Racial Segregation in South Africa: Degrees and Kinds
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No other state in world history has devoted as large a proportion of its energies and resources in imposing racial segregation as South Africa has done since 1948. While apartheid has been the object of an abundant literature, one of its important aspects has not received much attention, namely the degree of physical distance achieved by measures of segregation. We can distinguish three main degrees of segregation:

1) Micro-segregation, i.e. segregation in public and private facilities

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(such as waiting rooms, railway carriages, post-office counters, washrooms, etc.) located in areas inhabited by members of several "racial" groups;

2) *Meso-segregation*, i.e. the physical separation resulting from the existence of racially homogeneous residential ghettos within multi-racial urban areas;

3) *Macro-segregation*, i.e. the segregation of racial groups in discrete territorial units, such as the "Native Reserves" of South Africa, now being restyled as "Bantustans".

The above distinction, however, is not only one of degree but also of kind. Each form of segregation fulfills different purposes from the viewpoint of the ruling albinocracy, and entails different consequences for South African society as a whole. Let us first examine the "gains" of the White group from the various forms of segregation, then analyze the internal contradictions inherent in macro-segregation, and finally turn to the differential economic effects of the three types of racial separation.

It is often said that the apartheid policies of the present Afrikaner Nationalist government constitute simply a more systematic and intensified version of traditional practices of racial discrimination and segregation. This statement is true in the sense that large scale implementation of all three kinds of segregation extends at least as far back as the 19th century. However, in recent years the Nationalist government has increasingly stressed macro-segregation. There are two apparent reasons why this should be the case. First, if one accepts the government's premises that interracial contact promotes conflict and that apartheid is the only salvation for the albinocracy, then it follows that maximization of physical distance between racial groups is desirable. Second, macro-segregation in the form of the "Bantustan" policy can be presented, for purposes of international apologetics, as an attempt at equitable partition between separate but equal nations within a happy commonwealth. Indeed, a favorite argument of the apostles of apartheid is that their policy substitutes vertical, non-hierarchical barriers between ethnic groups for a horizontal, discriminatory color bar.

Beyond these obvious considerations, this shift of emphasis in the implementation of apartheid from micro-to macro-segregation is motivated by more basic factors. To be sure, micro-segregation is still as rigidly enforced as ever before, but not with the same order of priority. Micro-segregation with grossly unequal facilities is a constant symbol of the racial status hierarchy, and is a source of emotional gratification, economic advantages and other practical conveniences for the White
group. Substantial as the gains accruing from micro-segregation for the Whites are, however, this aspect of apartheid is a "luxury", in the sense that it contributes little to the maintenance of White supremacy and that it further exacerbates the non-White masses. (The Portuguese, for example, still maintain their rule in Angola and Mozambique without any resort to legal micro-segregation, thus claiming to be free of racial prejudice; similarly, the White-settler regime of Rhodesia has gone some way toward the elimination of micro-segregation without in any way jeopardizing its power monopoly.) The preservation of micro-segregation in South Africa serves mostly to indulge the albinocracy's phobia of racial pollution, but micro-segregation is definitely not a cornerstone of the socio-political order.

Meso-segregation, i.e. the maintenance of racial ghettoes, arose in the 19th century as a way of making the non-White helotry as invisible as possible to the Herrenvolk, and of preserving the latter from the moral and physical contamination of congested, unhygienic slums. The presence of many domestic servants living on their employers' premises, however, made most "White" sections of towns de facto interracial. In addition, these were a number of racially mixed residential areas in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, and many smaller cities.

When the Nationalists came to power in 1948, they proceeded to make meso-segregation as impermeable as possible through the policy of "Group Areas". Tens of thousands of people were expropriated, expelled from their domiciles and "relocated" according to their pigmentation. Even the number of non-White domestic servants allowed to live with their White employers was sharply reduced, a distinct departure from earlier practices. The enforcement of meso-segregation involves many hardships for non-Whites, threatens much of the Indian and Coloured middle class with economic ruin, and entails considerable profits for many thousands of Whites. But, beyond these side effects, the complete ghettoization of South African cities is ostensibly being promoted as a cornerstone in the maintenance of the status quo.

The presence of millions of non-Whites in cities is deplored by the government, but reluctantly accepted as an economic necessity. Given the latter, the government endeavors to enforce a new style of rigid meso-segregation, in great part for reasons of internal security. With mounting unrest among Africans, military and police control become increasingly crucial. The older non-White shantytowns with their maze of narrow, tortuous alleys were often located close to White residential or business districts; they are now systematically being razed as a major military hazard. They are being replaced with
“model townships” with unobstructed, rectilinear fields of fire, and wide streets for the passage of police vans and armored cars. The new ghettos are typically situated several miles from the White towns, with a buffer zone in between; they are sprinkled with strategically located police stations, and often enclosed by barbed wire.

Macro-segregation because of its many practical and ideological implications, is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Nationalist racial policy, and hence deserves closer attention. Total territorial separation is the avowed ideal which apartheid seeks to achieve for all racial groups. Ideally, the government would like to cram the eleven million Africans into the impoverished, eroded and entirely rural “Native Reserves” which constitute thirteen per cent of the nation’s territory. The rest of the country would then acquire a pristine white purity. While the government realizes that this aim is utopian, it is nevertheless implementing an elaborate scheme, the so-called “Bantustan” policy, to keep as large a percentage of Africans as possible in these rural slums. Africans deemed to be “redundant” in the “White” areas are constantly being “endorsed out” of them and sent to their “Bantu homelands”. The Bantustans have several obvious security advantages: they are relatively isolated, dispersed, ethnically homogeneous, distant from the “White” cities, and devoid of any urban concentrations of more than a few thousand people; and communication within and between them is difficult.

In its basic conception, the “Bantustan” policy of the South African government is not new. Interpretations of its “real” intention vary, but the limits of actual variability in implementation which the government is prepared to tolerate can be determined with a fair degree of precision. In “minimum” form, the Bantustans are a revamping of the “Native Reserves” along the following main lines:

1) Geographical segregation of as many Africans as possible from non-Africans and of specific African ethnic groups from each other.

2) Pretoria-sponsored cultural revivalism, and the elaboration of pseudo-traditional authority structures.

3) An extension of the sphere of local autonomy under the authority of government-appointed chiefs, which, in effect, amounts to a shift from “direct” to “indirect” rule.

Leo Kuper gives a vivid description of the “minimum” Bantustan scheme as it is presently being implemented:

“Here the power of the White man is displayed in a comic opera of equality with the Black man, indeed of homage to his tribal essence. Here backward

tribal reserves are in a state of Messianic transformation to satellite bucolic Ruritanias . . . The policy is to retribalize Africans and to fragment them into separate tribal entities, self-policed, introspectively detached from each other and from the White man's world, and self-perpetuated by the insemination of tribal ardor"\textsuperscript{1}.

In this sense, the Bantustan concept amounts to the transformation of the South African colonial empire from an internal one as analyzed by Leo Marquard\textsuperscript{2}, to an external one: the "Native Reserves" are being restyled into semi-autonomous puppet states or protectorates under a quasi-traditional aristocracy.

At the other end of the "tolerable" spectrum from the government's viewpoint is the "maximum" notion of Bantustans as "separate Black States". While this alternative is clearly distasteful to the government, it was being envisaged, as early as 1961, as a possible line of retreat in response to external and internal pressures. Thus, Prime Minister Verwoerd said in reaction to this possibility: "This is not what we would have preferred to see. This is a form of fragmentation which we would rather not have had if it was within our control to avoid it"\textsuperscript{3}. Even under nominal political "sovereignty" the Nationalist government counts on the ethnic division, small size and utter economic dependence of the Bantustans to maintain them in a colonial relationship. Developments in the High Commission Territories in the near future may provide reasonably good predictors of the possible political behavior of the independent Bantustans, and thus indirectly influence Nationalist policies.

The basic question concerning the future of the Bantustans and indeed of the Republic as a whole then becomes: Will the government be able to contain the Bantustan scheme within these fairly narrow limits? My argument is that it will not, in part because of international pressures, in part because of mounting conflicts in the "White" areas of the Republic, and lastly because of the dialectic unleashed by contradictions within the Bantustan scheme itself. We shall focus here on this last point.

There are four major aspects to the contradictions evident in the Bantustan policy; all of these are, to a large degree, unanticipated consequences of that policy, and threaten to make its implementation in the Transkei the opening of Pandora's box from the government's point of view.

\textsuperscript{1} Leo KUPER, \textit{An African Bourgeoisie}, New Haven, 1965, pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{2} Leo MARQUARD, \textit{South Africa's Colonial Policy}, Johannesburg, 1957.
The first aspect concerns the use of the magic word “independence”. In 1951, Verwoerd was careful to emphasize:

"Now a Senator wants to know whether the series of self-governing Native areas would be sovereign. The answer is obvious . . . It stands to reason that White South Africa must remain their guardian . . . We cannot mean that we intend by that to cut large slices out of South Africa and turn them into independent States".

Later, he ostensibly reversed his stand by stating eventual “independence” as a possibility. The lack of a timetable, or indeed of an even approximate definition of the term, made the statement vacuous, particularly in conjunction with Verwoerd’s 1963 statement: “We want to make South Africa White . . . Keeping it White can only mean one thing, namely White domination, not leadership, not guidance, but control, supremacy.” However, the magic word has been spoken, partly, no doubt, as a carrot to the collaborationist African chiefs, and perhaps also on the assumption that the statement would be taken at face value by some leaders of Western powers on the non-intervention of which the future of apartheid hinges to a considerable degree.

It seems likely that the independence pronouncement, however vague, will exacerbate, or even create, rather than mollify opposition. There are already signs that this is happening in two opposite ways. The strategy of many African chiefs who have decided to further their power and pursue their interests within the Bantustan framework is to exert whatever pressure they can against the government in terms of the avowed goal of “independence”. This most cautious form of “subversion from within” involves little danger to its advocates since it is couched in government rhetoric and ostensibly follows government logic. The sheer use of the term “independence” represents a retreat, if only a verbal one, on the part of the government, and it is in the nature of tightly oppressive regimes that concessions easily lead to an escalation of demands, as already shown by several tremors of protest among Transkeian chiefs.

The rhetoric of independence has also opened up a new avenue of opposition to government policy. Unlikely as this may have seemed until 1961, Verwoerd is now under attack from the right, both from the rural, platteland elements within his own party, and from the United Party. The latter in particular claims to accept the independence pronouncements at face value, and takes the government to task for partitioning the Republic and creating hostile black States in its midst.

2. Ibid., p. 118.
Thus, de Villiers Graaff recently proclaimed:

"We would scrap the Bantustan plan. We shall retain South Africa as one integral unit with fifteen million people. We shall not fragment it into a group of States, some of which may become, and indeed are likely to become, hostile to White South Africa. We reject the idea of one man one vote, and we shall retain White leadership all over South Africa and not only in parts, as Dr. Verwoerd would have us do."

Consequently, the government faces an interesting dilemma. On the one hand if it refuses to transfer sovereignty to the Bantustans, the latter will be exposed more and more clearly as elaborate shams, and this may even precipitate a revolt of the puppet chiefs. On the other hand, should Verwoerd take definite steps towards granting political independence to the Transkei and other future Bantustans, he must face the danger of losing the support of his reactionary Afrikaner electorate.

The second contradiction in the Bantustan scheme is somewhat related to the first. It concerns the extension of universal adult franchise to Africans of the Xhosa and Sotho groups, who live in the Transkei or whose theoretical homeland is supposed to be located therein. The government may have assumed that the cathartic effect of casting a ballot would reduce the hostility of Africans, and that this franchise would meet demands for "one-man-one-vote". It is clear, however, that few Africans are satisfied with virtually meaningless voting rights which entitle some ethnic groups to elect a minority of members in a Legislative Assembly, which is itself subject to Pretoria's veto and the jurisdiction of which is restricted to only some of the people living in 3.2 per cent of the Republic's territory. If anything, it seems probable that the exercise of an ineffective franchise heightens the level of discontent. What can be more frustrating than to be allowed to express one's hostility to apartheid, only to witness the forcible establishment, during a state of emergency, of a "self-government" led by appointed chiefs whose position was overwhelmingly defeated at the polls?

In this respect, the Transkei scheme is fundamentally different from a Fascist-type regime where ritualistic plebiscites, propaganda, mass rallies and the like are used to create the illusion of consensus. In the Transkei, Africans have been allowed to express their strong opposition to apartheid at the polls, only to see their views disregarded and overridden. This use of the franchise seems to maximize discontent, in that it reflects the government's contempt for African opinion.

Implicitly, the latter is regarded as so inconsequential as not even to be worthy of a concerted propaganda effort to "sell" apartheid.

The third, and perhaps most interesting contradiction in the Bantustan scheme concerns the stand on the racial issue taken respectively by the collaborators and those in opposition. Ironically, the opponents of apartheid, as represented by Victor Poto, take what is ostensibly a "pro-White" position. They protest against the plan to make the Transkei an exclusively black State, and favor "multi-racialism" with equal opportunities and rights to all including whites. Conversely, the collaborating chiefs, under the leadership of Kaiser Matanzima, express their uneasy agreement with apartheid by raising the thinly veiled spectre of anti-whiteism.

Since apartheid is the product of white racism, it is not surprising that it calls forth black counter-racism. The latter is of course repressed by the South African government when it takes a militant nationalist form as in the Pan-African Congress. However, black racism can also be couched in apartheid phraseology and take the form of extolling narrow ethnic nationalism, and giving vent to xenophobia. Indeed, there is no safer way for an African to express his hostility to Whites than to make use of the official hate ideology. The government keeps warning Africans of outside "hyenas" and "jackals" who come to exploit or deceive them; it tells them what noble savages they are so long as they do not let themselves be spoiled by Western culture, etc.

Thus, apartheid and the Bantustan concept can easily become latent platforms for a surreptitious and insidious variety of ethnic particularism and anti-whiteism. Such is Mbeki's interpretation of the Transkeian Chief Minister's motives: "A cold, haughty man who nurses an enmity towards Whites and wishes to escape their oppressive presence, Matanzima has chosen to try to do this by using apartheid . . ."

The fourth contradiction inherent in the Bantustans is the most basic of all and indeed underlies the other three. Both the practicability of the Bantustans and their acceptability to sufficient numbers of Africans hinge on a massive redistribution of wealth and power at the expense of the albinocracy. More specifically, the economic

1. This is but one of several ways in which South Africa differs from a Fascist-type regime. See Van den Berghe, op. cit., for a more extensive treatment of this point. Bunting, on the other hand, stresses, and indeed over-stresses, the similarities of South Africa with Nazi Germany. See Bunting, op. cit. The Southern United States constitute a closer parallel to South Africa than does Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, or Franco's Spain.
3. Although the vast majority of African leaders have rejected the partition of South Africa on any terms, there have been a few dissenting voices. E.g.
viability of partition in South Africa depends on the manifold enlargement of the African (and indeed other non-White) areas, on the large-scale subsidization of subsistence agriculture by the money sector of the economy, and, consequently, on drastic land and income redistribution. Politically, if the partitioned areas are to retain any federal association, the basis of such association must clearly be an effective sharing of power between the constituent racial groups in the joint government rather than the Bantustan blueprint of a White colonial state dominating a half-dozen or more labor reservoirs administered by puppet chiefs.

However, it is obvious that these necessary conditions to any viable partition scheme are precisely those which the Nationalist government desperately seeks to avert through its Bantustan scheme. The latter is apparently based on the assumption or the hope that Africans and the outside world are mistaking the "comic opera" of equality and the shadow of economic development for the real things. The Bantustan scheme is thus in part an ineffective attempt to mollify internal and external opposition at minimal cost to the ruling caste, and in part a blueprint for the improvement of the state's repressive apparatus.

All four paradoxes or contradictions in Bantustan policy which we have briefly examined raise doubt as to the government's ability to control apartheid's latest litter of feral children.

In summary, apartheid aims to introduce between racial groups the greatest degree of physical separation consistent with economic imperatives in a highly industrialized society. Macro-segregation is deemed by the government to offer the greatest chance of continued White supremacy, but, where White industry, mining and agriculture require non-White labor, lesser degrees of segregation are acceptable.

The last aspect of our analysis concerns the differential economic consequences of micro-, meso-, and macro-segregation. Many analysts of the South African scene have observed that apartheid involves a great economic cost and interferes with economic development. Apartheid certainly conflicts with principles of economic "rationality", and government policies often assign priority to political as opposed to economic aims. Directly and indirectly, the economic cost of apartheid is no lesser for being difficult to assess with any degree of precision. However, the three degrees of segregation have different effects and entail different economic costs.

Micro-segregation is certainly the least costly of the three. Segregated non-White facilities are either vastly inferior to the White ones, or altogether non-existent. To avoid any suggestion of a "separate but equal" doctrine, a law was passed (the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act) providing for segregated and unequal facilities. True duplication of public conveniences is highly exceptional, and segregation often means nothing more than the exclusion of non-Whites from many places. Thus micro-segregation frequently involves a saving over what it would cost to provide adequate facilities for the entire population, and there is little or no economic incentive for the White group to abolish it.

With the introduction of the new style of meso-segregation, the government is deliberately paying an economic price for the maintenance of White supremacy. Much of that price, however, is not paid by the government, but by the Africans who have to finance many of the amenities in their streamlined ghettos, and bear the cost of transport to and from the "White" areas where they work. In addition, White employers of non-White labor suffer indirectly from the lower labor efficiency resulting from employee fatigue and time wasted in transit. Consequently, while the total economic cost of ghettoization is quite high, the direct price paid by the government and the bulk of the White electorate which votes for the Nationalists is relatively low.

Macro-segregation is potentially the most expensive for the government. The sums required to subsidize economic development in the Bantustans in order to raise the standard of living above starvation would run into hundreds of millions of dollars. But, here again, the government spends only a small fraction of the necessary sum on the development of the "Bantu homelands". What the Bantustan policy does, in effect, achieve economically is to perpetuate the sharp distinction within the South African economy between a high production money sector and a sub-subsistence one. The productive potential of the one-third of the African population which is kept in or even forced back into the Reserves is thus vastly underutilized. In the same way as South Africa combines politically the properties of a quasi-democracy for the Herrenvolk and a colonial tyranny for the Africans, economically the country is, at once, a booming industrial nation and one of the most destitute of the "underdeveloped" countries.

From the above analysis, it seems that all three levels of segregation on which the policy of apartheid rests are doomed to economic and

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1. Only a small fraction of the conservative 1956 estimate of £104 million recommended by the Tomlinson commission for a ten-year period has so far been expended. On the other hand, defense expenditures aimed primarily at the repression of internal unrest have climbed from £40.0 million a year in 1960-61 to £104 million in 1963-64.
political failure for a combination of reasons. Micro-segregation serves little purpose in the preservation of the status quo, but also involves a minimum of cost to the government. Its major function is to provide a bigoted albinocracy with some psychological and material “fringe benefits” of oppression.

Meso-segregation is considerably costlier but on it rests the political control of the highly explosive urban areas. From the viewpoint of the maintenance of White supremacy, meso-segregation is thus essential. Only through the compartmentalization of racial groups into streamlined ghettos can the dominant White minority hope to combat open insurgency. On the other hand, the implementation of meso-segregation with the entire repressive machinery of “reference books”, “influx control”, “job reservation”, “population registration” and “group areas” is directly responsible for the overwhelming majority of acts of protest and revolt against apartheid. Thus, the ghettoization of urban life brings with it the growing hypertrophy of the police and military apparatus. Not only is the militarization of an ever-growing proportion of the White population expensive, but its effectiveness is limited by at least two factors. First, the open and unrestrained use of military violence, given the climate of world opinion, threatens the government with outside intervention. Second, as the Whites monopolize all key positions in government, industry, transport, communications, etc., and as many Whites hold such key positions, the simultaneous mobilization of the albinocracy on any sizeable scale would bring about considerable disruption of civilian activities, not to mention the problem of the protection of dependents.

In the foregoing analysis, I have tried to show that the continued enforcement of meso- and macro-segregation is essential to the preservation of white supremacy. However, apartheid also generates conflicts and contradictions, the control of which involves an ever-rising cost in economic, human and military resources. Micro- and meso-segregation in urban areas create an undercurrent of revolt precariously held in check by a growing police and army apparatus, and the Bantustan scheme unwittingly threatens to destroy the entire edifice of White supremacy.