be analysed as such.

"Dans la mesure où tout acte social suppose un échange de paroles, où tout acte individuel est lui-même une manière de s’exprimer, la ‘parole’ est parfois synonyme d’action." (Calame-Griaule 1965:24.)

Second, linguistic philosophy started by analysing statements and considering the relation between statements and facts on which they impart information. Following this track they come to the position at which they have forgotten that some statements do not convey information but are performances of actions. J. L. Austin drew the attention of his colleagues to the class of performative sentences in which the utterance is the performance of an act.

"For example, some performative statements are contractual:
'I do take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife.'
'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.'

Some are declaratory:
'I name this ship Queen Elizabeth.'
'I declare war.' " (Austin 1962.)
The Dogon do not need to be reminded of this faculty of speech.

"Acte et parole sont liés dans la pensée dogo, c'est pourquoi on appellera aussi symboliquement 'parole' le résultat de l'acte, l'œuvre, la création matérielle qui en résulte." (Calame-Griaule 1965:24.)

Dogo would even enlarge the performative class of speech to include insults and blessings (Calame-Griaule 1965: 422-429), which they consider to have immediate material efficacy.

In these two instances the Dogon are on the side of contemporary thought. The things that our philosophers and linguists are now remarking are things the Dogon know well. But this is because among ourselves the movement to greater and greater specialisation has run itself to a halt in certain directions. We are forced to return to more naive approaches. It is not so remarkable that a traditional African philosophy should be found to enshrine some old truths we have forgotten.

More impressive is Dogon subtlety in respect of truth. As is well known, the Dogon divide their universe between Nommo and Yourougou. Nommo is the heavenly power who represents right, reason, society, ritual and order in all its forms. Yourougou or the Pale Fox is his brother, fallen from grace by an initial act of disobedience. He represents enigma, disorder. Dogon classify speech into 24 forms belonging to Nommo and 24 belonging to the Fox. The analysis of this classification shows the speech attributed to the Fox is the obverse of the speech attributed to Nommo. And it is fascinating to note that truth is associated with the Fox: that is, truth in all its forms, both unexpressed and truth expressed. Formal judgments are the speech of Nommo. They lay down the law, as it were. But the speech which predicts the future and the speech which sifts the truth from lies belong to the Fox. Here we can hail a really sophisticated approach to the sociology of truth.

Franz Steiner pointed out a similar native wisdom when he analysed Chagga concepts of truth (1954). A true statement, for the Chagga, had to be formally vested with an extra charge of value. For them the true word differs from ordinary speech in much the same way as we would distinguish sworn affidavits from other kinds of statement. Lienhardt, taking up this line of thought (1961), has observed an elaboration of the difference between ritual truth and actual truth among the Dinka. If the Dinka perform a sacrifice to turn aside the ill-effects of quarrelling, the sacrificer is likely, in his oration, to deny the existence of past quarrels. As Lienhardt says, he is not attempting to deceive divinity or hoping to get away with a false representation of what has happened. The ritual and prayer are used to control experience, to put an imprint on men's minds of what their life should
be like and to bridge the gap between actual behaviour and moral intentions. So the Chagga give us sworn truth which is more fully guaranteed than ordinary statements, and the Dinka recognise ritual truth which may be very different from remembered experience.

Both these approaches allow less validity for the statements which are not ritualised. To this extent I find them naive and superficial. The Dogon recognise another kind of reality, that which is not expressed in ritual. For them formal judgments, curses and blessings are efficacious rites. They belong to Nommo. But truth belongs to the Fox. This is a marvellous insight. They recognise oracular truth and locate it somewhere beyond formal appearances. The truth of the Fox is discovered in oracles and it is held a truer truth than the judgments of priests and elders. This Fox should be a great surrealist figure, for he challenges the validity of realist perspectives. The Pale Fox is an obvious emblem for André Breton since he honours the riches and truth of the imagination. May we claim him also as an emblem for English anthropology? It is flattering, no doubt, to see ourselves in the guise of diviners. But here is the source of the paradoxical affinity which I see between our way of thinking and that of the Dogon.

Any culture which admits the use of oracles and divination is committed to a distinction between appearances and reality. The oracle offers a way of reaching behind appearances to another source of knowledge. We can therefore place Dogon thought in a historical perspective. For this is a perennial problem of philosophy. It is as alive today as it was for Parmenides and Plato.

As I understand Dogon philosophy, they place the world of appearances under the control of Nommo. It is a well-defined, well-illumined field. Their theory of speech and of thought is part of a crudely mechanistic physiology and psychology of hot and cold emotions. Their formal sociology deals only with external behaviour and it treats formal judgments and ritual statements in a formalistic way. An example of their concrete treatment of the world of appearances is the physical efficacy they attribute to speech. At the level of language analysis, I find the Dogon have only used their complex classification to produce another highly structured type of symbolic patterning, a totemism of linguistics, as it were. At the level of socio-linguistics, again, I find their insights less subtle and profound than I had hoped. Socio-linguistics is specially concerned with what is not said, the suppressed idea, the unexpressed choices which control use of verbal forms. The object of all behavioural sciences is to go behind the external forms of behaviour and discover other information than that which is overtly expressed.

At first sight Dogon formal theory of language is extremely simple
on these points. Dogon comments on silence, hesitation and confused speech are not specially profound. They seem to be more concerned to classify their material rather than to solve any problem. The speech of the drunkard has neither oil nor grain, it has more beer than water and goes in gusty zigzags. The deaf-mute is like a child who has never acquired control of speech. The stutterer is not much better. False promises are equivalent to theft. The Dogon seem not to admit that it is possible for one sort of speech to rise up in the mind while another issues involuntarily from the mouth. They could not begin to discuss Benjamin Lee-Whorff's hypotheses about how language may shape our inchoate thoughts, since they do not recognise one except as the manifestation of the other. Their mechanical linguistic theory cannot deal with the case of a thinker deceived by the structures of his own words. Mme Calame-Griaule notes this rigidity:

"... on peut craindre que trop de codifications n'aboutissent à un formalisme stérile, qui ramènerait la société au péril d'immobilisme qu'elle voulait justement éviter. Nous pouvons nous demander quelle place la société dogon fait à la liberté." (1965:546-547.)

She indicates that the answer to this lies in the theory of divination. The oracle, by the obscure sign language of the Fox, aims at freedom from the formal conditions of knowledge. The oracle gives access to a form of reality which is free from the restrictive frame of time. The Fox, by his initial incest with his mother defied the order of the generations and so of time itself: thus he can read the future. Death lies in the domain of the Fox and the Fox knows secret remedies and poisons by which life and death can be controlled. It is clear that the Dogon are not misled by their solidly material theory of speech into seeing no difference between symbols and symbolised. Half of their coding system deals formally with knowledge of the world of appearances and half of it attempts to find short-cuts by another method. The clear words of Nommo are contrasted with those of the Fox, which include false promises, contradictions, stuttering, and dreaming. Nommo is respectable, while the Fox is a shady character.

Thus the Dogon are as convinced as Plato that the world of appearances and sensation is not the whole of truth. They recognise another kind of reality. Plato used the metaphor of the prisoners in the cave who took their shadows to be real. They disbelieved the man who had been in the daylight of logic and philosophy, but he alone understood how the shadows were cast. For Plato the world of appearance is confused and shadowy and the world of ideas is bright. The Dogon reverse the light and shade. They situate real truth (the sifting of lies and contradictions) in the shadowy realm of the Pale Fox. Formal appearances they place in the daylight world of Nommo.
I ask you here to note the extraordinary sympathy between the Dogon and the surrealists, a sympathy of both methods and aims. André Breton was a poet, reflecting on the conditions of poetic inspiration. His problem was to go behind the screen of realist control and release the imagination. Stimulated by Freud's work on dreams, he also reversed Plato's pattern of light and shade. Wakefulness, logic and necessity for him distort and limit human experience. Revelation comes with dreams in the night, by means of nonsense, disjunction, total relaxation of control. There is no time to quote here his account of how he developed techniques for escaping the dreary perspectives of realism (Breton 1924:30-35). But one is struck at once by their close relation to techniques of oracular consultation.

From here we can place the British anthropologists in a new light. Apparently so down to earth, so practical, so interested in realist themes—now we turn out to be allies of the surrealists on the one hand, and of the Pale Fox of the Dogon on the other. For we also are passionately interested in getting behind the screen of appearance. All our professed interest in politics and kinship is an interest in the machinery that casts the shadows on the wall. The field in which our efforts have been most successful is in trying to discover the social determinants of cosmology. We have done regrettably little in the recording of cosmologies, but something more in what can be called pre-cosmology.

There is one field which is characteristically ours. That is the question of how mystical powers are distributed. There are at base only two classes of mystical power. On the one hand there is mystical knowledge, the power to see and reveal. On the other hand there is power to do harm or good to fellow men. The allocation of these powers is undoubtedly the part of cosmology which excites our interest. It is the mechanism which links cosmos to social structure. If we could understand this link, we could explain the intricate peculiarities of a particular cosmology by the channelling of energies in the particular social system. This is not the same as treating the cosmology as a mirror-image of the society. It is not showing the congruence of the infrastructure with superstructure. The programme is more ambitious—an attempt to discover how the two are generated. We start by assuming that society consists of individuals who seek to manipulate any given situation to their private intentions. Thus we have concentrated largely on the drive for power and legitimacy.

Durkheim rivetted our attention on cosmology as a source of legitimation. Evans-Pritchard has been called the Stendhal of anthropology. Certainly he has revealed the secrets of men's hearts. He first showed how Azande used oracles to manipulate social situations. He also saw that accusations of witchcraft are found in limited niches
of the social structure. Since then, our best work has followed on these lines. I cite the work of Turner in Ndembu (1961) and Middleton in Lugbara (1960) on how divination serves political ends. And the work of Gellner on the Islamic cosmology of Berbers of Morocco. He found the alleged distribution of baraka or divine power is sensitively attuned to the distribution of political strength and has a practical effect in re-inforcing the strong. Not only is baraka on the side of the big battalions, but they become even bigger as change of allegiance is justified by the appearance of baraka on the winning side. The exact mechanism of how vox populi becomes vox dei is our favourite puzzle. As to witchcraft, we should one day be able to map the areas of social structure in which men are likely to blame their misfortunes on others, and those in which the victim is held responsible for his own misfortunes.

In “Spirits, Witches and Sorcerers in the Supernatural Economy of the Yakö”, Daryll Forde has sought to show the human concerns for health and prosperity which energise the cosmological system. Here he was countering a tendency to attribute all cosmological variations too narrowly to variations in the social dimension. But elsewhere he has probably come closest to formulating a testable hypothesis on the relationship between cosmology and social structure. In The Context of Belief he suggests that the peculiarly fragmented and uncoordinated character of the Yakö cosmology and the lack of sharp definition given to the principal mystic forces which control their lives may be related to characteristics of their social structure:

“Where the field of interaction of the individual is both wide and heterogeneous as a result of activities and interests in a series of distinct, non-congruent units” (Forde 1958a:208-211),

we may expect that beliefs in mystical forces are not closely co-ordinated in a harmonious and complex cosmology.

Now to draw the parallel between our consuming interest in pre-cosmology and those of the Dogon Pale Fox. Denise Paulme, in an important article (1937), tells us that any fine evening a number of Dogon men can be seen stooping over the flat sandy rocks outside the village. They are preparing their divining tables. They represent a man’s personal problems by drawing a rectangular box with three sub-sections, one for heaven, one for man and one for the Fox. The box of heaven has an upper half for dealing with all the divine powers and their attitudes to the consulter, and a lower half for dealing with his specific ritual duties. The rectangle for man has an upper section dealing with outsiders and enemies, and a lower section dealing with the consulter’s own family. The upper section of the rectangle for the Fox deals with death in general, and the lower part with the
grave of the consulter himself. Here is a reduced and entirely abstract model of the universe. In these empty squares a man fills in little pebbles and sticks, to represent his personal problems. He diagrammatises the interplay of his ambition and his conscience. Psychologists use something of the same technique in devising games for child analysis. But I am struck with the efficiency and economy of the Fox oracle. Note that the symbols used for posing the problem are lifted out of their general context. They are stripped bare—mere tools for setting a limited question. Then note, and most important of all, that having posed the question the enquirer goes to bed. In the night the Pale Foxes will come and make mute signs with their paws on the sand and thus the truth will be revealed. The consulter abandons conscious control of the oracle. He does not expect that his rational analysis will yield results. He is even ready to admit that the way the problem has been posed is all wrong. If one Fox runs along the divining table from heaven to the grave, and another runs the other way, he is forced to reconsider the whole matter and pose it again the next day. In many ways the process of consultation reminds me of the nightly examination of conscience recommended by St. Ignatius. But the Ignatian system put great stress on duty and rational control. The Fox oracle, with its homage to the free imagination, could have spiritual advantages. Perhaps the Fox oracle fits closer to the religious genius of St. Francis of Assissi who used little oracles to teach his monks humble dependence on the will of God.

In reading of the techniques of the Fox oracle I am haunted by the correspondence between this and the techniques of certain surrealists. Artistic creation bristles with technical and personal problems and the great work of art is always one in which the artist has succeeded in organising both himself and his technical apparatus at the same time. I do not understand Raymond Roussel's poetry. But two of his books in prose, Locus Solus and Impressions d'Afrique are wonderfully rich fantasies. They serve as a perfect illustration for my theme. He has described for us his elaborate technique in Comment j'ai écrit certains de mes livres. He would construct a kind of acrostic or métagramme as he called it.

"Je choisissais deux mots presque semblables (faisant penser aux métagrammes). Par exemple billard et pillard. Puis j'y ajoutais des mots pareils mais pris dans deux sens différents, et j'obtenais ainsi deux phrases presque identiques." (ROUSSEL 1963:11.)

Then he would use these two phrases, so close in sound, but different in meaning as a problem for his imagination. Somehow within these artificial constraints a story had to be worked out. At first, when he was a very young writer, he set himself the task of opening his tale
with the phrase in its more obvious meaning, and closing it with the same phrase in the more recondite sense. In between the two phrases the story hardly mattered. He used banal little Breton folk tales. The result was not a literary masterpiece—more a clever parlour trick, rather as Dr. Johnson said of women novelists: If we are amazed at a dog standing on its hind legs it is not because it does it well, but that it does it at all! However, the young Roussel was cast down because his techniques did not bring him instant glory. Observe that one thing was missing from his early experiments. He had discovered a technique of creative writing but he had not learnt to use it to express his own preoccupations. As I see his early work, he was at the same point at which the late Marcel Griaule and Denise Paulme were in 1937 when they recorded the system of divination by the Fox. The technique was well demonstrated, but only by the use of hypothetical examples. They neither knew how the Dogon used it to solve their dominant preoccupations, nor how to use it to solve their own problems as investigators.

The cold neglect of his work drove Raymond Roussel to intensify his efforts. His technique became more elaborate and more supple. He used it to bore a narrow well into his imagination and then watched artesian waters gush up. The two books I admire give passionate expression to the writer's own personal concerns. They consist of loosely strung together episodes. Each describes the creation of a work of art which brings glory and renown to its author. Sometimes the episodes describe a man watching a crowd which is admiring a work of art, which portrays a crowd admiring a work of art, which portrays... and so on.

Generally the work of genius consisted in discovering how to make a work of art create itself. The inventor pushes a lever and starts the machinery working of its own accord. Michel Butor in his critical essay on Roussel has made it abundantly clear what personal driving force lies behind these stories. Here we have a writer who found a technique which harnessed the guiding power of his own ambition to his problems as a creative artist. Granted that he was one of the most richly imaginative writers of his generation, we only need to note three things about his technique: one, the violence done to the association between word and meaning, between symbol and thing symbolised; second, his adherence to rigid, artificial constraints; third, the indirect approach to the problem. This last is the true surrealist respect for the unfettered imagination. Somehow the work of art must be made free to produce itself. Note also that many of the fantastic inventions which Roussel described are no more and no less than oracular techniques which produce mysterious writings or hidden truths.
Now, finally, I must try to convince you that British anthropology is not inspired by down to earth concern with problems of colonialism. We must be classed along with other allies of the Fox, both in our aims and our techniques.

To start with the techniques, we reduce the universe to small-scale abstract models, such as genealogies and tables of village composition. These do not serve a love of genealogical lore for its own sake. They are designed to isolate the dynamic conflict of politics and conscience. Take, for example, Marwick's interpretation of Cewa witchcraft in 1952. He suspected that accusations of witchcraft expressed rival claims for political control. To demonstrate this he needed to depict the structure of political units: hence the need for lineage tables. Similarly, John Middleton in 1960 had an insight about how the ancestral cult of the Lugbara interacted dynamically with their witch beliefs. Above all, the insight itself derived from reflecting on the struggle for power and the channelling of private ambition through the lineage structure.

These techniques require a suspension of respect for the symbolic order. Raymond Roussel tore words apart and stripped them of fixed associations, to make them tools for richer uses. Less savagely than James Joyce, he treated words irreverently. He would take a common phrase and chop it up phonetically into different units. From the phrase "Napoléon Empereur", he got nappe, ollé, ombre, and these gave him the image of a Spanish dancer (ollé) on a table, so clearly seen that even the shadow (ombre) of the crumbs on the cloth (nappe) were visible. He thus made a practice of ignoring the stock meanings attached to verbal symbols and finding alternative readings. Surely the Dogon who consults the Fox oracle is also led to analyse his stock allegiances and confront himself with alternative readings of a situation. In a very sensitive perception, Denise Paulme suggests that the oracle consulter is torn between two desires. He must pose his problem unequivocally so as to get a clear answer for himself. But he must choose ambiguous symbols so as to disguise his problem from inquisitive eyes. Such a procedure would lead these tribal philosophers far into the problem of the relation between appearance and reality. No wonder their treatment of it in their cosmology is so sophisticated. Let me claim as much sophistication for the British anthropologists.

We also show little respect for symbols and try to prize them apart from the reality they represent. For example, David Tait in 1950 published an analysis of Dogon social structure with detailed lineage diagrams. By means of this tool of enquiry he discovered that Dogon social reality is less symmetrical than Dogon official theory claims. He found, for instance, that the arrangement of paired joking clans is not symmetrical. We should not be surprised, of course, that the
pressure of living distorts the actual pattern from its ideal form. But the question then becomes more acute: What is the actual experience to which corresponds the Dogon ideal pattern of symmetrical pairs of twins? One final point as to technique: Only the oblique approach will yield the results we seek. The scrupulous setting down of informants' views merely sets up the screen which must then somehow be passed or penetrated. The kind of truths we seek to reveal are hidden from informants themselves. Hence our attempts to develop a foxy cunning in checking statements against action. In the nursery stories about Brer Fox, remember that he always "laid low and said nuffin." We try likewise to lie low and to eschew direct questions. We aim to let the informants reveal, by contradiction and inconsistency, the practical social uses to which their cosmological schemes are put.

So much for technique. I hesitate whether to count Professor Lévi-Strauss among the followers of the Fox. Obviously he too is passionately interested in going behind the screen and finding hidden meanings. He is a great diviner. His techniques are as rigid and as oblique as any and he certainly succeeds in catching the informant unawares. Above all, he seeks to reveal the mechanism which casts the shadows on the wall. His prodigious achievement has dealt precisely with the relation between infrastructure and superstructure. On all these counts he is with us up to the hilt, only one detail is missing. He works at the cognitive level of experience. He is not interested in the self-regarding passions. I feel he is hardly at all concerned with the effect of men's ambition and remorse on society and its cosmos. This is the crucial difference between his work and the kind of English anthropology in Africa that I am talking about. Working on this same problem of World of Forms, he stays with Plato and we stay, perhaps benightedly, with the Fox.

To conclude. The ethnographers of the Dogon and the Nuer are following different trails and use different techniques to pursue different kinds of quarry. Their combined research would open a new era of advance in these sciences. The French would map the marvellous world of forms, whilst the English would burrow underground. Who are these sorcerers whom the Dogon fear? Who is accused and why, and what is the result of an accusation? What is the real balance of power which is expressed in the honouring of twins and the rejection of odd numbers? Who are the effective leaders and who are the figureheads? Where is authority most precarious? What is the ladder to advancement? In these subterranean corridors we are more at home.
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